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Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive
Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial
Review of Election Laws
Edward B. Foleyt
American democracy is plagued by excessive partisanship, and yet constitu-
tional law thus far has been incapable of redressing this ill. Gerrymandering is one
clear example: the partisan distortion of legislative districts has accelerated dramat-
ically in the last several decades, yet the federal judiciary has been unable to develop
a constitutional standard for curbing this egregiously antidemocratic behavior.
Likewise, state legislatures around the country in the last decade have been enacting
statutes to cut back on voting opportunities, and federal courts have struggled with
articulating appropriate standards for evaluating the constitutionality of these roll-
back laws. A main reason for this struggle has been the judicial unwillingness to
tackle directly the transparently partisan motives underlying these legislative cut-
backs in voting opportunities.
This judicial difficulty with curtailing excessive partisanship stems from an
attempt to rely on equal protection as the relevant constitutional standard for judi-
cial review of election laws. Invocation of equal protection is understandable given
the initial success of Warren Court precedents, like Reynolds v Sims and Harper v
Virginia Board of Elections, in using equal protection to protect equal voting rights.
But as the courts have subsequently discovered, equal protection is ill-suited to the
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problems of gerrymandering or legislation that cuts back on voting opportunities for
all voters.
This Article offers a previously undeveloped alternative to equal protection:
due process. In a wide range of areas, including civil and criminal procedure, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that due process encompasses a principle of fair
play. This fair play principle, well understood to apply in society to athletic compe-
tition, is suitable in the domain of politics for constraining excessive partisanship in
electoral competition. In fact, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification
reveals that this fair play principle played an essential role in constraining excessive
partisanship that threatened to destabilize the Republic at the time the amendment's
ratification was under consideration in Congress. Once the significance of this his-
tory is recognized, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is properly con-
strued as constraining the partisan overreaching that currently threatens to under-
mine American democracy. In this way, the federal judiciary appropriately can
invoke due process to directly redress excessive partisanship in the form of gerry-
mandering or rollbacks in voting opportunities.
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INTRODUCTION
Can the US Constitution, as currently written, handle the prob-
lem of excessive partisanship? Or, instead, does the Constitution
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need to be amended to address this problem? That urgent issue is
the focus of this Article.
Partisan overreaching takes different forms. Best known is
the gerrymander: the deliberate manipulation of legislative dis-
trict lines to increase a political party's chance of holding power
in a legislative chamber.' But also pernicious is legislative alter-
ation of voting rules, like eliminating the opportunity to register
and cast a ballot at the same time-known as "same-day registra-
tion"-in the hope that this rule change will lower turnout of the
opposing party's voters, thereby increasing the chances of elec-
toral victory for one's own party.2
Partisan competition, as long as it stays within appropriate
bounds, is a desirable feature of electoral democracy.3 Parties are
1 For the history of congressional gerrymandering, see generally Erik J. Engstrom,
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy (Michigan 2013).
For a richly detailed study of gerrymandering as practiced in the Gilded Age after the Civil
War, see generally Peter H. Argersinger, Representation and Inequality in Late Nineteenth-
Century America: The Politics o/Apportionment (Cambridge 2012). For a useful introductory
survey of contemporary issues concerning gerrymandering in light of its historical devel-
opment, still valuable despite now being somewhat dated, see generally David Butler
and Bruce Cain, Congressional Redistricting: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives
(Macmillan 1992).
2 These legislative changes to election laws are part of what has come to be known
as the contemporary "voting wars." Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida
2000 to the Next Election Meltdown 41-73 (Yale 2012); Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting
Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 Geo Wash L Rev 1865,
1870-78 (2013). My own prior contribution to this topic includes Edward B. Foley, Voting
Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 Geo Wash L Rev 1836 (2013). For a recent discussion of
same-day registration (also called "election day registration" when referring specifically to
simultaneous registration and voting on Election Day itself, in contrast to early voting),
see Sean J. Young, The Validity of Voter Registration Deadlines under State Constitutions,
66 Syracuse L Rev 289, 291-95 (2016).
3 The Framers of the federal Constitution obviously did not think so. As is well-
known to any student of American history, the Framers hoped that through the separation
of powers they could prevent political factions from coalescing into the kind of entrenched
two-party competition that occurred between Whigs and Tories in Britain. Of course, their
constitutional design quickly failed in this respect, with two-party competition between
Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans becoming well-developed by the disastrous pres-
idential election of 1800. Although Founders such as James Madison had become resigned
to the presence of two-party competition by this time, they still did not view this two-party
competition as a desirable feature of democracy. Rather, the goal of both Federalists and
Jeffersonian Republicans was to obliterate the opposing party's existence, not merely de-
feat its candidates for office. It was not until the development of America's second party
system, with the political competition now between Whigs and Jacksonian Democrats,
that the leading participants accepted this two-party competition as a healthy feature of
a robust electoral democracy. For the development of this acceptance, including President
Martin van Buren's important role in its fruition, see Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a
Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 212-71
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in the business of winning elections, and the existence of two (or
more) parties vying vigorously for support among voters is a
healthy sign of political freedom. Each party has different views
on matters of public policy, and each hopes to convince voters that
its views are preferable, at least for the immediate future. One
would expect the fight between parties in the effort to prevail at
the ballot box to be energetic and robust.4
But this partisan competition spills over into an unhealthy
domain when one party is able to capture the operation of the
electoral process itself and to use this control to give itself an ad-
vantage in the competition to win votes.5 This unfair advantage
is a subversion of democracy because it interferes with the au-
thentic electoral choice that the voters otherwise would make.6
Absent the unfair advantage, no party would have power over the
electoral choice, and if the electoral system were otherwise work-
ing properly, voters would freely elect the candidates they most
wished to represent them. Partisan control over the electoral pro-
cess distorts this free choice, causing voters to elect candidates they
would not have picked in the absence of this partisan distortion.
A well-designed constitution would prevent this kind of par-
tisan control over the electoral process. It would do so through
some sort of institutional arrangement whereby the government
(California 1970). I have recently explored this development in the specific context of dis-
putes over electoral outcomes. See Edward B. Foley, Ballot Battles: The History of Dis-
puted Elections in the United States 75-97 (Oxford 2016).
4 For a leading contemporary account of the essential role that political parties cur-
rently play in American democracy, see John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look 163-
292 (Chicago 2011). Professor Richard H. Pildes has prominently made a vigorous defense
of political parties a key theme of his recent election law scholarship. See Richard H. Pildes,
Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Govern-
ment, 124 Yale L J 804, 828-33 (2014). See also Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 144-45
(1986) (O'Connor concurring in the judgment) ("There can be little doubt that the emer-
gence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously
to sound and effective government.").
5 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv L Rev
593, 617-30 (2002) (employing an antitrust model to analyze the harm to electoral compe-
tition from excessive partisanship). See also Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55
Wm & Mary L Rev 1787, 1793-1810 (2014) (distinguishing different forms of beneficial
and pernicious partisanship in a democracy).
6 A well-functioning electoral democracy strives to "secur[e] the selection of repre-
sentatives that as fully as possible stand for the 'free and uncorrupted choice of those who
have the right to take part in that choice."' Issacharoff, 116 Harv L Rev at 648 (cited in
note 5), quoting Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 662 (1884). For a theoretically sophisti-
cated explication of this "alignment" principle-designing electoral rules so that the re-
sults of the electoral process align as much as possible with the inputs that the electorate
submits in the form of ballots cast-see Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Align-
ment, 114 Colum L Rev 283, 304-13 (2014).
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bodies empowered to operate the electoral process would be struc-
tured in a way to prevent one party from controlling them.7 This
arrangement might explicitly give two parties equal power over
the electoral process, so that they mutually prevent each other
from monopolizing the process.8 Or the arrangement might be
more nonpartisan in nature, keeping the parties at arm's length
from the levers of the electoral machinery.9 But whatever partic-
ular institutional arrangement would be employed, the constitu-
tion would block a party's ability to take over the procedures for
running elections.
The US Constitution famously lacks an explicit institutional
arrangement of this type. It does so because the Framers were
hoping to avoid the development of political parties in the first
place.10 No institutional check on a party's ability to control elec-
tions would be necessary if parties did not exist.
But of course it did not work out that way. Political- parties
very much do exist in America's system of electoral democracy.
They have existed for almost as long as the ink has been dry on
the original Constitution itself," and they obviously are not going
to disappear-at least not in the foreseeable future, and most
likely not as long as the First Amendment guarantees political
freedom.
Thus, the question arises: Is the US Constitution inherently
flawed insofar as it contains no mechanism for constraining the
7 On the essential role of sound institutional design in the regulation of the electoral
process, see Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing
and How to Fix It 11-37, 110-33 (Princeton 2009). See also Richard L. Hasen, Book Re-
view, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism, 98 Cal L Rev 1075,
1085-98 (2010); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institu-
tions, 28 Yale L & Pol Rev 125, 143-53 (2009). I have also explored these issues of institu-
tional design. See Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 Mont L Rev
139, 146-62 (2013).
8 The Federal Election Commission is structured along this model, illustrating the
problem of bipartisan control without a tiebreaking mechanism. See Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C.
Can't Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says (NY Times, May 2, 2015), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abuse-commission
-chief-says.html (visited Sept 25, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
9 See, for example, Daniel P. Tokaji, America's Top Model: The Wisconsin Govern-
ment Accountability Board, 3 UC Irvine L Rev 575, 577-78 (2013) (praising Wisconsin's
Government Accountability Board for its nonpartisan structure). Regrettably, partisan
conflict over voting in Wisconsin has overtaken the GAB, as the state legislature has re-
placed it with a more politically accountable institution. See Scott Bauer, Wisconsin GAB
in Final Days as State's Elections Authority (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 26, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/QD55-2C43.
10 See note 3.
11 Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System at 1-39 (cited in note 3).
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ability of a political party to capture control over the electoral pro-
cess? Will the Constitution remain defective in this respect until
it is amended to include the institutional mechanism that it has
lacked since the outset? Or, alternatively, despite having no such
explicit institutional mechanism, does the existing Constitution
have the capacity to be interpreted in such a way as to make up
for this apparent structural deficiency?
Over the last several decades there has been an effort to con-
strue the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause to fill this gap.
Equal protection has been invoked in an effort to constrain parti-
san gerrymanders.12 Equal protection has also been invoked as
grounds for invalidating legislation that alters voting rules to give
one party an electoral advantage.13
But equal protection has run into difficulties when invoked
in this way.14 In the context of partisan gerrymandering, Justice
Antonin Scalia memorably intoned that equal protection was in-
capable of providing a judicially manageable standard.1 And
equal protection has similarly stumbled when attempting to pro-
vide a principled standard for constraining partisan manipulation
of voting rules.16
This Article offers an alternative to equal protection. Due pro-
cess, instead, provides a more promising basis for constraining
partisan overreach. Due process embodies the principle of fair
play, and fair play is an appropriate concept to employ as a con-
straint on excessive partisanship. Moreover, a return to the his-
torical circumstances in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
added to the Constitution provides compelling justification for
12 Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymander-
ing, 14 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 397, 402-07 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan,
Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U Pa L Rev 541,
543-64 (2004).
13 Hasen, 81 Geo Wash L Rev at 1880-85 (cited in note 2). See also Daniel P. Tokaji,
Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 Harv CR-CL L Rev 439, 442-47 (2015)
(discussing § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as an alternative to equal protection as a basis
for challenging these laws insofar as they are racially discriminatory in the burdens they
impose).
14 See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review
of Political Fairness, 71 Tex L Rev 1643, 1669-88 (1993).
15 See Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 305 (2004) (Scalia) (plurality) ("We conclude
that neither Article I, § 2, nor the Equal Protection Clause, nor (what appellants only fleet-
ingly invoke) Article I, § 4, provides a judicially enforceable limit on the political consider-
ations that the States and Congress may take into account when districting.").
16 See Foley, 81 Geo Wash L Rev at 1854-59 (cited in note 2) (discussing the difficul-
ties that lower courts had in applying equal protection precedents to voting procedures
litigation in 2012).
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construing the Amendment's Due Process Clause as embodying a
constraint against partisan overreaching. Once this history is
understood, this Article shows how judicial enforcement of due
process as fair play can work to invalidate both partisan gerry-
manders and legislative changes to voting laws aimed at secur-
ing an unfair partisan advantage.17
At the outset, it is important to be explicit about what kind
of exercise in constitutional interpretation this Article engages in.
It is not a narrowly confined reading of the text, seeking the most
limited reading that its words will bear, an approach Professor
Ronald Dworkin called "conventionalism"18 and for which Scalia
17 This Article, broadly speaking, shares some basic goals with Professor Richard E.
Levy's new essay. See generally Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 Kan
J L & Pub Pol 377 (2016). But the approach here differs from Levy's in some important
details. First of all, Levy states his nonpartisanship principle much too broadly when he
writes, for example, "partisan electoral rules violate freedom of speech." Id at 378. On the
contrary, much of American election law is structured according to party affiliation. For
example, primary elections are inherently partisan, and state laws can, without violating
the First Amendment, require candidates and voters to be party members in order to par-
ticipate in the partisan primary. Indeed, it can violate the First Amendment if state law
fails to honor a political party's wishes to limit participation to party members. See
California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 572-82, 586 (2000).
Similarly, state laws that regulate access to the general election ballot can distin-
guish between major-party and minor-party, or independent, candidates. See Mandel v
Bradley, 432 US 173, 177-78 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that an early filing deadline
that applied only to independent candidates was not per se unconstitutional). While it is
true, as Levy observes, that state law cannot make ballot access unduly restrictive, there
is no constitutional requirement of strict nondiscrimination between major and minor par-
ties, and Levy's nonpartisanship principle is not sufficiently nuanced to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate considerations of partisanship. See id, quoting Storer v
Brown, 415 US 724, 742 (1974) (holding that the proper standard was whether "a reason-
ably diligent independent candidate [could] be expected to satisfy the . . . requirements").
The same point applies to a legislature's consideration of party membership when allocat-
ing seats on a legislative committee, for example. See generally Judy Schneider, Commit-
tee Assignment Process in the U.S. Senate: Democratic and Republican Party Procedures
(Congressional Research Service, Nov 3, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/4XM3-UKQY.
It is simply too strong a statement to say that the government must be strictly nonpartisan
in its regulation of political competition. See Levy, 25 Kan J L & Pub Pol at 382-86, 399-
402 (cited in note 17).
Levy falters in this respect because, like others before him, he has attempted to rely
on equal protection as well as free speech as the two constitutional sources for a constraint
on partisanship. But neither of those constitutional sources provides a basis for distin-
guishing permissible from excessive partisanship. Levy does not consider due process as
an alternative. It is the distinctive contribution of this Article to show that due process,
and the principle of fair play that it embodies, provides a basis for constraining partisan
overreaching. The idea of fair play accepts a large degree of partisanship in politics, but
steps in when partisanship goes too far. In this respect, it is a more advantageous consti-
tutional ground on which to proceed, rather than Levy's mistaken attempt to rely on either
equal protection or the First Amendment. See id at 378-88.
18 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 94-96 (Belknap 1986).
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has arguably been the most influential advocate during the last
quarter century. Nor does this Article advocate the kind of uto-
pian approach to constitutional interpretation associated with
Justice William Brennan and such theorists as Professors David
Richards, Lawrence Sager, and James Fleming, among many
others, which endeavors to identify philosophically pure princi-
ples of equality and liberty and then employ the "equal protection"
and "liberty" clauses of the Constitution as vessels for imposing
those philosophically pure principles on a reluctant Republic.19
Instead, the Article endeavors to provide a version of the mid-
dle ground approach that Dworkin labeled "law as integrity,"2o
which attempts to construct the best "fit" with the country's his-
torical record and trajectory, including the totality of its judicial
precedents and the most sensible system of law to which those
precedents collectively point.21 As Dworkin explained, finding the
best "fit" requires viewing the existing historical record "in the
best light" and thus bringing to that historical record some moral
judgment about what understanding of that record would be most
attractive.22 Yet at the same time, Dworkin insisted, for the exer-
cise to be one of interpretation, the constraint of fit must be genu-
ine. The interpretative understanding of the historical record
must be authentic, true to the history itself, and not a distorted
imposition of "presentist" values upon the historical record, which
cannot bear the weight of that imposition.23
The understanding of the Due Process Clause that this Arti-
cle advances-that due process encompasses a principle of fair
play that constrains excessive partisanship-is an exercise of
Dworkin's middle ground "law as integrity" approach. It is an
19 See, for example, James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The
Case of Autonomy 61-85 (Chicago 2006) (developing a "Constitution-perfecting theory");
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice
42-57 (Yale 2004); David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 296-303 (Oxford
1986). Fleming's more recent work, however, is arguably more accepting of the necessary
gap between what an ideal constitution would provide and what is properly justifiable as
a matter of interpreting the actual Constitution that we have. See generally, for example,
James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and against
Originalisms (Oxford 2015).
20 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 225 (cited in note 18) (describing the concept as one that
"insists that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward- and
forward-looking elements").
21 See id at 239 ("The judge's decision-his postinterpretive conclusions-must be
drawn from an interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before.").
22 Id at 256-57.
23 See id at 255 (noting that the "brute facts of legal history" will constrain the judge's
decision-making process).
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interpretation of due process that emerges from the historical
record itself and, constrained by the obligation of fit, aims at an
authentic understanding of that record. At the same time, as an
exercise of interpretation, it seeks to understand the totality of the
historical record in its best light, and this understanding is not
necessarily the same one that the historical actors themselves
would have had at the moment they engaged in historically sig-
nificant conduct. Due process as embodying a constraint against
partisan overreaching is an interpretation we today make of the
existing historical record, because it is an interpretation that
makes the most sense of the Constitution we have been be-
queathed and which we must use to conduct our politics for the
foreseeable future, until we have the capacity to amend it for the
better. This interpretative exercise pursuant to "law as integrity"
does not yield the most just possible constitution for contempo-
rary America, or even the most democratic possible constitution.
Rather, it yields an interpretation that is true to the existing
Constitution's text and historical circumstances, with those his-
torical circumstances seen in their best light given the use we
must make of the Constitution to govern partisan competition as
it exists today.
L EQUAL PROTECTION AND PARTISANSHIP
A. Gerrymandering
After the Warren Court's "reapportionment revolution,"24
in which the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause to require states to redistrict their legislatures
every decade to maintain constituencies of roughly equal popula-
tion, opponents of partisan gerrymandering thought that this
equal protection jurisprudence could be extended to invalidate
gerrymandered maps even if they complied with the Court's equal
population requirement. In seeking this jurisprudential exten-
sion, however, the antigerrymandering plaintiffs encountered dif-
ficulties not experienced by those who had achieved the initial re-
apportionment victories.
24 See generally Michael E. Solimine, Book Review, The Causes and Consequences of
the Reapportionment Revolution, 1 Election L J 579 (2002). The key case is Reynolds v
Sims, 377 US 533, 577 (1964) (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that a
State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its
legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable").
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In Davis v Bandemer,25 the Supreme Court fractured badly
over how to handle a claim that the gerrymandering of Indiana's
legislature violated equal protection. Four justices, led by Justice
Byron White (and including Justices Brennan, Thurgood Marshall,
and Harry Blackmun), were willing to consider in principle that
gerrymandering might violate equal protection but articulated a
standard so stringent that no plaintiff would have a realistic
chance to prevail.26 Three justices, led by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor (with Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William
Rehnquist), were prepared to rule categorically that claims of par-
tisan gerrymandering are "nonjusticiable political question[s],"
meaning that as a matter of law no plaintiff ever would be entitled
to prevail.27 Only two justices--Justices Lewis Powell and John
Paul Stevens-were prepared to adopt an approach that would
cause the Equal Protection Clause to operate as a meaningful con-
straint on partisan gerrymandering.28
Two decades later, in Vieth v Jubelirer,29 the Court was even
more fractured over the applicability of equal protection to the
problem of partisan gerrymanders. This time four justices, with
Justice Scalia writing (joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Justice
Clarence Thomas), thought that these claims were categorically
precluded from judicial review as nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.30 Four other justices (Stevens and Justices David Souter,
25 478 US 109 (1986).
26 The standard that the Bandemer plurality articulated was that to prevail a plain-
tiff would need to show that "an electoral system has been arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole." Id at 142-43 (White) (plurality) (quotation marks omitted). The plurality itself
observed that proving this would be difficult, especially because redistricting every ten
years would generate new maps, starting the clock all over again on whether a map re-
sulted in "consistently degrad[ing]" electoral opportunities. Id at 139-43 (White) (plural-
ity). As Justice Scalia's plurality opinion observed in Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267 (2004),
no plaintiff was successful in winning a gerrymandering claim under this standard in the
eighteen years between the two cases. Id at 279-80 (Scalia) (plurality).
27 Bandemer, 478 US at 144 (O'Connor concurring in the judgment) ("I would hold
that the partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable
political question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch as the Framers
of the Constitution unquestionably intended.").
28 See id at 165 (Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he merits of a
gerrymandering claim must be determined by reference to the configurations of the dis-
tricts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other criteria that have inde-
pendent relevance to the fairness of redistricting."). The dissenters would have affirmed
the district court's finding that the Indiana legislature had perpetrated an unconstitu-
tional gerrymander. Id at 184-85 (Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29 541 US 267 (2004).
30 See id at 281 (Scalia) (plurality) ("[N]o judicially discernible and manageable
standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them,
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer) thought that these
claims should be justiciable, but they could not agree on a standard
for making them so and instead, among the four, wrote three
separate opinions offering three different standards.31 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, speaking solely for himself, wrote an eyebrow-
raising opinion in which he said that he was unprepared to hold
these claims categorically precluded as political questions but
that at the same time he was unable to identify a principle by
which to render them justiciable.32 Essentially, Kennedy was de-
claring that he was going to stay sitting on the fence, a position
for which Scalia excoriated him on the ground that fence-sitting
was not an available option for a federal judge, who instead is
obligated to decide under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
whether a claim alleged in a complaint either has or lacks legal
merit.33
we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that
Bandemer was wrongly decided."). In so holding, Scalia for the plurality did not disagree
with Stevens's conclusion that "severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution";
he just insisted that courts were incapable of identifying "when a violation has occurred."
Id at 292 (Scalia) (plurality). The distinctive due process approach set forth in this Article,
because it relies on a specifically historical measure for identifying unconstitutional ger-
rymanders (as explained in Part III), supplies the standard that Scalia found missing in
the equal protection analysis conducted in Vieth.
31 Breyer would have adopted a statewide test to see if an entire legislative map per-
petrated "unjustified entrenchment" of the mapmaking party. Id at 360-62 (Breyer dis-
senting). By contrast, Stevens and Souter offered different ways to challenge a specific
district within an overall map. Compare id at 335, 339 (Stevens dissenting), with id at
347-53 (Souter dissenting). Scalia responded with extensive point-by-point critiques of all
three alternatives offered by the dissenters. Id at 292-95 (Scalia) (plurality) (critiquing
Stevens's position); id at 295-98 (Scalia) (plurality) (critiquing Souter's position); id at
299-301 (Scalia) (plurality) (critiquing Breyer's position).
32 Id at 306-17 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). First, Kennedy made clear
that he agreed with the plurality that no one-not the plaintiffs, the dissenters, or the
Bandemer justices-had yet been able to identify a judicially manageable standard for
adjudicating a partisan gerrymandering claim, and accordingly, the plaintiffs complaint
must be dismissed: "Because, in the case before us, we have no standard by which to
measure the burden appellants claim has been imposed on their representational rights,
appellants cannot establish that the alleged political classifications burden those same
rights." Id at 313 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). But then Kennedy went on to say
that he was not ruling out the possibility of identifying such a judicially manageable standard
in the future: "If workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens, however, courts
should be prepared to order relief." Id at 317 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
33 Vieth, 541 US at 301-05 (Scalia) (plurality). One can easily imagine Scalia's blood
pressure rising as he wrote these words:
The first thing to be said about Justice Kennedy's disposition is that it is not
legally available. . . . [I]t is our job, not the plaintiffs', to explicate the standard
that makes the facts alleged by the plaintiffs adequate or inadequate to state a
claim. We cannot nonsuit them for our failure to do so.
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A couple of years after Vieth, despite Scalia's protestations,
Kennedy continued to sit on the fence. In League of United Latin
American Citizens v Perry34 ("LULAC"), a case involving an equal
protection challenge to Texas's decision to redistrict its legislative
map in the middle of the decade, Kennedy agreed with Scalia and
three others (Chief Justice John Roberts, Thomas, and Justice
Samuel Alito) that the plaintiffs had failed to present a judicially
feasible theory on which to invalidate Texas's partisan gerryman-
der.3s At the same time, however, Kennedy joined with the four
other justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) to an-
nounce that he was continuing to hold out hope that some sort of
judicially feasible theory might be developed in the future.3 Mean-
while, these four justices continued to offer alternative theories in
dissent, although once again they could not agree on a theory to
embrace. As in Vieth, these four justices produced three separate
opinions, propounding three approaches that not only differed
among themselves but significantly differed from the various al-
ternatives that the same four justices had advanced only a couple
of years earlier in Vieth.31
The problem confronting these four justices, along with any-
one else who wants to invalidate partisan gerrymandering on
equal protection grounds, is conceptual.3 What exactly is unequal
about partisan gerrymandering? It is possible to achieve a parti-
san gerrymander with districts with precisely the same number
Id at 301 (Scalia) (plurality). Scalia went on to elaborate the legal impossibility of Kennedy's
fence-sitting, ending with this crescendo: "We can affirm because political districting pre-
sents a nonjusticiable question; or we can affirm because we believe the correct standard
which identifies unconstitutional political districting has not been met; we cannot affirm be-
cause we do not know what the correct standard is." Id at 305 (Scalia) (plurality).
34 548 US 399 (2006).
35 See id at 423 (Kennedy) (plurality) ("We conclude that appellants have established
no legally impermissible use of political classifications. For this reason, they state no claim
on which relief may be granted for their statewide challenge."); id at 492 (Roberts concur-
ring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, joined by Alito)
("I agree with the determination that appellants have not provided 'a reliable standard for
identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders."'); id at 511 (Scalia concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas) (adhering to the view articu-
lated in Vieth that "no party or judge has put forth a judicially discernible standard by
which to evaluate" "claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering").
36 Writing for the Court, Kennedy asserted, "A plurality of the Court in Vieth would
have held such challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority declined
to do so. We do not revisit the justiciability holding." Id at 414 (citations omitted).
37 Id at 475-77 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 483 (Souter
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg); id at 492 (Breyer concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
38 See Issacharoff, 71 Tex L Rev at 1669-75 (cited in note 14).
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of individuals (or voters) residing in each.39 Thus, partisan gerry-
mandering is not an affront to the constitutional principle that
each member of the legislature represents the same number of
citizens.
In L ULAC, relying on an amicus brief submitted on behalf of
several political scientists, Stevens argued that a districting map
with a built-in bias in favor of one of the two major political par-
ties (and against the other major party) potentially violates equal
protection.40 The political scientists had proposed something
called "the symmetry standard" as a way to measure a map's
built-in partisan bias.41 Essentially, a map is symmetrical if each
party receives the same number of seats in the legislature as a
result of receiving the same number of votes for its candidates.42
For example, if Democrats get 57 percent of legislative seats when
Democratic candidates for these seats receive 52 percent of votes
statewide, and Republicans get 57 percent of legislative seats
when Republican candidates for these seats receive 52 percent of
votes statewide (obviously in a different election from the one in
which the Democrats win this same percentage), then the map is
symmetrical with respect to both parties in terms of their ability
to translate votes into seats. (In this example, both parties get a
5 percent boost in translating votes into seats when they receive
52 percent of the vote.) Conversely, if Democrats get 57 percent of
legislative seats when their candidates receive 52 percent of the
votes, but Republicans get only 48 percent of the seats when their
candidates receive 52 percent of the votes, then the map is asym-
metrical. Democrats do much better than Republicans in terms of
legislative seats as a result of receiving the same percentage of
votes: 57 percent of seats for Democrats, but only 48 percent of
seats for Republicans.
The symmetry standard has obvious superficial appeal in the
effort to tie gerrymandering to an equal protection violation.
Asymmetry seems to be a form of inequality. Even Kennedy in his
own LULAC opinion was willing to acknowledge that the sym-
metry standard might have some "utility in redistricting planning
and litigation."43
39 See Issacharoff and Karlan, 153 U Pa L Rev at 545-47 (cited in note 12).
40 LULAC, 548 US at 466 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Bernard Grofman
and Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerry-
mandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 Election L J 2, 6-20 (2007).
42 Grofman and King, 6 Election L J at 6 (cited in note 41).
43 LULAC, 548 US at 420 (Kennedy) (plurality).
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Nonetheless, as Kennedy also observed, "asymmetry alone
is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship."44 The
reason is that perfectly appropriate maps, without any trace of ger-
rymandering, might be asymmetrical. Given the way Democrats
and Republicans sort themselves geographically in many states,
with Democrats concentrated in urban areas and Republicans
spread out in rural or exurban ones, a map reflecting this differen-
tial population density would make it more difficult for Democrats
to translate votes into seats than for Republicans to do so. 45 When
Democrats win 52 percent of the votes, these votes are confined
to fewer urban districts, whereas when Republicans win 52 per-
cent of the votes, they have the effect of winning a broader set of
nonurban districts. In this situation, the map would be naturally
asymmetrical, not the product of a partisan power grab.
This phenomenon of political geography need not hold true
for all states for it to present a conceptual difficulty in interpret-
ing the Equal Protection Clause to bar redistricting maps with
built-in partisan asymmetry. As long as some redistricting maps
may harbor partisan asymmetry for entirely innocent reasons of
political geography, it makes no sense to hold a redistricting map
unconstitutional just because it has this feature. Nor does it make
sense to hold a redistricting map presumptively unconstitutional
just because of partisan asymmetry, putting the burden on the
government of proving that the asymmetry is caused by geogra-
phy and not gerrymandering. The Constitution does not contain
a command that redistricting maps be equally advantageous to
each of the two major political parties (although perhaps it might
be desirable, as a matter of political theory, for the Constitution
to be amended to contain such a command). Instead, at most the
Constitution as it exists prohibits the legislature's manipulation
of a redistricting map to give a political party an extra advantage
that it otherwise would not have as a result of geography.46 Thus,
44 Id (Kennedy) (plurality).
45 Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Ge-
ography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q J Polit Sci 239, 242-47 (2013). See also
Nicholas Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography? How Democrats Won the Popular Vote
but Lost the Congress in 2012, 1 Rsrch & Polit *1-5 (Apr-June 2014) (summarizing rele-
vant social science literature); Nicholas Goedert, The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A
2014 Update to the "Gerrymandering or Geography" Debate, 2 Rsrch & Polit *1-3 (Oct-
Dec 2015) (updating research in light of 2014 elections).
46 This point flows from adopting Professor Dworkin's "law as integrity" approach to
constitutional interpretation, rather than a more utopian account of equal protection.
From the perspective of ideal political theory, it is easy to argue that a sound constitution
for America would protect each of the two major political parties from redistricting maps
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it makes sense to require a state government to defend a redis-
tricting map against a charge of unconstitutional gerrymandering
only when the plaintiff meets an initial burden of demonstrating
inappropriate manipulation of the map in deviation from existing
geographical conditions. The symmetry standard offered in
L ULAC, however, had no way to differentiate between manipu-
lated and "unmanipulated" (that is, undistorted) maps, and it was
for this reason that Kennedy saw the symmetry standard as an
insufficient basis on which a plaintiff could predicate a claim of
unconstitutionality.
Since LULAC, political scientists have endeavored to develop
an alternative to the symmetry standard that might prove more
acceptable to Kennedy and other members of the Court (at least
enough to form a five-member majority). One such effort, which
is being employed in pending litigation to challenge Wisconsin's
legislative map, is called the "efficiency gap."47 It is designed to
measure the extent to which each party's votes are inefficient or
"wasted" in the party's attempt to turn votes into legislative seats.
A vote is inefficient if it either was superfluous insofar as it was
cast in a district that the party already won without need of this
particular vote or was cast in a district that the party did not win
and thus did not contribute to a victorious seat.48 The "efficiency
that give one party a competitive advantage, regardless of whether this competitive ad-
vantage was an element of the mapmaker's intended design. But from the perspective of
interpreting the Constitution as it exists, with the obligation that a sound interpretation fit
the Constitution's history as it has developed thus far, it is too much to say that America's
constitutional tradition, including the current corpus of equal protection precedents, is
properly interpreted as entailing an obligation on the part of legislative mapmakers to
refrain from adopting any map that would have the effect of putting one of the two major
political parties at a competitive disadvantage. Mapmakers might have a constitutional
obligation to refrain from engaging in mapmaking mischief, but there is insufficient ma-
terial in America's constitutional tradition from which to construct an existing obligation
of mapmakers to insulate political parties from the competitive effects that innocently
conventional districting might have. (I am grateful to several readers of an earlier draft
for helping me clarify this crucial point.)
47 See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U Chi L Rev 831, 849-67 (2015). In the Wisconsin litigation, as
of this writing, the plaintiffs' use of the efficiency gap as a constitutionally appropriate
measure of partisan gerrymandering prevailed, after trial, before a three-judge district
court. See generally Whitford v Nichol, 2016 WL 6837229 (WD Wis). The case is now pend-
ing on appeal in the Supreme Court. See No. 16-1161 (Supreme Court of the United
States), archived at http://perma.cc/33HU-AZPQ. A complete record of the case can be
found at Litigation: Whitford v. Nichol (Election Law @ Moritz, May 9, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/TZ6T-6FW7.
48 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 82 U Chi L Rev at 834, 850-51 (cited in note 47).
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gap" is the difference between how many inefficient votes each of
the two parties has.49
The idea of this efficiency gap is a simple and elegant way to
capture the evil of gerrymandering, because a gerrymander is de-
signed precisely to cause an opposing party to waste more of its
votes. A gerrymander does this either by packing an excessive
number of the opposing party's voters into fewer districts, so that
the opposing party wins those districts with lots of superfluous
votes, or by dispersing the opposing party's voters across a large
number of districts so that these voters are always in the minor-
ity and never have a chance to contribute to a victory. Given the
way that the efficiency gap directly calculates and compares
each party's total number of wasted votes, one understandably
might think it would provide a perfect way to measure a partisan
gerrymander.
The difficulty, however, is that an efficiency gap can occur
without the existence of partisan gerrymandering. As with asym-
metry, an efficiency gap can exist solely because of the geograph-
ical presence of Democrats concentrated in cities and Republicans
dispersed throughout exurban areas. 0 A legislative map that tracks
these residential patterns, without any partisan machinations, will
cause Democrats to waste a large number of superfluous urban votes
as well as all the votes of the relatively few exurban Democrats who
are routinely outnumbered by exurban Republicans. By contrast,
with the same legislative map, Republicans will be relatively effi-
cient in their votes, with fewer superfluous votes in their exurban
districts and fewer outnumbered votes in the cities. Thus, just as
with asymmetry, there is a conceptual challenge in identifying
when an efficiency gap is the product of partisan overreaching,
rather than the ordinary operation of districting given the self-
sorting of Democrats and Republicans into urban and nonurban
areas.51 The essence of the problem, again, is that an efficiency
gap can exist without any improper manipulation of a redistrict-
ing map, and yet the only basis for subjecting a state government
to the task of defending a redistricting map against the charge of
49 Id.
50 Id at 894.
51 One recent paper by five political scientists characterized the "problem" this
way: "the efficiency gap is also prone to detect gerrymanders when we have no other
reason to suspect them." Jonathan Krasno, et al, Can Gerrymanders Be Measured? An
Examination of Wisconsin's State Assembly *15 (unpublished manuscript), archived at
http://perma.cc/SRZ9-YTPQ. "As a result," these authors concluded, "we do not believe
that the efficiency gap is a reliable tool with which to detect gerrymanders." Id at *16.
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unconstitutionality would be the plaintiff providing evidence that
the map was the product of improper manipulation.52
Thus, while mathematically much simpler than the sym-
metry standard, and correspondingly much more intuitive, the ef-
ficiency gap ultimately suffers from the same inherent flaw. In
the history and structure of American elections, there is no expec-
tation that long-standing geographical subdivisions within the
polity will be consistent with both political parties' equal ability
to translate raw popular votes into effective electoral power. The
2016 presidential election is a reminder of this fundamental
truth. Secretary Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote,
yet lost the constitutionally authoritative Electoral College.53
President Donald Trump, in other words, was much more effi-
cient in converting his popular votes into winning seats in the
all-important Electoral College. Clinton beat Trump in California
by more than four million votes, but all those extra votes were
wasted; they added nothing in reaching the constitutionally nec-
essary 270 Electoral College votes. 54 Likewise, Clinton received
almost four million votes in Texas, but these too were entirely
wasted because they were useless in reaching 270, as Trump won
Texas with almost five million votes. 55 The Electoral College, in
other words, is consistent with an extremely large efficiency gap.
One could call the Electoral College a "natural gerrymander," but
to do so would only underscore the key point that-given the his-
tory and structure of America's electoral system-the Electoral
College is not an impermissible manipulation of electoral districts
to generate an improper partisan advantage. Consequently, if a
state's legislative districts tracked long-standing municipal and
52 In other words, a map is not inherently suspicious just because it has an efficiency
gap. One way the Whitford plaintiffs tackled this point was to suggest that a state should
not be required to defend a map unless the measure of its efficiency gap exceeds 7 percent.
See Plaintiffs' Post-trial Brief, Whitford v Nichol, Case No 15-CV-421, *11 (WD Wis filed
June 10, 2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 3457694). But quite apart from the su-
perficial arbitrariness of this 7 percent burden-shifting threshold, evidence at the Whitford
trial showed that court-mandated redistricting maps (among others lacking any indicia of
improper manipulation) can have an efficiency gap exceeding 7 percent. See Defendants'
Post-trial Brief, Whitford v Nichol, Docket No 15-CV-421, *13, 19-20 (WD Wis filed June
10, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/S4UY-HVSP.
53 See John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of 2016 (American Presidency
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other geographical boundaries, the fact that an efficiency gap re-
sulted would not be inherently improper given the traditions and
expectations of American elections.
In his own separate dissent in Vieth, Breyer attempted to
cabin the search for unconstitutional gerrymanders by focusing
solely on the situation in which a districting map unjustifiably
causes a minority of voters to capture a majority of seats.56 Limit-
ing this inquiry in this way seems laudable, as minority control of
a legislature seems particularly antithetical to democracy, with
its dedication to majority rule. But once again, linking this dem-
ocratic deficiency to partisan gerrymandering proves frustrat-
ingly elusive. The same residential patterns that yield asymmetry
and an efficiency gap without any partisan abuse can also cause
the circumstance in which a minority of voters statewide are able
to win a majority of legislative seats.57 The Electoral College ex-
ample itself shows that, even without manipulation of existing
geographical boundaries, a majority of overall votes does not nec-
essarily translate into a majority of seats.
Thus, if the Constitution is to constrain gerrymandering,
there needs to be a standard that identifies partisan distortion in
a legislative map. It is not enough that one party or its voters are
disadvantaged by the map. Such disadvantage may result from
innocuous, or at least nonmalevolent, geographical conditions.58
56 Vieth, 541 US at 360 (Breyer dissenting).
57 In Vieth, Kennedy categorically rejected the plaintiffs' contention that "a majority
of voters in the Commonwealth should be able to elect a majority of the Commonwealth's
congressional delegation." Id at 308 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). Kennedy did
so because he recognized that legitimate districting criteria-"(e.g., contiguity and com-
pactness)"-might sometimes produce maps that permit a minority of voters to win a ma-
jority of seats. Id (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). For a striking visualization of
this point, see the Pennsylvania congressional map that could have been drawn after the
2010 census using the shortest possible district lines. Gerrymandering: Tough to Avoid
(StatSheet, Apr 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/49HF-5UW7. With this nongerry-
mandered map, Democrats would have won only seven of the state's eighteen districts,
even if Democrats won a majority of congressional votes statewide. Id. The reason is the
demographic fact of Democrats clustering in Pennsylvania's big cities.
58 This crucial point is also ultimately what undermines Professor Samuel S.-H.
Wang's recent effort to develop a statistical method for measuring partisan gerrymanders.
See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering,
68 Stan L Rev 1263, 1306-09 (2016). Wang's sophisticated statistics, while endeavoring to
account for what he acknowledges as "population clustering," id at 1298, do not adequately
differentiate between when district lines legitimately are drawn to reflect existing geography
and when these lines deviate inappropriately from geographical considerations. Although
Wang thinks it advantageous that his statistical approach "do[es] not use geography," id at
1308, but instead endeavors to detect nonrandom variations from nationally typical dis-
tricts, see id at 1289, his method cannot tell whether a nonrandom map is caused by faith-
ful respect for preexisting local political boundaries or manipulative partisan deviation
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Instead, it is the partisan manipulation of district lines beyond
what geography alone would entail that is the distinctive perni-
ciousness of gerrymandering and that is in need of being captured
by the appropriate constitutional test.59
B. Changes in Voting Rules
The same Warren Court that produced the "reapportionment
revolution" also construed the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state laws that "invidiously
from those boundaries. Ultimately, Wang falls back on the assertion that legislative maps
should be invalid if statistics show them exhibiting the characteristic of nonrandom par-
tisan asymmetry even if there is no demonstration that these maps were the product of
malevolent partisan manipulations rather than fidelity to traditional geographical consid-
erations (like preexisting political boundaries):
I suggest that districting can impose a burden on a group's representational
rights whether or not the offense was intentional. Even where intentions are
nonpartisan, bipartisan, or unknown, the effect of a districting plan with parti-
san asymmetry is to produce legislative blocs whose size is unrepresentative of
the popular will.
Id at 1318. But that approach, of course, is entirely inconsistent with decades of consti-
tutional law, which requires invidious intent as part of any equal protection claim, see
Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 246-48 (1976)-a requirement that the Supreme Court
clearly has carried over into its three partisan gerrymandering cases (Bandemer, Vieth,
and LULAC), even if invidiousness in this context is partisan rather than race-based dis-
crimination (a point that Wang himself begrudgingly acknowledges, see Wang, 68 Stan L
Rev at 1272-73 (cited in note 58)). Thus, despite its own self-professed goals, Wang's ap-
proach is a nonstarter in terms of developing a judicially manageable standard for the
adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims under equal protection, because it is flatly
inconsistent with a core component of equal protection doctrine.
59 In his fence-sitting Vieth concurrence, Kennedy expressed the hope that the First
Amendment, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, would be able to provide a judicially
manageable standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders. Vieth, 541 US at 314
(Kennedy concurring in the judgment). That hope, however, has not materialized. The
reason-as I indicated in discussing Professor Levy's attempt at developing a "nonparti-
sanship principle"-is that the First Amendment provides no basis for distinguishing be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate considerations of partisanship on the part of a legisla-
ture. See note 17. See also Briffault, 14 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 408-09 (cited in note 12):
[U]ltimately, the First Amendment argument fails. . . . Indeed, so long as dis-
tricting is undertaken by legislatures elected on partisan lines, legislative
awareness of, and attention to, the partisan consequences of districting seems
impossible to avoid.
On the other hand, if the First Amendment is not an absolute prohibition on
attention to partisan concerns, then it is unclear what work the First Amendment
theory does.
(citation omitted). The due process principle of fair play that this Article develops, by con-
trast, provides a basis for distinguishing between legitimate and excessive partisanship.
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discriminate" among citizens with respect to voting.60 The canon-
ical case on this point is Harper v Virginia Board of Elections,61
which struck down Virginia's law requiring citizens to pay a $1.50
poll tax as a prerequisite to casting a ballot.62 "Wealth, like race,
creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intel-
ligently in the electoral process," the Court explained.63 Then, the
Court repeated the point for emphasis and clarity: "To introduce
wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor."64
Since Harper in 1966, the Supreme Court has applied this
equal-protection-for-voting jurisprudence to a wide variety of
state electoral laws, rejecting some while upholding others. For ex-
ample, in Dunn v Blumstein,61 the Court invalidated a Tennessee
law that required US citizens to have lived within the state for a
full year in order to be eligible to vote in the state's elections.66
The Court castigated the year-long residency requirement for its
"crudeness as a device for achieving the articulated state goal of
assuring the knowledgeable exercise of the franchise."67 A much
shorter residency requirement clearly sufficed, in the Court's
view, to establish that the voter was indeed a bona fide resident
of the state. By contrast, the Court sustained state laws that re-
quired voters to register fifty days in advance of Election Day in
order to participate in that particular election.68 "[T]he 50-day
voter registration cutoff," the Court observed, "is necessary to per-
mit preparation of accurate voter lists."69
Over the years, this equal-protection-for-voting jurispru-
dence has evolved into what is known as the "Anderson-Burdick
balancing test,"70 so named after two leading cases in this long
60 Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 US 181, 189 (2008) (Stevens)
(plurality), quoting Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663, 666 (1966).
61 383 US 663 (1966).
62 See id at 664, 670.
63 Id at 668.
64 Id.
65 405 US 330 (1972).
66 See id at 331, 360.
67 Id at 357-58.
68 Marston v Lewis, 410 US 679, 679-80 (1973) (per curiam). See also Burns v Fortson,
410 US 686, 687 (1973) (per curiam).
69 Marston, 410 US at 681.
70 For prior analysis of Anderson-Burdick balancing, see Foley, 81 Geo Wash L Rev
at 1847-51 (cited in note 2); Christopher S. Elmendorf and Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping
vs. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the
High Court, 17 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 507, 523-25 (2008).
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line of precedents: Anderson v Celebrezze71 and Burdick v Takushi.72
Along the way, the Court encountered election laws concerning
not only the opportunity of voters to cast ballots, but also the op-
portunity of candidates to appear on the ballots that voters cast;
and in considering these different types of election laws, the Court
has invoked not only the basic equal protection constraint against
invidious discrimination, but also the First Amendment interests
of candidates and voters to express their political beliefs through
their participation in the electoral process. Anderson itself in-
volved an Ohio law that imposed a March 20 deadline in order for
a presidential candidate to appear on the state's general election
ballot in November.78 There, the Court voided the deadline as ex-
cessively early and in doing so noted: "[W]e base our conclusions
directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and do not en-
gage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis."74 Burdick
involved Hawaii's prohibition against voting for write-in candi-
dates, and the Court again invoked the "First and Fourteenth
Amendments" as the predicates for its constitutional analysis.75
This time, however, the Court upheld the state law as among the
permissible class of "reasonable, politically neutral regulations
that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the
polls."76
Taken together, and along with other cases in the same line
of precedents, Anderson and Burdick create a kind of sliding-scale
balancing test, whereby the strength of the state's justification
required to defend its law depends on the severity of the burden
that the law imposes on the would-be voter's opportunity to cast
a ballot (or the candidate's opportunity to be on the ballot that the
voter casts). If the burden on casting a ballot is a heavy one, then
the court's scrutiny of the state's justification for the burden will
be strict, meaning that the imposition must be necessary to serve
a compelling interest that the state has. Conversely, if the burden
is modest, then the judicial scrutiny is more relaxed, and the im-
position needs to be only "reasonable" in light of "legitimate inter-
ests" that the state can articulate.77
71 460 US 780 (1983).
72 504 US 428 (1992).
73 Anderson, 460 US at 782-83.
74 Id at 786 n 7.
75 Burdick, 504 US at 430, 434.
76 Id at 438.
77 Id at 434, 440.
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In Crawford v Marion County Election Board,78 the Supreme
Court applied its Anderson-Burdick balancing test to Indiana's
voter identification law.79 The Court split three ways in Crawford,
with three justices in each camp. Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
would have invalidated the ID law in its entirety under Anderson-
Burdick, finding the law's purported benefits insufficient in rela-
tion to its potential burdens on exercising the right to vote. The
travel necessary to get an ID, or to get one's provisional ballot
counted if one lacked the ID, was for these justices "a high hurdle"
disproportionate to the claimed benefits of (i) combating voter
fraud (no evidence of a problem on that front), (ii) redressing the
state's bloated voter rolls (a problem of the state's own making),
and (iii) increasing public confidence in the integrity of the elec-
toral process (speculative).so
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito would have upheld the law in its
entirety, reaching the exact opposite conclusion about the appli-
cation of Anderson-Burdick. They viewed the burden of the ID re-
quirement as minor and thus would not have demanded that the
government prove more than a modest benefit from the law,
which they found that the state easily did: "The burden of acquir-
ing, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is simply
not severe. . . . And the State's interests are sufficient to sustain
that minimal burden."81
The controlling opinion in the case was written by Stevens
and joined by Roberts and Kennedy. These justices in the middle
refused to invalidate the law entirely, on the ground that for most
voters the burden was trivial (because most voters already pos-
sessed the required ID) and thus readily justified by the govern-
ment's asserted reasons for the law. "Petitioners urge us to ask
whether the State's interests justify the burden imposed on voters
who cannot afford or obtain a birth certificate and who must make
a second trip to the circuit court clerk's office after voting."82 But
there was insufficient "evidence in the record" regarding "this
narrow class of voters," Stevens observed, and in its absence the
78 553 US 181 (2008).
79 Id at 185, 190-91 (Stevens) (plurality).
80 Id at 217, 233-37 (Souter dissenting); id at 241 (Breyer dissenting). Although
Breyer wrote a separate dissent from Souter's, which Ginsburg joined, Breyer shared with
the other two dissenters the same view of Anderson-Burdick balancing as being highly
flexible. Breyer wrote separately primarily to explain his understanding of the role that
the so-called Carter-Baker Commission's report should have in the analysis.
81 Id at 209 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
82 Crawford, 553 US at 200 (Stevens) (plurality).
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challenge to the law could not begin to warrant a judicial decree
"that would invalidate the statute in all its applications."83 Under
long-standing doctrine, "[a] facial challenge must fail where the
statute has a plainly legitimate sweep," as the ID law did because
Indiana's interest in electoral integrity sufficed to impose the re-
quirement on the "vast majority of Indiana voters" for whom it
amounted to no trouble at all.84
At the same time, however, this centrist trio left open the pos-
sibility that the ID requirement might be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the specific subset of voters who lack the necessary ID
and for whom it would be difficult to get one. If in a different case
the necessary evidence as to these voters was forthcoming, then
the statute potentially could be rendered unenforceable just as to
them.85 Thus, under this trio's view of Anderson-Burdick, the bal-
ancing of the law's benefits and burdens might tip the scales in
the opposite direction as compared to the law's application to most
voters.
Anderson-Burdick balancing operated very differently in the
hands of these centrist justices than it did as employed by the
conservative trio of Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Those three explic-
itly stated that they would not let Anderson-Burdick be used in
an as-applied challenge that would evaluate an election law's bur-
den on individual voters, but instead would evaluate only a law's
entire scope: "[O]ur precedents refute the view that individual im-
pacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden [the
challenged law] imposes," and "requiring exceptions for vulnera-
ble voters would effectively turn back decades of equal-protection
jurisprudence."86 Quite apart from considerations of stare decisis,
Scalia's opinion added, a "voter-by-voter examination of the bur-
dens of voting regulations would prove especially disruptive," in-
viting "constant litigation," and accordingly should be rejected.87
Scalia also objected to the way Stevens characterized the slid-
ing scale nature of Anderson-Burdick balancing. Scalia preferred
to see Anderson-Burdick as establishing two distinct categories of
83 Id (Stevens) (plurality).
84 Id at 202-04 (Stevens) (plurality) (quotation marks omitted).
85 See id at 203-04 (Stevens) (plurality). See also Richard L. Hasen, Election Law's
Path in the Roberts Court's First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and
Surprising Twists, 68 Stan L Rev 1597, 1609-10 (2016) (explaining that the Crawford
plurality "left the door open for as-applied challenges as to those voters facing serious im-
pediments in securing a form of voter identification the state accepted as adequate").
86 Crawford, 553 US at 205-07 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
87 Id at 208 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
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judicial review: strict scrutiny for heavy burdens and "deferen-
tial" scrutiny for lesser burdens.88 By creating this "two-track ap-
proach," as Scalia put it, "Burdick forged Anderson's amorphous
'flexible standard' into something resembling an administrable
rule."89 Stevens, however, would have none of this, insisting that
Anderson had not lost its flexibility. Neither in Burdick nor in any
other case in this line of precedent, according to Stevens, did the
Court "identify any litmus test for measuring the severity of a
burden that a state law imposes on a political party, an individual
voter, or a discrete class of voters."90
The division among the justices in Crawford demonstrates the
difficulty in applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. This
difficulty has been replicated in the lower courts since Crawford.
Like the justices themselves, federal district court judges have dis-
agreed vociferously over how to apply Anderson-Burdick to voter
ID laws in other states, including Wisconsin and Texas.91 Federal
judges have also struggled with applying Anderson-Burdick to var-
ious state rules governing the casting and counting of provisional
ballots.92
88 Id at 204-05 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
89 Id (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
90 Crawford, 553 US at 191 (Stevens) (plurality).
91 See, for example, Frank v Walker, 17 F Supp 3d 837, 845-46 (ED Wis 2014), revd
and remd, 768 F3d 744 (7th Cir 2014), rehearing en banc denied, 773 F3d 783 (7th Cir
2014), permanent injunction denied, 141 F Supp 3d 932 (ED Wis 2015), vacd in part and
remd, 819 F3d 384 (7th Cir 2016), preliminary injunction granted, 196 F Supp 3d 893 (ED
Wis 2016), stayed pending appeal, 2016 WL 4224616 (7th Cir); Veasey v Perry, 71 F Supp
3d 627, 685-93 (SD Tex 2014), affd in part on other grounds, Veasey v Abbott, 830 F3d 216
(5th Cir 2016) (en banc); Lee v Virginia State Board of Elections, 188 F Supp 3d 577, 607-
09 (ED Va 2016), affd, 843 F3d 592 (4th Cir 2016); North Carolina State Conference of the
NAACP v McCrory, 182 F Supp 3d 320, 509-24 (MD NC 2016), revd and remd, 831 F3d
204 (4th Cir 2016).
92 See, for example, Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v Husted, 887 F
Supp 2d 761, 777-79, 788-92 (SD Ohio 2012), affd in part and revd in part, Northeast Ohio
Coalition for Homeless v Husted, 696 F3d 580, 604 (6th Cir 2012) (per curiam) ("NEOCH")
(reversing the preliminary injunction requiring the counting of provisional ballots despite
poll-worker errors). NEOCH was still in litigation in 2016, when the federal district court
ruled it unconstitutional to invalidate a provisional ballot solely because the voter acci-
dently wrote the current date instead of the voter's birthdate (when the innocent error did
not prevent the election officials from verifying the provisional voter's eligibility and reg-
istration). Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v Husted, 2016 WL 3166251, *5, 55
(SD Ohio). The Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the district court on this point
but affirmed it on a comparable issue concerning absentee ballots. See generally Northeast
Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v Husted, 837 F3d 612 (6th Cir 2016). Similar disagree-
ment among federal judges occurred over North Carolina's new statute for disqualifying
provisional ballots for being cast at the wrong polling location. See North Carolina State
Conference of NAACP v McCrory, 997 F Supp 2d 322, 365-70 (MD NC 2014) (denying a
preliminary injunction), revd in relevant part, League of Women Voters of North Carolina
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Yet these difficulties are relatively minor compared to the con-
ceptual conundrums associated with applying Anderson-Burdick
to state laws that cut back on the availability of early voting and
eliminate the opportunity to register and cast a ballot simulta-
neously. Both Ohio and North Carolina have enacted versions of
this kind of cutback law. In Ohio, a 2005 state law authorized
county boards of election to provide up to thirty-five days of early
voting, the first six of which would occur before the state's voter
registration deadline, set at thirty days before Election Day. The
result was a six-day window in which the opportunity to cast a
ballot during early voting overlapped with the opportunity to reg-
ister to vote before the thirty-day deadline.93 This window came
to be called "Golden Week" for the convenience it provided to pre-
viously unregistered voters, who now could simultaneously regis-
ter and vote in one trip to their local early voting site.94 In 2014,
however, the Ohio legislature enacted a new law that set the be-
ginning of early voting at the twenty-ninth day before Election'
Day, thereby eliminating Golden Week.95
Similarly, before 2014, North Carolina law authorized local
election boards to provide up to seventeen days of early voting,96
during which previously unregistered voters were permitted to
simultaneously register and cast their ballots at an early voting
site.97 What Ohio more colorfully called "Golden Week" North
Carolina simply labeled "same-day registration."98 But, as in
Ohio, the North Carolina legislature passed a new law in 2015 to
v North Carolina, 769 F3d 224, 248-49 (4th Cir 2014) (granting an emergency injunction
pending appeal), appellate mandate stayed, 135 S Ct 6 (2014). After trial, the federal dis-
trict court ruled that this North Carolina statute did not violate Anderson-Burdick bal-
ancing. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F Supp 3d at 509-11, 517-18.
Without reaching the Anderson-Burdick issue, the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground
that the statute was intentional race discrimination. North Carolina State Conference of
NAACP v McCrory, 831 F3d 204, 219 (4th Cir 2016).
93 Because it was possible to both register and vote on the thirtieth day before Election
Day, this day plus the five immediately preceding ones were the six days during which voting
and registration overlapped.
94 Ohio State Conference of National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People v Husted, 43 F Supp 3d 808, 812 (SD Ohio 2014).
95 Id.
96 North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F Supp 3d at 334.
97 Id at 336.
98 Id at 331.
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eliminate same-day registration.99 This new law also curtailed the
period of early voting to ten days.100
These legislative cutbacks in early voting, together with the
removal of the convenience of simultaneous registering and vot-
ing, understandably aroused suspicions. In both Ohio and North
Carolina, the legislatures that adopted these rollbacks were un-
der Republican control, and Democrats viewed the rollbacks as a
partisan ploy to lower turnout among Democratic voters, thereby
increasing the chances of electoral victories for Republican candi-
dates.101 Although Republicans in both states offered ostensibly
nonpartisan reasons for these legislative rollbacks, including the
simple notion of cutting costs and improving the administration
of the voting process,1 02 Democrats saw these rationales as mere
pretext for the partisan motive underlying the legislative curtail-
ment of voting opportunities.
These legislative moves indeed may be partisan mischief. But
do they violate equal protection under Anderson-Burdick balanc-
ing? They undoubtedly cause a loss of convenience compared to
what existed in each state before. But is this loss of convenience a
burden on exercising the right to vote for the purpose of Anderson-
Burdick balancing, requiring the state to justify the burden in or-
der for the judiciary to conduct a weighing of the asserted benefits
against the burden imposed?
In Ohio's lengthy litigation over the legislative curtailment of
Golden Week, the US Supreme Court (in a 5-4 order shortly before
the 2014 general election) stayed a preliminary injunction issued
by the federal district court and upheld by the Sixth Circuit on the
ground that the curtailment likely violated Anderson-Burdick bal-
ancing.10 3 After a settlement of that particular lawsuit, which re-
sulted in an adjustment of the specific days and hours of early
99 Id at 346-47. All North Carolina voters, including those who want to use early
voting, must comply with the state's preexisting registration deadline, set at twenty-five
days before Election Day. Id.
100 See North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F Supp 3d at 346.
101 See id at 337, 339-44; North Carolina State Conference ofNAACP, 831 F3d at 225-
29; NEOCH, 2016 WL 3166251 at *12-14.
102 See, for example, Ohio State Conference of the National Association v Husted, 768
F3d 524, 548-49 (6th Cir 2014) ("Ohio State Conference of the NAACP").
103 For the Supreme Court stay order, see Husted v Ohio State Conference of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 135 S Ct 42, 42 (2014). For
the district court decision to grant the preliminary injunction, see Ohio State Conference
of the NAACP, 43 F Supp 3d at 853. For the Sixth Circuit decision affirming the prelimi-
nary injunction on Anderson-Burdick grounds, see Ohio State Conference of the NAACP,
768 F3d at 540-49.
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voting in Ohio (but no restoration of Golden Week),104 a separate
lawsuit sought reinstatement of Golden Week on similar Anderson-
Burdick grounds.105 A different federal district judge, after a full
trial on the merits, agreed with the plaintiffs that the elimination
of Golden Week was a violation of Anderson-Burdick.106 A 2-1 de-
cision by a new Sixth Circuit panel, however, disagreed.107
In North Carolina's litigation over the elimination of same-
day registration, the federal district court rejected an Anderson-
Burdick claim similar to the one in Ohio.10s On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit sidestepped the Anderson-Burdick issue in the case, find-
ing instead that the entire statute of which the elimination of
same-day registration was one part was racially motivated by an
unconstitutional intent to make voting more difficult for African
Americans.109 Thus, as matters stand, there remains conflict and
confusion among federal judges over how Anderson-Burdick is
supposed to apply to legislative cutbacks in voting opportunities.110
Perhaps it is the inherent analytical ambiguities in Anderson-
Burdick analysis that account for these judicial difficulties."l'
104 Ohio Organizing Collaborative v Husted, 189 F Supp 3d 708, 724 (SD Ohio 2016).
105 See generally id.
106 Id at 739.
107 Ohio Democratic Party v Husted, 834 F3d 620, 630, 640 (6th Cir 2016) ("[E]ven
without Golden Week, Ohio's registration and voting processes afford abundant oppor-
tunity for all Ohio voters, of whatever racial or ethnic background, to register and exercise
their right to vote.").
108 North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F Supp 3d at 509-21.
109 See North Carolina State Conference of NAACP, 831 F3d at 233, 239.
110 Like Ohio and North Carolina, Wisconsin has enacted a cutback in the days and
hours of its in-person early voting, although the Wisconsin law does not involve an elimi-
nation of simultaneous registering and voting as do the laws in the other two states. One
Wisconsin Institute, Inc v Thomsen, 198 F Supp 3d 896, 905-07 (WD Wis 2016). A federal
district judge has held the Wisconsin cutback unconstitutional under Anderson-Burdick
(a "moderate" burden unjustified by the state's cost-saving and other administrative ra-
tionales) and also intentionally discriminatory on the basis of race. Id at 923-25, 931-35.
The case is on appeal. For a record of the pending case, see Litigation: One Wisconsin
Institute v. Thomsen (Election Law @ Moritz, Jan 20, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/F36E-N7UH. If the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court's Anderson-
Burdick analysis in the Wisconsin case, there will be a direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit's
Anderson-Burdick analysis in the Ohio case, as the two appellate rulings would be entirely
irreconcilable. The kind of cutback in early voting that the federal court in Wisconsin con-
sidered unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit considered inconsequential in light of the ro-
bust remaining voting options available (options, like voting by mail, also available in
Wisconsin). See Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F3d at 630.
111 Another example of the judicial inconsistency in applying Anderson-Burdick to
equivalent cases is the disagreement between federal district courts over whether the elimi-
nation of "straight ticket voting" violates Anderson-Burdick. A district judge in Michigan said
it likely did, while a week later a district judge in neighboring Wisconsin said it did not.
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Consider a hypothetical state that offers two weeks of early
voting before Election Day. Is that state imposing a burden on its
voters because it does not offer three weeks of early voting, or
more? It certainly is more generous than a state, like New York
or Pennsylvania, that offers no early voting at all.112
But suppose the hypothetical state moved to two weeks of
early voting after previously offering three weeks. Does that move
now make the two weeks of early voting a burden, whereas it
would not be in another state that expanded early voting from
zero to two weeks? That analysis would seem odd. It would make
a modest adjustment of an unusually lengthy five weeks of early
voting down to a still-robust four weeks qualify as a burden on
the opportunity to vote, whereas a state offering four weeks would
still be twice as generous as a state that offered only two, which
would not be a burden as long as these two weeks were an expan-
sion from zero (or one).
The idea that a mere trimming of a very expansive govern-
ment benefit automatically qualifies as a burden requiring the
government's justification does not fit easily with conventional
equal protection analysis. Suppose the government of a state gave
every citizen of the state a check at the end of each year for $1,000.
(Perhaps the state was funding this annual payment from reve-
nues received from the sale of the state's natural resources, like
oil.) Suppose, then, that in the next year the state slightly cuts
back the amount of the check that each citizen receives to $990.
(Perhaps the price the state received for its natural resources de-
creased somewhat.) It would be hard to think that, for equal pro-
tection analysis, this $990 check that each citizen receives would
be a burden, just because in the previous year each citizen re-
ceived a $1,000 check. Instead, equal protection is concerned with
how the government is treating individuals currently. With every
citizen in the state receiving the same $990 check, the govern-
ment would be treating each citizen equally with respect to this
benefit. The government would not be put to the task of justifying
Compare Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute v Johnson, 2016 WL 3922355, *7-
9 (ED Mich), with One Wisconsin Institute, 198 F Supp 3d at 945-46.
112 See Absentee and Early Voting (National Conference of State Legislatures, Mar
20, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/SC4T-5LEJ.
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the reduction of the benefit from $1,000 to $990. Simply put, giv-
ing everyone a $990 check instead of a $1,000 check would not be
an equal protection problem.113
The same basic conceptual point applies to the elimination of
simultaneous registering and voting. Clearly, the opportunity to
both register and vote during a single trip to an early voting site
is especially convenient. But there would be no equal protection
problem if the state did not provide this convenience in the first
place-just like there is no equal protection problem if a state
gives no year-end check to any of its citizens. Many states besides
Ohio and North Carolina currently offer no option of registering
and voting at the same time. Instead, all of these states require
voters to register in advance (often thirty days in advance) before
the thus-registered voter casts a ballot in the election, whether
early or on Election Day itself. No one considers this conventional
arrangement an equal protection problem. For a state to return to
this conventional arrangement after experimenting with an alter-
native should not be understood to generate an equal protection
problem, any more than would the abandonment of an experiment
of giving each citizen an annual $1,000 check. The loss of a $1,000
check surely would be a disappointment. But as long as everyone
returned to the previous circumstance of not receiving any check
at all, it would not be a denial of equal protection-no more so
than everyone not receiving a check in the first place. The same
with the loss of Golden Week or same-day registration. An obvi-
ous disappointment. But because Ohio and North Carolina elimi-
nated this convenience for all of each state's voters, the absence
of this convenience in those two states is no more unequal treat-
ment of the state's voters than is the absence of this convenience
in all those many states that never experimented with this con-
venience in the first place.114
This observation leads to an even more fundamental concep-
tual point. For there to be an equal protection issue requiring
some level of judicial scrutiny, a state must be engaging in some
sort of differential treatment between two groups of persons. A
tax law does not discriminate if everyone pays the same tax rate.
113 The reduction of the annual check from $1,000 to $990 would not even be subjected
to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, because there would be no
unequal treatment requiring justification even under the deferential rational basis test.
114 For further elaboration of this analysis, with additional examples, see Edward B.
Foley, A Tale of Two Swing States (Election Law @ Moritz, May 31, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/B2CA-GQ6F.
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A benefit law does not discriminate if it provides everyone with
the same benefit or uses a lottery to give everyone an equal
chance of obtaining the benefit. A voting law similarly does not
differentiate among voters if it provides all voters with exactly the
same opportunity to cast a ballot.
In all of its cases that apply Anderson-Burdick balancing to
assess whether a state has violated equal protection in its voting
laws, the Supreme Court appears to have adhered to this funda-
mental analytic precept. Harper was a case that treated would-be
voters differently depending on whether or not they paid the
$1.50 poll tax: those who did were entitled to cast a ballot, while
those who did not were precluded from doing so, thereby being
outright disenfranchised.115 The same was true in Crawford: those
with the required ID were entitled to vote a conventional ballot,
while those without the required ID were put to the extra burden
of casting a provisional ballot with the obligation of returning to
the local election board with adequate proof of eligibility in order
to have that provisional ballot counted.116 In Dunn, the case inval-
idating Tennessee's year-long residency requirement as a prereq-
uisite for voting, the Court made explicit its search for the way in
which the law discriminated between two groups of voters as the
first step of its analytic inquiry under equal protection:
Durational residence laws . . . divide residents into two
classes, old residents and new residents, and discriminate
against the latter to the extent of totally denying them the
opportunity to vote. The constitutional question presented is
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment permits a State to discriminate in this way
among its citizens.117
No Supreme Court case employing Anderson-Burdick repudiates
this fundamental analytic point.118
115 Harper, 383 US at 664 n 1.
116 Crawford, 553 US at 186 (Stevens) (plurality).
117 Dunn, 405 US at 334-35 (citation omitted).
118 Some have suggested that Anderson-Burdick is not really a species of equal pro-
tection law, but more akin to substantive due process. See, for example, Kevin Cofsky,
Comment, Pruning the Political Thicket: The Case for Strict Scrutiny of State Ballot Access
Restriction, 145 U Pa L Rev 353, 402-03 (1996); NEOCH, 696 F3d at 592 (noting that the
Anderson-Burdick test has been applied to facially neutral laws treating voters equally).
The abortion cases, as part of substantive due process law, employ an "undue burden" test
that is analytically similar to Anderson-Burdick balancing. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 873-74 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter) (plurality). But the Supreme Court has never explained Anderson-Burdick this
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A state that provides all of its voters with two weeks of early
voting would appear not to differentiate among its voters in a way
that would trigger equal protection analysis. All of the state's vot-
ers would be receiving exactly the same benefit of two weeks of
early voting in addition to the traditional Election Day. This equal
treatment of all voters would be the same, moreover, whether the
state previously provided three weeks of early voting or instead
none at all. Either way, two weeks of early voting would provide
the same amount of opportunity to cast an early ballot to all of
the state's voters. Anderson-Burdick balancing would not even
seem to be implicated in this situation, because there would be no
differential treatment of voters to judicially scrutinize.119
way, instead seeing it as emanating from its equal protection jurisprudence. In Crawford,
for example, the controlling opinion starts its analysis of Indiana's voter identification law
with a citation to Harper and an invocation of equal protection; the opinion then moves on
to a discussion of Anderson and Burdick as part of the same constitutional jurisprudence.
See Crawford, 553 US at 189 (Stevens) (plurality). In any event, insofar as Anderson-Burdick
is better reformulated as an element of due process law, rather than equal protection law,
this Article, with its historical analysis of the relationship between due process and the
fair play constraint against partisan overreaching, provides the much-needed jurispru-
dential underpinning for such a reformulation.
119 The argument might be made that a law offering two weeks of early voting differ-
entiates between those voters who are able to take advantage of this offering and those
who are not. Furthermore, this argument might go, this differentiation between two
groups of voters is analytically identical to the poll tax in Harper or the voter ID law in
Crawford, insofar as those laws differentiated between (a) voters able to pay the tax or
obtain the required ID and (b) those unable to do so. But this argument misses the funda-
mental distinction between disparate impact and facial discrimination-a distinction ap-
plicable not just in voting cases but to all areas of equal protection law. See Washington,
426 US at 242. A law requiring a voter to pay a $1.50 poll tax is a law that on its face
discriminates between the voter who pays the tax and a would-be voter who does not.
Likewise, a law requiring a voter to show a photo ID as a prerequisite to casting a regular
ballot is a law that on its face discriminates between a voter with the ID and one lacking
the ID. By contrast, a law permitting all voters to cast a ballot during two weeks of early
voting contains no such facial discrimination but has a disparate impact only on any voter
unable to show up during the two-week period.
In this respect, the law that makes early voting available for a two-week period is
analytically equivalent for equal protection purposes to a law that makes a municipal
swimming pool available to any member of the public for a two-month period during the
summer. It is possible to imagine a member of the public who is unable to go to the pool
during the two-month period during which the pool is open, but who would have been able
to go to the pool if it had opened one month earlier. As to this would-be swimmer, the two-
month period of the pool's availability (rather than three) has a disparate impact, but there
is no facial discrimination among any members of the public as to the pool's availability.
If the law required a member of the public to pay a $1.50 entrance fee to use the pool, then
the law would contain a facial discrimination against those unable to pay. If the law re-
quired a member of the public to show a photo ID to use the pool, then the law would
contain a facial discrimination against anyone without the requisite ID. But a law provid-
ing that "the pool is open during July and August, and anyone may use it then" does not
facially discriminate against someone who cannot use it then but who would have used it
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Insofar as Anderson-Burdick balancing encompasses First
Amendment as well as equal protection considerations, perhaps
the existence of differential treatment is unnecessary to trigger
Anderson-Burdick review. But it is difficult to see how the avail-
ability of two weeks of early voting, rather than a previous three
weeks, would be an infringement on a voter's expressive interests
in casting a ballot. After all, the unavailability of any early voting
at all in a state that never had it would not be any kind of impair-
ment of First Amendment expressive interests that would trigger
Anderson-Burdick balancing. Giving voters the opportunity to
cast their ballots for two weeks prior to the traditional Election
Day might be less of a facilitation of free speech than providing
voters with three such weeks, but it is still a facilitation of free
speech, not an infringement or abridgement of free speech.
Thus, there is no avoiding the conclusion that Anderson-
Burdick balancing is a poor doctrinal vehicle for considering the
constitutionality of laws that cut back on the availability of voting
opportunities. The question is whether there might be a better
doctrinal alternative.
II. DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PLAY
Elections, like sports, are about winning and losing. Espe-
cially in the kind of two-party system that America has, the com-
petition between parties to win elections resembles the competi-
tion between teams to win an athletic game or, perhaps more
aptly, a championship after a series of games. Each team desper-
ately wants to win, yet each player on the team knows that there
is conduct that would be ethically inappropriate in the effort to
win, no matter how intense the desire for victory.120
in June. The failure to appreciate this distinction between disparate impact and facial
discrimination misperceives a basic element of equal protection jurisprudence, and one
applicable just as much to voting cases as to any other cases (or at least the Supreme Court
has never explicitly announced to the contrary).
120 See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public
and Professional Life 113-35 (Princeton 1999) (developing a philosophical model of com-
petition as it applies across various social domains). For the ethical practice of political
competition specifically, see generally Candice J. Nelson, David A. Dulio, and Stephen K.
Medvic, eds, Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics (Brookings 2002); Ronald
A. Faucheux and Paul S. Herrnson, eds, Campaign Battle Lines: The Practical Conse-
quences of Crossing the Line between What's Right and What's Not in Political Campaign-
ing (Campaigns & Elections 2002); Bruce L. Felknor, Political Mischief: Smear, Sabotage,
and Reform in U.S. Elections (Praeger 1992).
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Sports, in other words, are subject to a morality of fair play.121
The obligation to compete fairly is consistent with the quest to
beat one's opponent.1 22 One certainly need not be indifferent be-
tween which side wins; one obviously wants one's own team to
vanquish the other side. Even so, one knows that certain tactics
would be out of bounds. Corking the bat in baseball, for example.
Even if one does it, one knows it is not merely against the rules,
but a form of cheating that it is antithetical to the essence of the
game. In the old days, using a gendered term, one would have
called it unsportsmanlike conduct.123
As with sports, so too with electoral competition.124 The mo-
rality of fair play is just as applicable to the effort to win an elec-
tion. No matter how hard one competes to win the race, one knows
that there is certain conduct that would be morally out of bounds
as part of the effort to prevail. Stuffing the ballot box with fake
votes, for example. Like corking the bat, it would be not merely
against the rules, but antithetical to the very idea of an election
as being an enterprise to determine which candidate received
more actual votes. A candidate or political party might be tempted
to do it, might even actually do it. But if one succumbed to this
temptation and did stuff the ballot box, one would know that one
had crossed the line and breached the ethics of fair play.125
121 See generally Peter McIntosh, Fair Play: Ethics in Sport and Education (Heinemann
1979); M.J. McNamee and S.J. Parry, eds, Ethics and Sport (E & FN Spon 1998).
122 See Robert Butcher and Angela Schneider, Fair Play as Respect for the Game, 25
J Phil Sport 1, 15 (1998):
Without question, any athlete who respects his or her sport will try his or her
best to win whenever he or she plays. However, respect for the game requires
that the athlete view winning only as a good if it comes as a result of a particular
process: the well-played, well-matched game.
123 See Sheila Wigmore and Cei Tuxill, A Consideration of the Concept of Fair Play, 1
Eur Physical Educ Rev 67, 71 (1995) ("'Fair Play' does not only mean adherence to written
rules; rather it describes the right attitudes of sportsmen and sportswomen and the right
spirit in which they conduct themselves.").
124 Sport is a useful analogy to politics precisely because athletic competition provides
"the paradigmatic examples of fair and foul play." Sigmund Loland and Mike McNamee,
Fair Play and the Ethos of Sports: An Eclectic Philosophical Framework, 27 J Phil Sport
63, 71 (2000).
125 Perhaps the most poignant example of this point is the self-destruction of Edward
Pritchard, who was a Justice Felix Frankfurter prot6g6, a rising star during the New Deal,
and destined, many thought, to be president. But he got caught stuffing the ballot box in
a 1948 US Senate election, and that ended his promising political career. He knew his
misconduct was morally wrong, but he was overcome by the temptation to prove to his
partisan teammates that he was a team player in their effort to win. See Foley, Ballot
Battles at 338 (cited in note 3); Tracy Campbell, Short of the Glory: The Fall and Redemp-
tion of Edward F. Prichard Jr. 137-48 (Kentucky 1998).
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Thus, fair play is a societal norm that constrains partisan
competition. Conduct of partisans that breaches the norm of fair
play would be, intrinsically, an instance of excessive partisanship,
or what we could call partisan overreaching. Policing partisan
competition to rule out acts that contravene the norm of fair play
would be an appropriate regulation of the competitive endeavor,
consistent with holding the competition in the first place. Far
from interfering with the competition, a referee who stops a com-
petitor from taking advantage of an opponent by means of conduct
contrary to fair play is upholding the spirit as well as the rules of
the competition, enabling it to occur in a way that is true to its
basic purpose. Thus, requiring electoral competition to occur
within the bounds of fair play-by enjoining partisan conduct that
contravenes fair play-would be a kind of umpiring entirely con-
sistent with both the reason for having an election to pick a win-
ning candidate and the actual operation of the election in order to
fulfill that social purpose.126
If judges were to enforce the norm of fair play in the context
of elections, there would be nothing inappropriate from the per-
spective of democratic theory-the philosophy that underlies the
function that elections serve. Even so, can the judicial enforcement
of fair play in electoral competition be linked to the Constitution?
Judicial review under Marbury v Madison27 consists of interpret-
ing and enforcing the text of the Constitution, at least according
to some understanding of what it means to interpret and enforce
the Constitution as authoritative law (whether that understand-
ing is "originalist" or otherwise).128 Consequently, before judges
leap into the enterprise of policing the partisan competition to win
elections so as to enjoin partisan overreaching that breaches the
norm of fair play, there must be some cogent basis for linking the
norm of fair play to the judicial exercise of the Marbury power to
interpret and enforce the Constitution.
126 See Simon Eassom, Games, Rules, and Contracts, in McNamee and Parry, eds,
Ethics and Sport 57, 65 (cited in note 121) (exploring a similar analogy between umpires
and judges).
127 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
128 For an introduction to American constitutional theory and the role of the judiciary
in constitutional interpretation, see generally Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Dynamic
Constitution: An Introduction to American Constitutional Law and Practice (Cambridge
2d ed 2013). See also Michael J. Gerhardt, et al, Constitutional Theory: Arguments and
Perspectives 59-293, 365-426 (LexisNexis 4th ed 2013); Michael C. Dorf and Trevor W.
Morrison, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Constitutional Law 11-68 (Oxford 2010).
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To put the point of the previous paragraph in Dworkinian
terms: although there is no obstacle to judicial invocation of the
norm of fair play as a constraint on partisan overreaching along
what Professor Dworkin called the dimension of "justifica-
tion"129-given the soundness of this norm from the perspective of
democratic theory-judicial invocation of the norm still must be
defended adequately with respect to the crucial dimension of fit.
No matter how attractive the norm of fair play might be as a
norm, it still is not an appropriate basis for judicial decrees as
mandated by interpretation of the Constitution if this norm
flunks the dimension of fit.130 Thus, the task at hand is to see if
the norm of fair play can achieve an adequate grade (so to speak)
along the dimension of fit, so as to provide a warrant for judicial
reliance upon it in the domain of litigation over election laws. To
conduct this inquiry, as Dworkin himself would have had Justice
Hercules do, it is necessary to examine the available legal materi-
als, beginning with relevant judicial precedents concerning the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and then expanding
the inquiry to the historical circumstances surrounding the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 131
A. The Judicial Invocation of Fair Play
It turns out that the Supreme Court regularly invokes the
idea of fair play as a core component of its due process jurispru-
dence and has done so for a century. In the context of civil proce-
dure, the International Shoe Co v Washington132 line of precedent
makes the test for in personam jurisdiction turn on whether the
lawsuit in question comports with "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."133 In criminal cases, vagueness in a stat-
ute making conduct a crime "violates the first essential of due
process" because it contravenes "ordinary notions of fair play and
the settled rules of law."134
The Supreme Court first invoked fair play as an essential el-
ement of due process in a 1914 opinion authored by Justice Oliver
129 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 239 (cited in note 18).
130 See id at 378-79 ("Many arrangements other than those now embedded in American
legal practice are possible, and some may well be better from the point of view of ideal
theory.").
131 See id at 379-99 (elaborating on this judicial methodology by his idealized Justice
Hercules).
132 326 US 310 (1945).
133 Id at 316.
134 Johnson v United States, 135 S Ct 2551, 2556-57 (2015).
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Wendell Holmes.135 The case involved a South Dakota statute im-
posing strict liability and punitive damages on a railroad com-
pany for loss of the plaintiffs property from a fire caused by a
locomotive engine.136 The Court unanimously invalidated the stat-
ute because it provided inadequate notice to the railroad of what
amount of damages a jury might award.137 In so holding, Holmes
wrote: "No doubt the States have a large latitude in the policy
that they will pursue and enforce, but the rudiments of fair play
required by the Fourteenth Amendment are wanting when a de-
fendant is required to guess rightly what a jury will find."138
Three years later, Holmes, writing again for a unanimous
Court, invoked fair play as a constraint on a state's exercise of in
personam jurisdiction.139 There, Texas had attempted to assert ju-
risdiction over an out-of-state resident simply by publishing a
newspaper notice.140 Holmes allowed that some circumstances
might permit jurisdiction over a defendant not located in the state,
but not in this particular situation. "[I]n States bound together by
a Constitution and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Holmes explained, "great caution should be used not to let fiction
deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhe-
sion to fact," given the principle that "[t]he foundation of jurisdic-
tion is physical power."141 International Shoe cited this 1917 opin-
ion by Holmes, as well as an intermediate precedent that echoed
the "fair play" phrase from this Holmes opinion.142 Thus, the en-
tire International Shoe lineage stems from this initial invocation
of fair play by Holmes as grounds for denying a state power over
a defendant in a civil case.
Since International Shoe itself, the Supreme Court has
quoted the now-talismanic "fair play and substantial justice" for-
mulation in over thirty cases. Among the most recent of these are
unanimous opinions in 2011 by Justice Ginsburg143 and 2014 by
Justice Thomas.144 That these two justices, at the opposite ends of
the Court's ideological spectrum, would so similarly rely on the
135 See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co v Polt, 232 US 165, 168 (1914).
136 Id at 167.
137 Id at 168.
138 Id.
139 McDonald v Mabee, 243 US 90, 91 (1917).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See International Shoe, 326 US at 316, citing McDonald, 243 US at 91, and
Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 (1940) (Douglas).
143 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, 564 US 915, 919 (2011).
144 Walden v Fiore, 134 S Ct 1115, 1121 (2014).
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same fair play standard on behalf of all their colleagues on the
Court indicates just how deeply embedded and universal this fair
play standard is. Indeed, even when the justices disagree on the
application of the standard to particular facts, there is no dispute
that fair play is the operative principle that governs the Court's
adjudication of the case. 145
In the realm of criminal procedure, the principle of fair play
arises in various different ways. As the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly observed for over half a century, "our sense of fair play"
lies at the heart of the constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination,146 including the Miranda doctrine147 that protects
this constitutional immunity.148 This same "sense of fair play and
decency" is what prohibits the government from pumping a per-
son's stomach in the search for evidence of a crime, as the Court
famously held in Rochin v California.149 And, as already observed,
"ordinary notions of fair play" underlie the constitutional prohibi-
tion against vague criminal statutes-a doctrine recently reaf-
firmed in an opinion for the Court by Justice Scalia.150
145 In her dissent in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro, 564 US 873 (2011),
Ginsburg's very last line was devoted to the claim that she, and not the justices reaching
the opposite conclusion, was being faithful to the International Shoe standard of "fair play
and substantial justice." Id at 910 (Ginsburg dissenting). These other justices thought they
were being true to the same canonical standard. Id at 880 (Kennedy) (plurality).
146 United States v Balsys, 524 US 666, 690 (1998); Withrow v Williams, 507 US 680,
691-92 (1993); Pennsylvania v Muniz, 496 US 582, 595 n 8 (1990); Doe v United States,
487 US 201, 212-13 (1988); Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463, 476 n 8 (1976); Couch
v United States, 409 US 322, 328 (1973). All these cases quote Murphy v Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor, 378 US 52, 55 (1964). Although the specific holding
of Murphy has been overruled, its invocation of the fair play principle endures. See Balsys,
524 US at 688-90 & n 11.
147 See generally Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
148 See Slagle v Ohio, 366 US 259, 265-66 (1961):
Surely traditional notions of fair play contemplate that a person summoned to
testify before any adjudicatory or investigatory body, including a legislative in-
vestigatory committee, may object to any question put to him upon any available
ground....
... To hold that these witnesses, in these circumstances, willfully and con-
tumaciously refused to answer those questions would deeply offend traditional
notions of fair play and deprive them of due process.
In Withrow, which held that Miranda violations are remediable in federal habeas proceed-
ings, the Court invoked the basic "sense of fair play" to justify why Miranda rights require
this extra level of procedural protection, whereas the Fourth Amendment and its exclu-
sionary rule do not. Withrow, 507 US at 691-92.
149 342 US 165, 173 (1952).
150 Johnson, 135 S Ct at 2557.
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None of these many cases, either civil or criminal, in which
the Supreme Court has linked due process with fair play specifi-
cally concerns the regulation of the electoral process. That fact,
however, is no barrier to such linkage in the future. Indeed, as the
Court itself observed in a case touching on voting rights, although
not regulating them directly, "[A]s a generalization, it can be said
that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which
through the years, have become associated with differing types
of proceedings.""'1 That case concerned the federal Civil Rights
Commission's investigation of voting rights violations.152 The spe-
cific question before the Court was whether the Commission's pro-
cedures for taking testimony from witnesses violated due pro-
cess. 5 3 In an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held
that they did not."54 In so holding, the Court recognized the vari-
ability of the fair play that due process requires depending on the
particular context at hand.155 Thus, due process can require a dif-
ferent form of fair play in administrative proceedings than in
criminal prosecutions, and by the same reason can also require a
different form of fair play when it comes to redistricting or other
ways in which the law regulates the electoral process.
Indeed, there already have been hints of this use of fair play
in cases concerning the procedures that the government uses to
count votes. In a monumental dissent to a decision invoking the
political-question doctrine in such cases, Justice John Marshall
Harlan proclaimed that for government officials to manipulate
the counting of ballots would be tantamount to stuffing the ballot
box and thus a subversion of free government that would neces-
sarily contravene due process. 156 This Harlan dissent was ahead
of its time (as was his dissent in Plessy v Ferguson1?). Thus, after
151 Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420, 442 (1960).
152 Id at 421-22.
153 Id at 423.
154 Id at 451-53.
155 See Hannah, 363 US at 442 ("The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature
of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which
must be taken into account.").
156 Taylor v Beckham, 178 US 548, 608 (1900) (Harlan dissenting) ("[T]he overturning
of the public will, as expressed at the ballot box, without evidence or against evidence, in
order to accomplish partisan ends, is a crime against free government, and deserves the
execration of all lovers of liberty.") (emphasis added). I have discussed the significance of
this Harlan dissent, including its relationship to Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000) (per
curiam), elsewhere. Foley, Ballot Battles at 170-77 (cited in note 3).
157 163 US 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan dissenting).
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the repudiation of the old conception of the political-question doc-
trine in Baker v Carr,158 lower federal courts began to apply the
same due process principle to constrain a state's manipulation
of its vote-counting rules.159 Moreover, some observers see the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v Gore160-that Florida improp-
erly varied its rules and procedures for the counting of "hanging
chads"161-as resting more soundly on due process rather than
equal protection.162
In sum, the fertile soil of the Supreme Court's due process
precedents provides ample grounds for generating a subsidiary
jurisprudence that requires a state's laws governing elections to
conform to the principle of fair play as appropriately tailored to
the electoral context.
B. Fair Play and the Fourteenth Amendment's Ratification
1. An overview of the argument, including its
jurisprudential perspective.
There is an additional, larger reason why it is appropriate to
construe the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to embody the principle of fair play as a constraint on partisan
overreaching. This reason emanates from the circumstances sur-
rounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. As
Professor Bruce Ackerman has highlighted in his monumental
project on how constitutional history should inform constitutional
interpretation, determining whether or when the Fourteenth
Amendment had become duly ratified by the requisite three-
fourths of the states was highly problematic.es Ratification oc-
curred in the midst of Reconstruction, when the status of the
Southern states was ambiguous.164 Was it necessary, or proper, to
158 369 US 186, 228-29 (1962).
159 See, for example, Roe v Alabama, 43 F3d 574, 580-81 (11th Cir 1995) (per curiam);
Griffin v Burns, 570 F2d 1065, 1077-78 (1st Cir 1978).
160 531 US 98 (2000) (per curiam).
161 See id at 105-06, 111.
162 See, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Lawlessness Principle:
A Comment on Professor Amar, 61 Fla L Rev 979, 985-86 (2009); Edward B. Foley, The
Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 Ohio St L J 925, 960-61 (2007). See also generally, for example,
Roy A. Schotland, In Bush v. Gore: Whatever Happened to the Due Process Ground?, 34
Loyola U Chi L J 211 (2002).
163 Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 110-13 (Belknap 1998).
164 For the leading history of Reconstruction, see generally Eric Foner, Reconstruction:
America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (Harper & Row 1988). For a new and highly
readable account, which focuses on the difficulties of restitching the Republic after the
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include these Southern states in calculating whether the requisite
three-fourths had been reached?165 (And who would speak for
these states, given their status as conquered territory after
General Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox?)
Moreover, there was a great partisan divide over the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification. Republicans, especially the radicals in
control of Congress and its Reconstruction policies, pushed hard
for the Amendment's ratification.166 Democrats, even those in the
North who had supported the Union during the Civil War, op-
posed the Fourteenth Amendment as an excessive interference
with state sovereignty and, from their perspective, an overly ag-
gressive embrace of racial equality.167 After Congress sent the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification, Democrats
won key elections for seats in the state legislatures of Ohio and
New Jersey, and they used these victories as an opportunity to
rescind the ratifications of the Amendment that occurred in those
two states.1 68 Because these rescission measures were adopted be-
fore it had become settled whether three-fourths of the states had
completed the ratification process, the question arose whether
these rescission measures were effective in undoing the previous
ratifications that had occurred in Ohio and New Jersey.169 Thus,
could those two states count as having ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment for the purpose of ascertaining whether the ratifica-
tion process had reached the decisive three-quarters mark?
In the midst of this uncertainty, it was also unclear who in
the federal government had the authority to make the definitive
pronouncement on whether the Fourteenth Amendment had duly
become part of the Constitution. Historically, the secretary of
state had been the federal officer who made this pronouncement,
Civil War, see generally Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New
History of Reconstruction (North Carolina 2014).
165 See Joseph B. James, The Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 287 (Mercer
1984) ("How many ratifying states were necessary to declare the Fourteenth Amendment
a part of the Constitution? That question had bothered Congress from the beginning and
was still unsettled in 1868.").
166 See id at 219-30.
167 For more on the role of the Democrats as the opposition party during Reconstruction,
see generally Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War
Era, 1860-1868 (W.W. Norton 1977).
168 See James, The Ratification at 282-87 (cited in note 165).
169 See Ackerman, 2 We the People at 112 (cited in note 163); James, The Ratification
at 287-88 (cited in note 165).
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but that authority was not specified in the Constitution itself.170
When the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment's status was put to
Secretary of State William Seward in the summer of 1868, he
hedged.171 In this context, Republicans in Congress felt it neces-
sary that Congress issue an official resolution proclaiming that
the Fourteenth Amendment had been duly ratified.172
The Democrats, given their fierce opposition to the Fourteenth
Amendment, could have attempted to obstruct this congressional
proclamation. Even though a minority in Congress, Democrats
could have employed the filibuster and other procedural devices
in an effort to block this congressional pronouncement that the
Fourteenth Amendment was now part of the supreme law of the
land.1" But they did not.1 74 Instead, as a thorough history of the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification succinctly observed: "The
concurrent Senate resolution was adopted without debate or
recorded vote."175
170 Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 Harv L Rev 386, 401 (1983) (noting that "[s]ince 1818, Congress
has provided a statutory mechanism for keeping a record of state ratifications [of consti-
tutional amendments]" and further noting that historically the secretary of state would
"cause the amendment to be published").
171 See Ackerman, 2 We the People at 112 (cited in note 163); James, The Ratification
at 294-96 (cited in note 165). Seward's proclamation, issued on July 20, 1868, was explic-
itly conditional, qualifying the status of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification as de-
pendent on treating the rescinding efforts in Ohio and New Jersey as ineffectual:
[If the resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey ratifying the afore-
said amendment are to be deemed as remaining of full force and effect, notwith-
standing the subsequent resolutions of the legislatures of those States, which
purport to withdraw the consent of said States from such ratification, then the
aforesaid amendment has been ratified.
Proclamation of William Seward, July 20, 1868, Appx 11, 15 Stat 706, 707 (emphasis
added).
172 Joseph James described the response of Republicans in Congress to Seward's con-
ditional July 20 proclamation: "In Congress, the reaction to the proclamation was strong.
Dominant Republicans judged it to be completely unsatisfactory and took swift and angry
action." James, The Ratification at 296 (cited in note 165). Ackerman echoed this point:
"Congressional reaction was swift and unequivocal." Ackerman, 2 We the People at 112
(cited in note 163). Indeed, the congressional resolution "to set the record straight," James,
The Ratification at 297 (cited in note 165), was adopted the very next day after Seward's
equivocation: "On July 21, both Houses passed a concurrent resolution ... declaring [the
Fourteenth Amendment] 'to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it shall
be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State."' Ackerman, 2 We the People at 112
(cited in note 163), quoting 39 Cong Globe, 40th Cong, 2d Sess 4266 (July 21, 1868).
173 For a history of the filibuster in the nineteenth century, see Gregory Koger, Fili-
bustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate 37-95 (Chicago 2010).
174 See 39 Cong Globe, 40th Cong, 2d Sess 4266 (July 21, 1868).
175 James, The Ratification at 296-97 (cited in note 165).
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Why did the Democrats not resist this resolution, when they
had fought so fiercely to resist ratification, including by means of
the rescission measures in Ohio and New Jersey? To understand
this acquiescence of the Democrats in its historical context, and
thus to understand the potential implications of this acquiescence
for modern interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and its role
in the Constitution that organizes our collective self-government to-
day, it is necessary to review the high drama that had occurred in
Congress just a few weeks earlier. In May 1868, the Senate had
acquitted President Andrew Johnson of the impeachment charges
brought by the House of Representatives.176 This acquittal, which
meant that Johnson would remain president, occurred because the
Senate's roll call on the charges against Johnson fell just one vote
shy of the two-thirds necessary for his removal. With Republicans
dominating the Senate, the reason why the effort to remove
Johnson failed was that seven Republican senators crossed party
lines and refused to convict Johnson for charges they saw as in-
appropriately partisan.177 Johnson's misdeeds concerned policy dis-
agreements with Republicans over how to pursue Reconstruction,
not the kind of "high crimes or misdemeanors" that would war-
rant impeachment and removal of a president from office.178
Thus, these seven senators put country and the Constitution
before party, refusing to engage in the partisan overreaching that
the removal of Johnson would have been.179 Two months later,
176 For the history of the impeachment and acquittal of Johnson, see generally David
0. Stewart, Impeached: The Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln's
Legacy (Simon & Schuster 2009); Michael Les Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of
Andrew Johnson (Norton 1999).
177 Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion at 139-40 (cited in note 164).
178 US Const Art II, § 4. See also Foner, Reconstruction at 334-35 (cited in note 164)
("Of the eleven articles of impeachment, nine hinged on either the removal of Stanton or
an alleged attempt to induce Gen. Lorenzo Thomas to accept orders not channeled through
Grant. Two others ... charged the President with denying the authority of Congress and
attempting to bring it 'into disgrace.'"). As Professor Eric Foner further explained, as
flimsy as even these charges were, they were camouflage for "the real reasons Republicans
wished to dispose of Johnson," namely, "his political outlook, the way he had administered
the Reconstruction Acts, and his sheer incompetence." Foner, Reconstruction at 335 (cited
in note 164).
179 One of the seven-Senator Edmund Ross, whose vote to acquit was most doubt-
ful-was featured in John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (Harper & Row memorial ed
1964). President John F. Kennedy started his chapter on Ross:
In a lonely grave, forgotten and unknown, lies "the man who saved a President,"
and who as a result may well have preserved for ourselves and our posterity
constitutional government in the United States-the man who performed in
1868 what one historian has called "the most heroic act in American history."
Id at 111.
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without partisan obstruction or even any debate from Democrats-
rather, by a voice vote of acclamation-the Senate passed the con-
gressional resolution proclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment as
duly ratified.180 Now, these two closely contemporaneous events
in the vernal season of 1868 need not be seen as an explicit quid
pro quo between the two parties. Instead, they are better under-
stood as two essential steps in the momentous achievement of a
constitutional equilibrium, after the nation teetered on the edge
of a partisan-induced unraveling during the Johnson impeach-
ment trial.
Moreover, it is not necessary that the congressional partici-
pants in this high constitutional drama themselves recognized the
equilibrium they achieved, or understood it in those terms. Rather,
for our own present-day purposes of interpreting the Constitution
that we have been bequeathed, is it reasonable for us to review
the historical record of what occurred in the summer of 1868 and
see it as the achievement of a constitutional equilibrium? More-
over, we can ask this interpretative question with a Dworkinian
frame of mind: Does the historical record sufficiently fit this ac-
count-that is, that an important constitutional equilibrium was
in fact achieved, whether or not the participants at the time self-
consciously appreciated their role in achieving this equilibrium-
such that we are justified in adopting this account? The alterna-
tive to this interpretation is that the Fourteenth Amendment, like
the Constitution as a whole, offers nothing in the way of a solution
to the serious problem of partisan overreaching. As between these
two alternatives, Scalia undoubtedly would have chosen this lat-
ter, minimalist interpretation, simply because the bare text of the
document is silent on the topic of excessive partisanship. But is
this latter, minimalist interpretation really the better one? Is it
better suited to the role the Constitution plays for us today in our
project of democratic governance? To put this question in explic-
itly Dworkinian terms, which of the two possible alternative in-
terpretations puts the Constitution "in its best light"?181 In other
words, which interpretation is the more attractive one given the
democratic function we want, and need, the Constitution to serve
for us today? Regarding the dimension of normative attractive-
ness alone, there is no doubt that seeing the Constitution as in-
cluding a constraint against partisan overreaching is superior.
180 Ackerman, 2 We the People at 112 (cited in note 163).
181 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 398 (cited in note 18).
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Even Scalia acknowledged this point in Vieth.182 If there were an
explicit clause of the Constitution that provided, "No state legis-
lature shall adopt legislation that, in contravention of the norm
of fair play as applied to political competition, amounts to parti-
san overreaching," Scalia undoubtedly would have judicially en-
forced that explicit constitutional command as best he could,
given his overriding commitment to constitutional text. But see-
ing no such text, Scalia found no warrant for enforcing a consti-
tutional constraint against partisan overreaching.
From a Dworkinian perspective, no matter how attractive a
constitutional constraint against partisan overreaching might be
as a norm of democratic theory, it cannot be an attractive inter-
pretation of the Constitution itself unless it has an adequate fit
with the historical record. On this point, Dworkin himself sided
with Scalia against any constitutional utopians willing to impose
whatever theoretical norm they find most attractive regardless of
fit. But Dworkin, unlike Scalia, was willing to look beyond bare
text to the larger historical record for the purpose of determining
whether there is at least an adequate fit, which need not be the
most perfect fit, for the purpose of choosing between the two avail-
able interpretations: either a Constitution that constrains exces-
sive partisanship or a Constitution with no such constraint. Thus,
given the normative desirability of having a Constitution that
contains a constraint against partisan overreaching, does an hon-
est examination of the historical record demonstrate a sufficient
fit with the proposition that the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the consequence of a constitutional equilibrium
that rendered partisan overreaching out-of-bounds in our system
of government? Readers will have to judge for themselves
whether the historical record supports a finding of adequate fit
from a Dworkinian perspective, recognizing that the essence of
judging according to Dworkin is to achieve "law as integrity."183
But what follows is an account of the available historical record
that, at least in the judgment of this Article's author, meets the
Dworkinian test of adequate fit.184
Excessive partisanship on the part of Radical Republicans
had pushed the nation to the brink with the House's prosecution
182 See Vieth, 541 US at 286 (Scalia) (plurality).
183 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 225 (cited in note 18) (emphasis added).
184 I am grateful to several readers, especially Professors Michael Les Benedict and
Lisa Marshall Manheim, for pressing me to explain more fully the jurisprudential, and
specifically Dworkinian, framework with which I approach the historical record.
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of its purely political impeachment charges. Seven Republican
senators, however, refused to go along with this excessive parti-
sanship and pulled the nation back from the brink. Partisan fer-
vor on the part of Democrats also had contributed to the disarray
over the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, with the partisan
rescission measures in Ohio and New Jersey especially adding to
the uncertainty. Simply put, the nation had been engulfed in a
partisan frenzy. But by July 1868, this overzealousness had set-
tled down, with Senate Democrats accepting the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification as part of that summer's overall consti-
tutional accommodation.
Enough Republicans pulled back from partisan overreaching
to prevent the constitutional calamity that would have been
Johnson's removal from the presidency. Enough Democrats pulled
back from their scorched-earth opposition to the Fourteenth
Amendment's adoption to avoid a crisis over the status of its rati-
fication. In this way, the Fourteenth Amendment owes its very
presence as an unquestioned component of the Constitution to an
operational acceptance in the summer of 1868 on both sides of the
partisan divide that partisanship can go too far. From a
Dworkinian perspective, this history provides enough grounds to
interpret the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
insofar as it already embodies the norm of fair play, as entailing
a constitutional constraint against excessive partisanship.
2. Details of the historical record.
The seven Republicans who voted to acquit Johnson saw their
votes in exactly this light, as a stance against partisan overreach-
ing. The Radical Republicans in the House, led by Representative
Thaddeus Stevens, had impeached Johnson because he had re-
moved Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in violation of a statute the
Radicals had passed to prevent such removal.185 The statute, an
unconstitutional interference with the president's authority over
the executive branch, reflected the strong disagreement between
Johnson and the Radicals over how best to pursue Reconstruction.186
The Radicals may have had the better of this policy dispute, but
185 Stewart, Impeached at 156-62 (cited in note 176).
186 The Supreme Court confirmed that the Tenure of Office Act, 14 Stat 430 (1867),
was an unconstitutional interference with the president's removal power. Myers v United
States, 272 US 52, 176 (1926). See also Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 561 US 477, 494 n 3 (2010) (stating that the Tenure of Office Act "was
widely regarded as unconstitutional and void (as it is universally regarded today)").
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Johnson was guilty of nothing more than disobeying an unconsti-
tutional statute concerning the power of the presidency to remove
a cabinet secretary. (Even if the statute had not been unconstitu-
tional, Johnson's malfeasance would have concerned purely a pol-
icy dispute and was nothing like the abuse of office that occurred
during Watergate, when President Richard Nixon participated in
an attempted cover-up of his campaign's criminal break-in of the
opposing party's headquarters.187)
Thus, no matter how strongly they had opposed Johnson on
policy grounds, these seven Republicans understood that it would
be a partisan abuse of their senatorial power to remove him from
the presidency for this reason. Johnson, a Democrat picked by
President Abraham Lincoln to be his vice president as an exercise
of wartime unity to bridge the two parties in the North, was pres-
ident solely because of Lincoln's assassination.188 But that did not
make him any less entitled to the office, and it did not make the
dispute between him and the Radicals over Reconstruction any
less partisan. The Democrats simply had different views on how
to bring the South back into the Union than the Republicans did,
and Johnson had simply used the presidential powers that con-
stitutionally belonged to him to promote the Democratic concep-
tion of Reconstruction rather than the Republican approach. Af-
ter his impeachment by the House, the question before the Senate
was whether to boot Johnson out of the presidency, thereby re-
placing him with one of their own-Senator Benjamin Wade-a
staunch Radical who happened to be next in the line of succes-
sion.189 Tempted as they were, these seven senators knew that
move would have been an egregious act of partisan overreaching.
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, one of the seven, ex-
pressed this point explicitly in the opinion he submitted to the
record to explain his vote of acquittal. Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, known for his integrity,190 and regarded as
a "great constitutional lawyer,"191 Trumbull was "[o]ne of the most
influential men in Congress."192 Trumbull opened his characteris-
tically judicious opinion with the observation that "the duty" and
187 For a discussion of the Watergate scandal, see generally Carl Bernstein and Bob
Woodward, All the President's Men (Simon & Schuster 40th anniversary ed 2014).
188 Stewart, Impeached at 5-13 (cited in note 176).
189 Id at 38.
190 Id at 228.
191 Edmund G. Ross, Historic Moments: The Impeachment Trial, 11 Scribner's Magazine
519, 524 (1892).
192 Foner, Reconstruction at 243 (cited in note 164).
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"oath" each senator took was "[t]o do impartial justice in all things
appertaining to the present trial," adding that "he who falters in
the discharge of that duty, either from personal or party consid-
erations, is unworthy [of] his position, and merits the scorn and
contempt of all just men."193 Trumbull defended his acquittal ver-
dict as consistent with this duty of nonpartisanship: "I have en-
deavored to be governed by the case," he explained, "without giv-
ing the least heed to the clamor of intemperate zealots who
demand the conviction of Andrew Johnson as a test of party
faith."194 Finding it "[p]ainful ... to disagree with so many politi-
cal associates and friends," Trumbull avowed that he opposed
Johnson's policies as much as any other Republican senator, but
that this was "insufficient cause" to "convict and depose the Chief
Magistrate":
His speeches and the general course of his administration
have been as distasteful to me as to any one, and I should
consider it the great calamity of the age if the disloyal ele-
ment, so often encouraged by his measures, should gain po-
litical ascendency. If the question was, Is Andrew Johnson a
fit person for President? I should answer, no; but [this im-
peachment trial] is not a party question.19
Trumbull then closed his opinion with a warning of the dire con-
sequences "to the future of the country" if the Senate did not re-
frain from removing Johnson in a fit of overzealous partisanship:
[Nbo future President will be safe who happens to differ with a
majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate on any
measure deemed by them important, particularly if of a polit-
ical character. Blinded by partisan zeal, with such an example
before them, they will not scruple to remove out of the way any
obstacle to the accomplishment of their purposes, and what
then becomes of the checks and balances of the Constitution,
so carefully devised and so vital to its perpetuity?196
There can be no doubt that Trumbull's opinion, from start to fin-
ish, is animated by the goal of keeping congressional partisanship
193 3 Trial ofAndrew Johnson, President of the United States, before the Senate of the
United States, on Impeachment by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and Mis-
demeanors 319 (GPO 1868).
194 Id at 327-28 (emphasis added).
195 Id at 328.
196 Id (emphasis added).
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within appropriate and manageable bounds, particularly at this
moment of acute crisis, for the sake of the Republic's posterity.
Senator James Grimes of Iowa, another of the seven, who
also was an influential leader in the Senate with a reputation
for integrity,197 and who had served on the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction,198 echoed Trumbull's position. "I cannot agree to
destroy the harmonious working of the Constitution for the sake
of getting rid of an unacceptable President," Grimes declared.199
He continued:
However widely, therefore, I may and do differ with the
President respecting his political views and measures, and
however deeply I have regretted, and do regret, the differ-
ences between himself and the Congress of the United States,
I am not able to record my vote that he is guilty of high crimes
and misdemeanors by reason of those differences.200
Senator Joseph Fowler of Tennessee, in his justification of his
acquittal vote, offered a disquisition on the evil of excessive par-
tisanship. "The framers of the Constitution," he observed, "were
not content to leave the term treason to any construction that
party spirit or unbridled ambition might educe" from the annals
of legal history.201 Nor could the Constitution be construed to give
the Senate power over removal of cabinet officers. Otherwise, the
exercise of this power would "become mere partisan c[o]nflicts
and end in the overthrow of all sense of justice and right in the
Senate."202
"There is no party impenetrable to the seductions of power,"
Fowler generally pronounced.203 "However much of integrity they
may possess in their origin, they will in time run upon the com-
mon rock on which all political parties in a republic must sooner
or later be wrecked."204 In a confession of candor relating to the
specific charges at hand, Fowler saw the statute that Johnson was
accused of breaching as motivated by a "violent party feeling," la-
menting that it was "unwise legislation to attempt a construction
197 See Foner, Reconstruction at 247 (cited in note 164); Stewart, Impeached at 228
(cited in note 176).
198 Stewart, Impeached at 44-45 (cited in note 176).
199 3 Trial of Andrew Johnson at 340 (cited in note 193).
200 Id.
201 Id at 193-94.
202 Id at 199-200.
203 3 Trial of Andrew Johnson at 200 (cited in note 193).
204 Id.
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of our Constitution under the influence of party animosity."205
Consequently, he viewed "[t]he present trial" with disdain-and
predicted that "the historian will so denominate it, the trial of the
integrity of the republi."206
Given the enormity of what was at stake, Fowler perceived
his role as resisting the "high party feeling" that was engulfing
"the greatest number" of his fellow Republicans at the moment,
causing them to "yield to the pressure of the political demand"
rather than following "any compunctions of conscience."207 But, as
for himself, Fowler would "trust with confidence" the "just judg-
ment of posterity."208 He could "endure" if "necessary" the "slan-
ders of the partisan, the desertion of friends."209 In this way, along
with the six others, he would serve as a bulwark against the egre-
gious abuse of power his own party was prepared to commit.
Senator William Fessenden of Maine was the most distin-
guished and respected of the seven so-called martyrs who crossed
party lines to acquit Johnson.210 He had been Lincoln's Treasury
secretary, fixing the nation's finances after mismanagement by his
predecessor (Secretary Salmon Chase), and had chaired the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, which had drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment.211 His opinion on acquittal mostly confined itself to
careful analysis of the relevant constitutional considerations. It
closed, however, with a peroration on the necessity of curbing par-
tisanship in the exercise of the impeachment power: "[I]t must be
conceded that the power thus conferred might be liable to very
great abuse, especially in times of high party excitement, when the
passions of the people are inflamed against a perverse and obnox-
ious public officer."212 He continued: "The office of President is one
of the great co-ordinate branches of the government," and "to
make it the mere sport of temporary majorities, tends to the great
injury of our government, and inflicts a wound upon constitutional
liberty."213 Accordingly, "the offence for which a Chief Magistrate
205 Id at 195.
206 Id at 198.
207 3 Trial of Andrew Johnson at 200 (cited in note 193).
208 Id at 207.
209 Id.
210 See Benedict, The Impeachment at 9 (cited in note 176) (noting that Fessenden
was "the Senate's most respected member"); Stewart, Impeached at 39 (cited in note 176)
(noting that "[s]ome regarded" Fessenden as "the Senate's finest legislator").
211 See Stewart, Impeached at 39-40, 56, 177 (cited in note 176).
212 3 Trial of Andrew Johnson at 29-30 (cited in note 193) (emphasis added).
213 Id at 30.
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is removed from office, and the power intrusted to him by the peo-
ple transferred to other hands, and especially where the hands
which receive it are to be the same which take it from him," should
be "beyond all question, an adequate cause."214 Here Fessenden
was averting to the fact that Wade, a Radical, would assume the
presidency upon Johnson's removal, and that this replacement
would appear especially partisan.215 To avoid any doubt about his
meaning, Fessenden added that any removal of the president in
such circumstances "should be free from the taint of party" and
"leave no reasonable ground of suspicion upon the motives of those
who inflict the penalty."216 For good measure, he added: "Anything
less than this . .. would be to shake the faith of the friends of con-
stitutional liberty in the permanency of our free institutions, and
the capacity of man for self-government."217
On the day that the Senate acquitted Johnson, Fessenden
was the first of the seven Republicans to cast an acquittal vote, as
the roll call proceeded in alphabetical order. But his was not the
most consequential of the seven. That belonged to Senator Edmund
Ross of Kansas, because his was the one most in doubt on that
fateful day. The tension in the chamber was most severe as his
name was called. Ross himself later described the moment as one
in which he "almost literally looked down into [his] open grave."218
He could see his fellow "Senators in their seats leaned over their
desks, many with hand to ear, that not a syllable or intonation in
the utterance of the verdict should be lost."219
Insofar as Ross's vote was the most decisive one, determining
that the count would fall one short of the necessary two-thirds for
removal, it is particularly significant that he, too, justified his
vote on the same grounds of the necessity to curb partisan over-
reaching in the exercise of the impeachment power. Shortly after
his crucial vote, he took to the floor of the Senate to explain: "I
sought to divest my mind of all party prejudice."220 Like Trumbull
and Grimes, he emphasized:
I had been, and still am, an earnest opponent of the recon-
struction policy of his Administration. I thought, as I still
214 Id (emphasis added).
215 Stewart, Impeached at 176-77 (cited in note 176).
216 3 Trial of Andrew Johnson at 30 (cited in note 193).
217 Id.
218 Ross, 11 Scribner's Magazine at 524 (cited in note 191).
219 Id.
220 39 Cong Globe, 40th Cong, 2d Sess 2599 (May 27, 1868) (statement of Sen Ross).
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think, that policy in many most important particulars, un-
wise and injurious to the best interests of the country. I
longed, and still long, for such changes in the administration
of the Government as would conform it to the views of the
dominant party of the country, and to the reconstruction pol-
icy of Congress.221
But these "differences as to governmental policy" could not be the
basis of a vote to "declare the President guilty of high crimes and
misdemeanors."222 On the contrary, Ross reiterated for emphasis:
"[W]hen I voted on the several articles of impeachment I cast out
of the scale, as far as I was able, all mere party considerations."223
Years later, in an article for Scribner's Magazine, Ross elab-
orated on the reasons for his acquittal vote. If "the President must
step down" because of "partisan considerations," the consequence
would "have revolutionized our splendid political fabric into a par-
tisan Congressional autocracy."224 Conversely, a vote "for acquit-
tal," being "non-partisan" because "no other could acquit him as
the Senate was then constituted," would
effectually impress upon the world a conviction of the
strength and grandeur of republican institutions in the
hands of a free and enlightened people-institutions rendered
vastly more substantial and enduring by reason of having
passed successfully and safely through the fiery ordeal of par-
tisan prejudice and turmoil into which they had been cast. 2 25
As Fessenden also had argued, for Ross nothing short of the whole
capacity for constitutional self-government was at stake. It was
thus essential for Ross to vote the way he did so that "America
would pass the danger-point of partisan rule."226
Taking together all these explanations offered by the Repub-
licans who saved Johnson from removal, one cannot avoid the
conclusion that preservation of the Republic from partisan over-
reaching was the evident motive. At a moment of great national
peril, when the country was literally reconstructing itself, those
holding the balance of power in the Senate set aside party loyalty




224 Ross, 11 Scribner's Magazine at 520 (cited in note 191).
225 Id at 520, 522.
226 Id at 522.
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president and Congress. To be sure, a majority of Republicans in
both the House and the Senate were willing to remove Johnson
from the presidency, thereby demonstrating the degree to which
overzealous partisanship did influence governance at the time.
Why then credit the role of the relatively few Republicans who
resisted this overzealousness? The reason is that it was these re-
sisters-the so-called Seven Martyrs-who engaged in the consti-
tutionally decisive conduct, given the two-thirds requirement for
removal of a president from office upon impeachment. Conse-
quently, from the perspective of constitutional construction, the
unwillingness of the Seven Martyrs to go along with the overzeal-
ous partisanship of their fellow Republicans saved the day, so to
speak, and in doing so established the constitutional principle
that excessive partisanship was contrary to preservation of the
constitutional order.227
A few weeks later, as part of the same overall enterprise of
Reconstruction, Democrats in the Senate essentially reciprocated
by refusing to engage in partisan overreaching to provoke a crisis
over the status of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification.22s In
227 In addition to the justifications for acquittal offered by the seven Republican sena-
tors, there is arguably an additional reason to understand the acquittal of Johnson as a re-
pudiation of partisan overreaching. According to one historical account, Radical Republicans
considered accelerating the admission of senators from the Reconstruction states, knowing
that these additional senators would be extra votes to remove Johnson. But the Radicals
declined to make this move, recognizing that it would be an especially egregious form of
partisan abuse. "[N]ot even Stevens was willing to pack the impeachment jury this way."
Stewart, Impeached at 273 (cited in note 176).
228 Because there was no debate in the Senate on the crucial resolution to recognize
the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Democrats in the Senate did not give
speeches explaining themselves in the same way that the Republicans who refused to con-
vict Johnson did. But it is the silence of the Democrats on this crucial resolution that
speaks volumes. The key point is precisely that there was no debate, and no opposition,
when there could have been. As a party, the Democrats had been doing their utmost to
block the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, including by rescinding the previous
ratification measures in New Jersey and Ohio as soon as they had the political power to
do so in those states. It is not as if the Democrats, as a party, had reversed themselves on
their views of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it would not be until four years later,
in 1872, that the Democrats as a formal matter of their party platform explicitly recog-
nized their acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the Constitution. Thus, in
the summer of 1868, the Democrats in the Senate kept themselves in check on the status
of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, despite their vehement opposition to it and
all that they had done as a party to block its ratification. The only explanation for their
silent acquiescence, then, is a recognition (however reluctant) that attempting to block the
ratification resolution in the Senate would be a partisan step too far. See Ackerman, 2 We
the People at 110-13, 227-38 (cited in note 163).
It has been suggested that the Senate Democrats may have been fearful of the elec-
toral consequences to their party in November 1868 if they had attempted to block the
ratification resolution. Perhaps, but that electoral motive is entirely consistent with the
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the summer of 1868, Congress managed to achieve a new consti-
tutional settlement, one with the Fourteenth Amendment at its
center. Congress reached this new constitutional equilibrium be-
cause of a balance of political forces, one that ruled out-of-bounds
the excessive partisan zeal that was attempting to rid the nation
of an unwanted president, and one that simultaneously rendered
unacceptable a degree of partisan obstructionism that would have
put in doubt the Fourteenth Amendment's place in the new con-
stitutional order.
A century and a half later, one can read the bare words of the
Constitution and think that it has nothing to say on the subject
of partisanship. But to read the words alone, without understand-
ing the historical circumstances of their adoption, would be to
point that they pulled back from the brink of going too far in their partisan zeal to block
the Fourteenth Amendment. The crucial point is that the constitutional equilibrium
against partisan overreaching had been achieved, even if part of the political dynamic that
resulted in that equilibrium had been a fear of the electorate's reaction to partisan over-
reaching. See id.
what matters is that during the summer of 1868, as part of the process that resulted
in the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the Constitution, political forces
converged to the point that both political parties acted as if they recognized that there
were outer limits to the extent to which they could pursue their respective partisan posi-
tions on how to reconstruct the Union. The Republicans pulled back from the outer limit
when enough of them refused to remove Johnson from the presidency. The Democrats, in
turn, pulled back from the outer limit when in the Senate they refused to block the reso-
lution recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification. It was as if the two parties
were doing an elaborate constitutional dance. First the Republicans made their move, and
then the Democrats. The two parties may not exactly have been partners in this constitu-
tional minuet, but what is important is where the political system as a whole ended up as
a consequence of these maneuvers on both sides. The upshot was an equilibrium that de-
pended on the rejection, on both sides, of partisan overreaching, and that equilibrium gave
us the Fourteenth Amendment as an accepted part of the Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, it is sufficient to see the events in 1868 as establishing
this constitutional equilibrium. One could additionally rely on the Democratic Party's for-
mal acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1872 as an essential component of fully
achieving the constitutional equilibrium that resulted in the Fourteenth Amendment's in-
disputable status as part of the Constitution. This alternative account would see the
achievement of the constitutional equilibrium as a four-year process, which included the
election of 1868 and subsequent political developments during Reconstruction. Insofar as
this alternative account ends up in the same place, it would be a basis for interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment as a constraint against excessive partisanship. My own view is
that the focus on 1868 is more parsimonious and accurate in describing that the requisite
equilibrium had been achieved at that time. From the moment that the Democrats in the
Senate refused to block the ratification resolution, the Fourteenth Amendment was function-
ally part of the Constitution. The formal recognition of this fact in 1872 by the Democrats
was, in my view, just a retrospective acknowledgement of the constitutional equilibration
that had already occurred-and not itself an essential component of achieving that consti-
tutional equilibrium. (I'm very grateful to Michael Les Benedict for discussions that have
led to the clarification of this point.)
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miss an essential component of their meaning. The words of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including its capacious guarantee of
"due process," owe their existence as part of the Constitution to
the new equilibrium achieved in the summer of 1868, an equilib-
rium premised on the rejection of partisan overreaching. Thus,
far from saying nothing concerning the problem of excessive par-
tisanship in a democracy, the Fourteenth Amendment itself rests
on the foundation that partisan overreaching is antithetical to the
success of constitutional self-government. For this reason, the prin-
ciple of fair play that has been so widely and routinely recognized
as a component of due process easily can-and should-be under-
stood to encompass a constraint against excessive partisanship.229
It is important to reiterate what should be evident from the
history just recounted: the Congress that ultimately refused to
remove Johnson from office, and essentially at the same time rat-
ified the Fourteenth Amendment, hardly condemned all partisan-
ship. On the contrary, even the seven Republicans who crossed
party lines to acquit Johnson were partisan politicians in most of
their thinking and conduct, as they themselves acknowledged.
It was only the extreme form of egregiously rabid partisanship
that threatened to destabilize the entire democratic system of
the Republic that they wished to rule out-of-bounds. It is this lim-
ited constitutional prohibition against excessive partisanship
that historically underlies the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment and deserves recognition as a component of due pro-
cess. Accordingly, it is for this reason that due process-in con-
trast to equal protection (or the First Amendment)-provides a
principled basis for condemning excessive partisanship, without
condemning all forms of partisan conduct by legislatures or other
branches of government.
229 This understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment shares affinities with Ackerman's
methodology of constitutional interpretation, in part because Ackerman himself has
pointed to the special circumstances surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's ratifica-
tion. See text accompanying note 163. But Ackerman's own work does not draw the same
connection between the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification and the Senate's ultimate
refusal to remove Johnson from office, and Ackerman has not offered a reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment that would render excessive partisanship a due process violation.
Ackerman views the events of 1868 more in terms of Republicans achieving a new consti-
tutional hegemony than as a constitutional settlement that recognized the inevitability of
two-party competition in a well-functioning republic. See Ackerman, 2 We the People at
227-38 (cited in note 163). Moreover, although reading the Fourteenth Amendment in this
way can be characterized as "Ackermanian" in nature, one can embrace this reading with-
out adopting all elements of Ackerman's approach to constitutional interpretation, includ-
ing his view that the New Deal represents an unwritten constitutional amendment.
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III. FAIR PLAY AND GERRYMANDERING
Part II established that due process embodies the idea of fair
play and that, in light of the special historical circumstances as-
sociated with the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, it makes
sense to understand the fair play principle embedded in due pro-
cess as encompassing a constraint against excessive partisan-
ship.230 In this Part, it is necessary to consider how this due pro-
cess constraint against excessive partisanship applies to the
problem of gerrymandering. To do this requires three tasks. First,
this Part considers the historical understanding of gerrymanders
as an especially egregious form of partisan overreaching. Second,
it shows how this historical understanding can be employed as
the foundation for a workable judicial test to identify unconstitu-
tional gerrymanders. Third, it compares this historically
grounded test, rooted in the due process requirement of fair play,
to the existing equal protection alternatives, which emanate from
political science but which so far have been unable to generate a
successful judicial method for differentiating between unfair and
appropriate districting.
230 The historical analysis developed in Part II also explains why it is appropriate to
locate the fair play constraint against partisan overreaching in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, rather than in the original Constitution's "Republican Form of Gov-
ernment" or "Guarantee" Clause. US Const Art IV, § 4. Like the original Constitution of
which it is a part, the Guarantee Clause is premised on the Framers' expectation that the
separation of powers (as a form of constitutional architecture) would prevent the consoli-
dation of multifarious factions into stable and ongoing two-party competition, and thus the
Guarantee Clause does not contain within it the norm of constraining one well-established
party from overreaching in its ongoing competition against the opposing party that is its
consistent and perpetual adversary. Thus, it would be anachronistic to interpret the orig-
inal Constitution's Guarantee Clause as protecting the Republic from the risk of one party
dominating the other in the way that the Reconstruction Republicans threatened to dom-
inate the Democrats during the impeachment and trial of President Johnson. But the cru-
cial point is that it is not anachronistic to so interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, given
the historical role that the impeachment and trial of Johnson had just played at precisely
the point when Congress was considering the status of the Fourteenth Amendment's rat-
ification. By this point, not only had the nature of two-party competition developed-and
come to be accepted as the normal equilibrium in a democratic Republic-but the impeach-
ment and trial of Johnson had demonstrated the potentially devastating threat to that equi-
librium from excessive partisan overreaching. Thus, as a matter of history and America's
constitutional development, it is appropriate to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause as containing the necessary constitutional constraint against undue parti-
sanship that threatens the functioning of the democratic Republic, whereas it is not simi-
larly appropriate to interpret the original Constitution's Guarantee Clause in this way. (I
am indebted to Professor Evan Zoldan for recognizing the importance of this comparative
point about the Guarantee Clause.)
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A. Gerrymanders and the Fourteenth Amendment
It is all well and good that, as Part II showed, the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that it should be understood
to constitutionalize a constraint against excessive partisanship.
But if it turned out that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically did not believe that gerrymandering was a form of ex-
cessive partisanship, it would be difficult to employ this constitu-
tional constraint against excessive partisanship as a means of
rendering gerrymandering unconstitutional.31 As it happens,
however, the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment shows that its authors, far from accepting gerry-
mandering as appropriate political behavior, condemned it as the
very essence of the excessive partisanship that they considered
inappropriate.
While it would be too much to say that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had a specific intent to outlaw gerry-
mandering as a component of their constitutional handiwork, it
is not too much to say that those responsible for the Fourteenth
Amendment being part of the Constitution exhibited adherence to
both the general goal of eradicating the kind of extreme partisan-
ship that threatened the nation during the Johnson impeachment
proceedings and the specific understanding that gerrymanders
231 In Dworkinian terms, there would be an obstacle to this interpretation in terms of
its fit with the historical record. This obstacle would occur at the level of applying a general
principle that otherwise did fit (the constraint against excessive partisanship) to a specific
practice, gerrymandering. Consider an analogy from Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Suppose at the level of general principle that the Establishment Clause is properly inter-
preted as containing a constraint against the government engaging in an official endorse-
ment of sectarian faith, as Justice O'Connor famously articulated with her "no endorse-
ment" test. See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor concurring).
Suppose further, however, that at the level of specific application, it was impossible to
conclude that the long-standing practice of legislative prayer led by legislatively appointed
(and legislatively funded) chaplains was a violation of the Establishment Clause. See
Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 795 (1983). The historical record of this particular prac-
tice being consistent with the Establishment Clause was just too strong for the practice to
be invalidated. Id at 790. Any interpretation that invalidated the practice would flunk the
dimension of fit. In this situation, even if the general principle of no endorsement other-
wise adequately fit the historical record, and thus properly could be applied to invalidate
other government practices inconsistent with the principle, the Dworkinian approach
would have to uphold the validity of legislative prayers based on legislative practice as a
necessary interpretative exception to the general principle. Thus, to comply with the man-
date of "law as integrity," the Dworkinian approach requires an examination of the histor-
ical record to see whether gerrymandering must be accepted as an entrenched exception
to the otherwise-valid principle that constrains partisan overreaching in the same way
that legislative prayer must be accepted as an entrenched exception to the otherwise-valid
"no endorsement" principle.
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were the archetypal evil resulting from overzealous partisanship.
Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment themselves
may not have combined these two propositions into the constitu-
tional conclusion that follows from their combination-that ger-
rymandering contravenes the constraint against partisan over-
reaching embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment-judges today
can take both of these historically rooted propositions and com-
bine them to reach this constitutional conclusion. Both proposi-
tions are comfortably sound along the dimension of fit, and for
Professor Dworkin's Justice Hercules to combine them to reach
the conclusion that gerrymandering violates due process is to in-
terpret the historical circumstances of the Due Process Clause in
their best light. To be sure, it is not the most minimalist interpre-
tation of the Due Process Clause. "Law as integrity," however,
does not seek the most minimalist interpretation, but rather the
one that is the most appropriate understanding of the historical
record for the purposes that the Constitution serves today-most
especially, as the framework for organizing democratic govern-
ance. In this way, a contemporary determination that gerry-
mandering violates the principle of fair play embedded in due
process follows from historically appropriate propositions con-
cerning the Fourteenth Amendment generally and gerryman-
dering specifically.
The original gerrymander was a misshapen district adopted
by the Massachusetts legislature in 1812 as part of the new map
for seats in the state senate. 232 Named after Governor Elbridge
Gerry, who signed the map into law, and shaped like a monstrous
salamander according to a cartoon that quickly came to represent
the archetype of inappropriate districting,233 this original gerry-
mander was designed to preserve the political power of the so-
called Democratic Republican, or Jeffersonian Republican, Party,
which recently had overtaken its rival, the Federalist Party.234
232 Elmer C. Griffith, The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander 16-18 (Scott,
Foresman 1907).
233 See Figure 1.
234 See Kenneth C. Martis, The Original Gerrymander, 27 Polit Geo 833, 834-35 (2008).
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FIGURE 1. THE ORIGINAL GERRYMANDER235
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Despite their recent ascendency, the Democratic Republicans
were fearful of the Federalists mounting a comeback. The two
parties had been locked in ferocious combat, especially in New
England, at least since President Thomas Jefferson had won the
presidency in 1800.236 The salamander-shaped senatorial district
was immediately denounced as an especially egregious weapon in
this partisan war. 2 37 It is impossible to overstate the importance
of the district's grotesque shape as an essential element of its im-
propriety to those that condemned it in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, insofar as the term "gerrymander" is a portmanteau of
235 The Gerry-Mander, Boston Gazette 2 (Mar 26, 1812).
236 See Martis, 27 Polit Geo at 834-35 (cited in note 234).
237 As Professor Elmer Griffith described it, the map of the misshapen district was
described as lacking only "wings to resemble a prehistoric monster," and the artist
Elkanah Tisdale "at once" took up the suggestion by drawing the famous cartoon that,
once printed in a newspaper and widely circulated, gave the original gerrymander its
quickly ubiquitous name. Griffith, The Rise and Development at 17-18 (cited in note 232).
See also Martis, 27 Polit Geo at 834-35 (cited in note 234).
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"Gerry" and "salamander," the visual image of its ugliness is built
into the very definition of the objectionable practice. Like all the
other examples of gerrymandering that have followed in the foot-
steps of their original namesake, the 1812 partisan distortion of
district lines that constituted the original gerrymander literally
changed the field of electoral combat so that the field would favor
one side over the other.
The Democratic Republicans were indeed successful in van-
quishing their Federalist opponents, as America's first party sys-
tem gave way to the "Era of Good Feelings."238 That interlude was
unstable, and there soon arose the second party system, with the
Whigs now the opponents to the Democrats, who became increas-
ingly populist under President Andrew Jackson's leadership. The
Whigs in turn were replaced by the new Republican Party during
the battles over slavery that led up to the Civil War.239 By 1860,
when President Lincoln was elected and the South seceded, ger-
rymandering had become a prevalent practice in each version of
the two-party combat that characterized American politics.240
Prevalent, but not popular. Viewed as a political sin, gerry-
mandering was the public analog to private immorality, like adul-
tery or prostitution. "The gerrymander was considered a political,
civil and moral injustice."241 It might have been a widespread
practice, but that was because of susceptibility to temptation.
Gerrymandering was no less evil or pernicious, or less recognized
as such, because of its prevalence. Politicians simply could not re-
sist engaging in the practice when they had the opportunity to do
so, just as alcoholics cannot resist a drink when addiction over-
powers their will.
The politicians addicted to gerrymandering themselves rec-
ognized the sinfulness of their behavior. For example, the future
president James Garfield publicly acknowledged as a congress-
man that he was a beneficiary of gerrymandering to the detriment
of his constituents. He pleaded for an institutional solution that
238 See Aldrich, Why Parties at 103-04 (cited in note 4).
239 For a useful overview of the development of America's party systems in the nine-
teenth century by the leading political scientist on the topic, see John H. Aldrich, Did
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison "Cause" the U.S. Government Shutdown? The Institu-
tional Path from an Eighteenth Century Republic to a Twenty-First Century Democracy,
13 Persp Polit 7, 10-11 (2015).
240 Engstrom, Partisan Gerrymandering at 81 (cited in note 1) ("Throughout the 19th
century, state political parties used gerrymandering to bias congressional election out-
comes in their favor.").
241 Griffith, The Rise and Development at 124 (cited in note 232).
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would rid the American political system of this evil, because he
knew that he could not resist it as an individual politician.242
Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, this duality
regarding the immorality of gerrymandering was commonplace:
it was both widespread and widely condemned as a paramount
political sin. As the first leading history on the topic summarized
this essential point: "By 1840 the gerrymander was generally
practiced by all the states that used election-districts. Moreover
by that time it was fully recognized as an evil of the republic
which demanded legislation to prevent it."243
The question remained what was to be the institutional fix
that would cure American democracy of this evil addiction, so that
the public was not at the mercy of weak-willed politicians and
their inevitably partisan motives. Congress legislated to address
the manipulation of congressional districts in 1842, but this leg-
islation was counterproductive because, by mandating single-
member districts, Congress only exacerbated the problem?2
States amended their own constitutions in an effort to slay the
gerrymander, but these measures had only limited success be-
cause their prescriptions tended only to redress particular means
of accomplishing a gerrymandered map rather than outlawing
gerrymanders in their entirety. For example, "[t]hese provisions
included the requirements that the districts be composed of con-
tiguous territory, that they be compact," and "that no county be
divided."245 As the Civil War approached, a universal cure re-
mained elusive.
In 1861, across the Atlantic, John Stuart Mill published Con-
siderations on Representative Government.246 In it, he proposed a
form of proportional representation as a means to redress Britain's
problem of "rotten boroughs," whereby the interests of constitu-
ents were submerged by partisan manipulations aimed at favor-
ing the members of Parliament and their party's interests.247
242 See Argersinger, Representation and Inequality at 19 (cited in note 1) (discussing
Garfield's confession of benefiting from gerrymandering at the same time as he denounced
it as "the weak point in the theory of representative government, as now organized and
administered").
243 Griffith, The Rise and Development at 11 (cited in note 232).
244 See id at 119, 123. See also Argersinger, Representation and Inequality at 13-14
(cited in note 1) (recognizing that the congressional motive may have been more partisan
than fair-minded).
245 Griffith, The Rise and Development at 123 (cited in note 232).
246 See generally John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government
(Parker, Son, and Bourn 1861).
247 See Dale E. Miller, J.S. Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought 181 (Polity 2010).
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While not identical to gerrymandering, Britain's rotten bor-
oughs were an analogous cancer that subverted representative
democracy. When Mill's book reached America's shores, it imme-
diately aroused great interest, sparking a flurry of publications
aimed at using his ideas to improve American democracy.48 Most
especially, Mill's American readers saw his theory of proportional
representation as an innovative way to eradicate the American
evil of gerrymandering.
The leading text was The Degradation of Our Representa-
tive System, and Its Reform by J. Francis Fisher, a prominent
Philadelphian.249 Written in the midst of the Civil War, it was a
call for the rejuvenation of the Union's democratic-republican in-
stitutions, which the author believed were perishing due "to the
rapid decay of public virtue in [elected] representatives."250 After
discussing Mill's Representative Government generally and the
dangers of overreaching by a political party in majority control of
a legislature, Fisher singled out gerrymandering as particularly
pernicious:
[O]f all the evil consequences of this unstable possession of
power, the most obnoxious is a party measure peculiar to our
country, invented, it is said, by one of the early Democratic
Governors of Massachusetts, from whom it has its appella-
tion,-Gerrymandering. A more unprincipled scheme, and
one more opposed to the true principles of Democracy, never
was imagined or put in practice; ... it is one of the monstrous
evils arising out of our mode of electing by local majorities,
which cries out for reform.251
Two years after Fisher's work appeared, Simon Sterne, a
Philadelphia native who had moved to New York after studying
law at the University of Pennsylvania, took a trip to England and
248 See Kathleen L. Barber, A Right to Representation: Proportional Election Systems
for the Twenty-First Century 19 (Ohio State 2000) (explaining that Mill's "writings were
widely read in the United States").
249 See generally J. Francis Fisher, The Degradation of Our Representative System, and
Its Reform (C. Sherman, Son 1863). Fisher was active in creating the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, which continues to house his family's papers. See Collection 1858: Joshua
Francis Fisher (1807-1873) Papers *1 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania 2004), archived
at http://perma.cc/FZ3W-UZHJ.
250 Fisher, The Degradation of Our Representative System at 3 (cited in note 249).
251 Id at 9-10 (emphasis added).
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met with Mill.252 Upon his return, Sterne worked with other lead-
ing lawyers of his era, including David Dudley Field, to promote
the adoption of proportional representation in America.253 One of
Sterne's lectures on the topic, at the Cooper Union in 1869, drew
a crowd estimated at about fifteen hundred listeners.254 Sterne
also wrote his own book, On Representative Government and Per-
sonal Representation.255 Like Fisher, Sterne explained why a
Millian system of proportional representation would eliminate
the evil of gerrymanders:
That political knavery known as gerrymandering, which is
possible only by means of, and is created by the district sys-
tem, would, under [proportional] representation, be utterly
destroyed and laid to rest....
This.evil, so necessarily incident to the district system,
would cease by means of [proportional] representation.256
About the same time as Sterne published his book, Salem
Dutcher, another New Yorker, wrote one of his own, Minority or
Proportional Representation, which made equivalent claims: "In-
stances of the operations of 'gerrymandering' in the United States
might be given ad infinitum. No party seems ever to have had
virtue enough to refrain from yielding to the temptation afforded
by it to sustain itself in power."257 Dutcher even cited "one miracle
of 'gerrymandering,' by which the majority on the popular vote
failed to obtain a single Representative in the legislative body!"258
Proportional representation, Dutcher maintained, was the anti-
dote to this disease.
The discussion was not confined to books, but instead ex-
tended to the pages of the American Law Review. In an 1872
252 Clarence Gilbert Hoag and George Hervey Hallett Jr, Proportional Representa-
tion 183 (Macmillan 1926); John Foord, The Life & Public Services of Simon Sterne 1
(Macmillan 1903).
253 Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation at 184-85 (cited in note 252).
254 Id at 185.
255 See generally Simon Sterne, On Representative Government and Personal Repre-
sentation (J.B. Lippincott 1871). Sterne, born in 1839, was thirty-two years younger than
Fisher, who was born in 1807. Foord, The Life & Public Services of Simon Sterne at 1 (cited
in note 252); Joshua Francis Fisher Papers at *1 (cited in note 249). Thus, Sterne was in his
thirties when he wrote his book, while Fisher was in his fifties at the time of writing his.
256 Sterne, On Representative Government at 96-97 (cited in note 255).
257 Salem Dutcher, Minority or Proportional Representation: Its Nature, Aims, His-
tory, Processes, and Practical Operation 23 (United States Publishing 1872).
258 Id.
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article entitled The Machinery of Politics and Proportional Rep-
resentation, the Boston polymath Professor William R. Ware col-
lected all the relevant sources then available. Ware added his
voice to the rising chorus of intellectuals who were advocating
proportional representation as an alternative to America's nox-
ious system of legislative districting: "The most notorious evil con-
nected with the system [ ] is that known as 'Gerrymandering."'259
The article included a reproduction of the original cartoon of the
monstrously shaped district that visually defined what a gerry-
mander was. 26 0 Leading newspapers, "including the New York
World and Tribune, the Chicago Republican, Times, and Tribune,
the Cincinnati Enquirer, and the St. Louis Republican," were
making the same point in their editorials.261
It was not just intellectuals who were attacking America's
problem of gerrymandering. After Mill's Representative Govern-
ment garnered attention in the United States, the campaign to
259 William R. Ware, The Machinery of Politics and Proportional Representation, 6
Am L Rev 255, 283 (1872).
260 See id at 284. The article attributed the original cartoon to the famous artist Gilbert
Stuart, a common misattribution at the time. Id at 283 n 1. See also Martis, 27 Polit Geo
at 836 (cited in note 234). This misattribution hardly undercuts the point that in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, whenever anyone condemned the evil of gerrymandering,
they visually had in mind the image of the original cartoon of the 1812 misshapen district.
On the contrary, attributing the cartoon to the same artist who painted the most promi-
nent portraits of Presidents George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and vir-
tually all the other leading figures of the Founding pantheon only elevated the status of
the cartoon as representing exactly what was widely understood-and condemned-as an
unconscionable gerrymander. Carrie Rebora Barratt and Ellen G. Miles, Gilbert Stuart
134-90, 217-22, 277-85 (Yale 2004). Indeed, Professor Kenneth Martis has observed that
some credited Stuart with the very term "gerrymander" as well as the quintessential car-
toon depicting it. Martis, 27 Polit Geo at 836 (cited in note 234).
261 Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation at 185 (cited in note 252). See also
Dutcher, Minority or Proportional Representation at 42 (cited in note 257).
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adopt proportional representation as a remedy for gerrymander-
ing gained traction in Congress as well.262 Its leading advocate
there was Senator Charles Buckalew of Pennsylvania.263
Buckalew favored a version of proportional representation
known as cumulative voting, whereby each voter receives the
same number of votes as seats and can cast up to all of those votes
for a single candidate. (Cumulative voting works as a form of pro-
portional representation insofar as adherents of a minority polit-
ical party can win a portion of the seats by concentrating more
votes on fewer candidates.)264 Buckalew introduced a bill to adopt
cumulative voting for congressional elections in 1867. In a speech
to the Senate on July 11 of that year, Buckalew directly invoked
the elimination of gerrymandering as a reason to support cumu-
lative voting: "[O]ne great advantage of this system is that it
abolishes gerrymandering in the States, cuts it up by the roots,
ends it forever. That is one of the most crying evils of the time."265
Buckalew repeated the point for emphasis: "The system of cumu-
lative voting, however, avoiding the creation of single districts in
a State, avoids altogether this capital evil and mischief of gerry-
mandering and brings it to an end so far as the selection of mem-
bers of Congress is concerned."266
Buckalew delivered his speech at the same time that the
Fourteenth Amendment was under active consideration. It had
been sent to the states by Congress in June 1866.267 A year later,
when Buckalew brought cumulative voting and the evil of gerry-
mandering to the Senate's attention, it had been ratified by
262 There were also efforts to adopt proportional representation in the states. For ex-
ample, New York's constitutional convention in 1867 considered one such proposal. One
proponent observed:
I am not one of those, Mr. Chairman, who consider the existence of parties as an
unmixed evil. I think we must and should have parties in a free government and
the plan proposed will not break up or destroy parties. It will tend to do away
with party tyranny. It will liberate the voter from the dominion of party. . . .And
this I consider not an end to be feared, but "a consummation devoutly to be
wished."
Dutcher, Minority or Proportional Representation at 51 (cited in note 257). Illinois was one
state that had a system of proportional representation for over a century. See generally
Robin Tholin, "One Person, Three Votes;" Illinois' 110-Year Experiment with Cumulative
Voting (unpublished thesis, Wesleyan University, Apr 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/WV94-VPSQ.
263 Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation at 183-84 (cited in note 252).
264 See Tholin, "One Person, Three Votes" at *14-29 (cited in note 262).
265 39 Cong Globe, 40th Cong, 1st Sess 577 (July 11, 1867) (statement of Sen Buckalew).
266 Id.
267 See James, The Ratification at 2-6 (cited in note 165).
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twenty-two states (including Ohio and New Jersey, which had not
yet voted to rescind their ratifications), but not the twenty-eight
states presumed necessary on the assumption that the former
Confederate states still counted for the purpose of reaching the
three-quarters necessary under Article V of the Constitution.268
Thus, when Buckalew proposed cumulative voting as a remedy
for gerrymandering, Congress was still deliberating about the
fate of the Fourteenth Amendment, which would not be resolved
until the following summer.
Congress did not adopt Buckalew's plan for cumulative vot-
ing. But that was not because Congress accepted gerrymandering
as salutary. Rather, cumulative voting was too radical a cure for
the disease. Members of Congress still condemned gerrymander-
ing, even as they were searching for a more appropriate remedy.
As Representative, later president, Garfield put it: "In my judg-
ment it is the weak point in the theory of representative govern-
ment, as now organized and administered, that a large portion of
the voting people are permanently disenfranchised."269
After acknowledging that he could "find no stronger illustra-
tion of the evil than in [his] own State," where "the adjustment
and distribution of political power" through gerrymandering
caused an essentially fifty-fifty split in votes to yield a fourteen-
to-five partisan split in the state's congressional delegation,
Garfield proclaimed: "Now no man, whatever his politics, can
justly defend a system that may in theory, and frequently does in
practice, produce such results as these."270
Although a congressional statute eradicating gerrymanders
would have been desirable, Congress provided an alternative
foundation for a remedy through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Members of Congress may not have been aware of its potential
implications at the time, but the Amendment's Due Process
Clause and its principle of fair play had the capacity to become an
antidote to gerrymandering. There is no reason not to let the Due
Process Clause do this work simply because the Congress that
simultaneously condemned gerrymandering and secured the
Fourteenth Amendment's place in the Constitution did not put
two and two together for themselves. Judges today still can rec-
ognize the truth that 2 + 2 = 4. Indeed, from a Dworkinian per-
spective, it is precisely the task of contemporary judges to engage
268 See id at 280-81.
269 41 Cong Globe, 41st Cong, 2d Sess 4737 (June 23, 1870) (statement of Rep Garfield).
270 Id.
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in such an enterprise. When the historical record presents to the
contemporary judge both the major and minor premises of a syl-
logism, putting both premises together to yield the syllogism's
conclusion is an example of interpreting the historical record in
its best light, and this is true even if at the time the historical
protagonists did not recognize the syllogistic connection them-
selves.21 The Fortieth Congress, which sat in 1867 and 1868, be-
queathed both components of the syllogism that renders gerry-
mandering unconstitutional. It gave us the major premise that
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalizes
a constraint against partisan overreaching, as well as the minor
premise that gerrymandering is a pernicious form of partisan
overreaching that must be redressed. Just like 2 + 2 necessarily
equals 4, it is now incumbent on Dworkin's Justice Hercules to put
together the major and minor premises of the syllogism, both of
which are rooted in the historical record, to yield the necessarily
entailed conclusion: gerrymandering is a form of partisan over-
reaching that violates the Due Process Clause's norm of fair play.
B. Due Process and Gerrymanders: A Judicially Workable Test
Even if we accept that the principle of fair play embedded in
due process imposes a constitutional constraint on partisan ger-
rymandering, there still needs to be a way for judges to operation-
alize this constraint. As Part I demonstrated, efforts to use the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to generate a
judicially enforceable constraint against partisan gerrymanders
have foundered in part because of a perception that such efforts
can yield no judicially manageable standard to distinguish an un-
constitutional gerrymander from permissible legislative district-
ing. What makes the Due Process Clause and its principle of fair
play different in this regard?
The answer lies in the use of the original gerrymander as an
appropriate historical benchmark for measuring partisan manip-
ulation of legislative districting that contravenes fair play. The
evil of gerrymandering, as was immediately understood upon
looking at the monstrous, salamander-shaped district on the map,
was that the district lines were an inappropriate distortion of
what the legislative districts should be. It was evident that this
271 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 227-32 (cited in note 18).
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distortion was committed for partisan purposes. 272 Moreover, it is
possible to measure the amount of distortion in this original ger-
rymander and use that measure as a standard by which to judge
any other legislative map. 27 3
As explained more fully in the next Section, it is appropriate
to use the visual image of the original gerrymander in this way
precisely because it is what nineteenth-century writers and poli-
ticians had in mind when they condemned gerrymandering as
pernicious. From a historical perspective, grounding the constitu-
tional constraint against gerrymandering in the visual shape of
the original gerrymander is not unprincipled. On the contrary, it
is the constitutional interpretation that simultaneously best fits
the historical record and is capable of construing the Constitution
in its best light for the purpose of employing the Constitution as
the framework for contemporary democracy. Other ways to inval-
idate partisan redistricting might be more normatively attractive
from the perspective of pure political theory, but they do not ade-
quately fit the historical record, whereas a constitutional standard
grounded in the original gerrymander itself meets the essential
test of interpretive fit.
Thus, a plaintiff challenging a map as a violation of the Due
Process Clause would have to show that the challenged map con-
tained a measure of distortion equal to or greater than the distor-
tion of the original gerrymander. The plaintiff would also have to
show that this distortion was a breach of fair play because it pro-
duced a partisan advantage for the mapmaker's party that would
272 See Griffith, The Rise and Development at 70 (cited in note 232) ("That the in-
tended results of this law were generally known is further evident from the number of
resolutions passed throughout the state and the numerous protests sent to the legisla-
ture."). Federalists asserted that the original gerrymander, which passed on purely parti-
san votes in the legislature, was "a travesty upon the Bill of Rights when it allowed the
minority to govern." Id at 71. The original gerrymander was successful in achieving its
purpose, as the Democratic Republican Party retained control of the state senate, with
twenty-nine seats compared to eleven for the Federalists, even though statewide Federalist
candidates for state senate seats had received 51,766 votes, whereas their Democratic
Republican opponents had received only 50,164. Id at 72-73. "Thus the twenty-nine
Democratic senators were elected by a smaller vote than the eleven Federalist senators
received." Id at 73. The original gerrymander appropriately serves as the archetypal ex-
ample of the evil gerrymandering accomplishes not only because of its distorted shape but
because this distortion enabled a party rejected by a majority of voters nonetheless to cling
to majority control of a legislative chamber. That kind of partisan overreaching is inher-
ently subversive of majority rule in a democracy.
273 See generally Stephen Ansolabehere and Maxwell Palmer, A Two Hundred- Year
Statistical History of the Gerrymander, 77 Ohio St L J 741 (2016) (measuring the compact-
ness of congressional districts against the original gerrymander).
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not have been achieved with an undistorted map. The plaintiff
would meet this burden of proof by offering an example of an un-
distorted map that would have yielded an electoral result lacking
this partisan advantage. In other words, if the distorted map
caused Party A to win x legislative seats, whereas using the un-
distorted map would have caused Party A to win y seats, where
y <x, then the plaintiff would have met the burden of showing
that the distorted map produced a partisan advantage.274
The plaintiff would not automatically win the case upon
meeting this burden of proof. Rather, at that point, the burden
would shift to the mapmaker to justify the use of the distorted
map despite the partisan advantage it conferred. Perhaps the
mapmaker could demonstrate a good reason for the distorted
map. But this justification would need to be nonpartisan. The
mapmaker could not defend the constitutionality of the map on
the ground that the goal was to achieve the partisan advantage
that the distortion produced. That would be the very essence of
unfair play in violation of the Due Process Clause. Instead, the
mapmaker would be required to show that what superficially ap-
peared to be distortion reflected legitimate geographical circum-
stances, such as the nature of demographic residential patterns
in the particular localities involved. If the mapmaker could make
this showing, then the map would not be a breach of fair play and
thus would withstand due process scrutiny. But if not, then the
plaintiff would prevail by demonstrating that the distorted map
274 Using precinct-level electoral returns, the plaintiff would satisfy this burden by
showing that, with the undistorted alternative map, the vote totals for each party in each
district would cause Party A to win more votes in only y number of districts, whereas with
the same precinct-level data and the distorted actual map the vote totals for each district
would cause Party A to win x number of districts. This calculation could be applied to an
election that already occurred using the actual distorted map. If so, the calculation for the
alternative undistorted map would be made as if the same candidates were running in all
the same legislative races, even though the district lines would be different. Obviously,
that assumption is counterfactual insofar as different district lines might cause different
candidates to run within each party, and different candidates to win party primaries.
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs demonstration that changing from a distorted to an un-
distorted map would eliminate a partisan advantage even assuming the same candidates
is enough to put the burden on the mapmaker to justify the choice of the distorted map.
Similarly, even before an election is run using the distorted map, a plaintiff could
challenge the map with precinct-level data from the most recent election held in the state.
With that data, one can see how many seats the mapmaker's party would have won in that
election if the distorted map had been in use. One can also show how many seats that
same party would have won if the plaintiffs alternative undistorted map had been used.
If the mapmaker's party would win more seats under its new, distorted map than it would
under the plaintiffs alternative, undistorted map, that showing should suffice to require
the mapmaker to justify the distorted map on the basis of a legitimate, nonpartisan reason.
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was an exercise of partisan overreaching that could not be justi-
fied on legitimate nonpartisan grounds, and thus was a violation
of the Due Process Clause's fair play principle.
What is distinctive about this approach is its use of the orig-
inal gerrymander as the benchmark. In an important new paper,
the political scientists Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and
Maxwell Palmer demonstrated how the original gerrymander can
be used in this way to create a standard by which all other dis-
tricts can be measured.275 There are actually multiple ways to
measure the extent to which a district is misshapen, and any one
of these can be used for the purpose of setting the original gerry-
mander as the standard. For example, the so-called Reock method
identifies the smallest circle in which a district will fit and com-
pares the area of the district to the area of that circle.276 The
Polsby-Popper method, by contrast, measures a district's perim-
eter and then compares the district's area with the area of a circle
having the same perimeter as the district.277 As Ansolabehere and
Palmer showed, these two methods often, but not always, agree
on which districts are misshapen.278 And for each method, the
original gerrymander can be set as 1, so that it serves as the
standard, with every other district having a measure greater or
less than 1.279 All districts measuring greater than 1 are more mis-
shapen that the original gerrymander according to that particular
method.280
For purposes of litigation under the Due Process Clause's
principle of fair play, a plaintiff should be permitted to identify a
district as presumptively problematic according to any of these
particular methods of measurement. In other words, if a district
exceeds a score of 1 under either Reock or Polsby-Popper, and if
the plaintiff also demonstrates a partisan advantage resulting
from a district that is more misshapen than the original gerry-
mander according to this score-meaning that the plaintiff can
offer a map with all districts scoring less than 1 and not causing
this partisan advantage-then it is appropriate to shift the bur-
den to the mapmaker to justify the misshapen district.281 Because
275 See generally Ansolabehere and Palmer, 77 Ohio St L J 741 (cited in note 273).
276 Id at 743, 746.
277 Id at 746-47.
278 See id at 757.
279 See Ansolabehere and Palmer, 77 Ohio St L J at 752 (cited in note 273).
280 This test can be used for either congressional or state legislative districts.
281 The reason why it is appropriate to let a plaintiff rely on either Reock or Polsby-
Popper, rather than require the plaintiff to demonstrate that a challenged district is worse
723
The University of Chicago Law Review
the plaintiff has shown that it was possible to draw a map without
any district having a worse score than the original gerrymander,
why did the mapmaker draw a district having this poor score? If
the mapmaker offers a good reason for having done so (meaning,
again, a nonpartisan reason), then the map is valid. But if the
mapmaker is incapable of offering a legitimate, nonpartisan rea-
son to have a map with a worse score than the original gerryman-
der, and if the plaintiff has demonstrated that the map's distorted
shape has yielded an unjustified partisan advantage, then the
map should be declared invalid under the Due Process Clause's
fair play principle.
Thus, using the original gerrymander in this way yields a
straightforward, workable test for judges to employ in identify-
ing modern gerrymanders that are unconstitutional because
they violate the Fourteenth Amendment's constraint against
partisan overreaching.282
C. The Appropriateness and Comparative Advantage of This
Workable Test
For the reasons just given, one might agree that this use of
the original gerrymander as a benchmark might yield a judicially
workable test, and yet still ask whether this test is appropriate,
or why it is superior to the various tests that have been proposed
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Is it arbitrary to make the constitutionality of contempo-
rary legislative districts turn on their resemblance to a single
malformed district adopted in one state in 1812? And even if it
is not arbitrary, is it really any different-or better-than the
burden-shifting tests that Justices Stevens and Souter proposed
in Vieth under the Equal Protection Clause?
than the original gerrymander according to both mathematical measures, is that the pur-
pose of the math is to have a precise way to identify what looks suspicious upon visual
inspection. Any district that scores worse than the original gerrymander is presumptively
suspicious, because the original gerrymander was so objectionable itself. To be sure, the
mapmaker must have an opportunity to rebut that suspicion, but it is still constitutionally
appropriate to put that burden on the mapmaker for any map that is suspicious just be-
cause of its comparability to the quintessential evil of the original gerrymander.
282 Ansolabehere and Palmer offered visual examples of fifteen of the most gerryman-
dered districts in history, most of which are recent. Ansolabehere and Palmer, 77 Ohio St
L J at 759 (cited in note 273). While all of these are highly suspicious simply as a result of
their appearance, in each case the mapmaker would be entitled to attempt a defense on
nonpartisan grounds before the district could definitively be ruled unconstitutional under
this due process analysis.
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The answer to the first question is no, the use of the original
gerrymander is not arbitrary, and the reason is the special histor-
ical link between the original gerrymander and the problem of
partisan overreaching that the Fourteenth Amendment, embody-
ing the principle of fair play, exists to curtail. The original gerry-
mander is not just any legislative map. It is the map that everyone
in the middle of the nineteenth century invoked to define what
they meant by inappropriate partisan overreaching. Not only did
this map generate the very term "gerrymandering," but when
Buckalew and others in the 1860s used this term they had the
particular map from Massachusetts in 1812 very much in mind.23
For them, this map was the illustration of what inappropriate par-
tisanship looked like, and they themselves used this map as the
benchmark for the evil they wished to avoid-evil being the exact
word routinely used to describe this pernicious partisanship.84
At the same time as Congress was castigating the original
gerrymander as the quintessential illustration of improperly ex-
cessive partisanship, the Fourteenth Amendment was coming
into existence because of the recognition that the Constitution
must be understood to contain a constraint against partisan over-
reaching. Once it is recognized that it is appropriate to interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment as embodying a constitutional con-
straint against partisan overreaching, because of the historical
circumstances surrounding the congressional affirmation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, it becomes equally appro-
priate to identify the original gerrymander as the archetypal il-
lustration of what this constitutional constraint against partisan
overreaching renders unconstitutional. Far from being arbitrary,
the original gerrymander is the very essence of what the idea of
fair play, in its application to partisan competition and as under-
stood by the Congress that affirmed the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification, condemns.
This condemnation of the original gerrymander as the antith-
esis of political fair play is not rooted in any particular theory con-
cerning the ideal way to engage in legislative districting. Like-
wise, it is not premised on any particular conception of voting
rights or the nature of political equality among citizens. Instead,
283 Again, such mid-nineteenth-century authors as Fisher and Ware made explicit
reference to the original 1812 gerrymander, including reproducing a visual depiction of it,
as part of their condemnation of the practice named after that archetypal instance of it.
See text accompanying notes 249-60.
284 See text accompanying notes 251, 256, 259, 265-66, and 270.
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it is based on a specific historical understanding of what consti-
tutes inappropriate, or undue, partisanship. For purposes of con-
stitutional adjudication, however, this historical rootedness is a
feature, not a bug. The Due Process Clause, it has long been un-
derstood, is concerned with history and tradition, not abstract
political theory.285 This point applies as much to the fair play
principle embedded in due process as it does to any other aspect
of due process jurisprudence. Thus, to determine what amounts
to a violation of fair play, as constitutionalized through the Due
Process Clause, it is necessary to conduct a historical inquiry con-
cerning what America's political tradition reveals as a breach of
fair play. This historical inquiry leads immediately to the ines-
capable conclusion that the original gerrymander constitutes the
quintessential breach of fair play as this principle applies to the
domain of partisan competition.
By eschewing abstract political theory, this historically
rooted understanding of how due process and fair play apply in
the context of legislative districting avoids the problems that
arise with the use of the symmetry standard, or the efficiency gap,
or other ways to equalize electoral opportunities. As was shown,
those approaches founder because of residential patterns uncon-
nected with partisan overreaching.26 When Democrats clump to-
gether in urban areas at the same time that Republicans are dis-
persed in rural and other exurban areas, there is no single theory
of electoral representation that can be tied to the Equal Protection
Clause to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate district-
ing. But using the original gerrymander as a benchmark entirely
escapes that problem.
It is important to be clear how this distinction between using
the original gerrymander as a benchmark and developing a non-
historical standard of partisan fairness (like the efficiency gap)
relates to the enterprise of constitutional interpretation. From the
perspective of ideal political theory, the original gerrymander is
indeed arbitrary, just one possible deviation from fair districting
among many. From the perspective of ideal political theory, it de-
serves no privileging.
285 See, for example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substan-
tive Due Process Analysis, 62 Duke L J 535, 540-45 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, The
Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 Utah L Rev 665, 669-71. See also
generally, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 Mich L Rev
1543 (2008).
286 See notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
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But ideal political theory cannot be adequately linked to the
history of the Constitution itself to warrant its use in an exercise
of constitutional interpretation. There is no basis in the historical
record for saying that the Constitution embodies a standard of
partisan symmetry or the condemnation of districting maps that
produce an efficiency gap between parties. There is no reason
whatsoever to believe that nineteenth-century writers and politi-
cians would have condemned maps with partisan asymmetry, or
maps with large efficiency gaps, if those maps were merely the
consequences of districting decisions that tracked existing politi-
cal boundaries or other conventional districting criteria. In the
nineteenth century, a map would not have been even presump-
tively problematic, requiring government justification, simply be-
cause the map had a bad efficiency gap score.
By contrast, what nineteenth-century writers and politi-
cians vociferously condemned was the conscious manipulation,
or distortion, of a legislative district's lines, which was visually
recognizable by the misconfigured shape of the district on the
map itself. Making the constitutional standard turn on a visually
distorted map is faithful to the historical record underlying the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of its
soundness as a matter of pure political theory. It is appropriate
as an exercise of constitutional interpretation to put any map-
maker to the burden of justifying a district that is more mis-
shapen than the original gerrymander itself. It is appropriate as
constitutional interpretation, not because of a theory of political
equality that can be linked to equal protection, but instead be-
cause an egregiously misshapen map that cannot be defended on
nonpartisan grounds breaches the norm of fair play, which
properly can be linked to the Due Process Clause.
With the original gerrymander as the standard for identify-
ing presumptively unconstitutional districts, the focus is entirely
on whether or not a legislative district is as misshapen as the
original gerrymander, not on whether a legislative map is defi-
cient under the symmetry standard, efficiency gap, or some other
contestable norm for determining how districts should be drawn.
A district that is not as distorted as the original gerrymander does
not contravene the Due Process Clause's historically rooted princi-
ple of fair play, regardless of whether that district is part of a map
that flunks the symmetry standard, has an excessive efficiency
gap, or is arguably deficient according to some other contestable
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measure of electoral equality.287 Conversely, however, any district
as or more distorted than the original gerrymander must be jus-
tified by the mapmaker based on legitimate, nonpartisan
grounds-and that is exactly how Justice Hercules should con-
duct the constitutional analysis according to "law as integrity,"
which requires adequacy of historical fit. The original gerryman-
der is the template of unconstitutionality based on the fair play
principle embedded in due process, and thus any contemporary
district that is equally egregious according to that template of un-
constitutionality requires nonpartisan justification.
In Vieth, both Stevens and Souter proposed burden-shifting
tests that share some affinities with the workable burden-shifting
test proposed here. But neither Stevens nor Souter used the orig-
inal gerrymander as the benchmark for determining when the bur-
den shifts to the mapmaker to defend the map, and both Stevens
and Souter attempted to derive their burden-shifting tests from
equal protection, rather than due process, analysis. Both ap-
proaches, while promising, ultimately faltered because they could
not identify a constitutionally principled benchmark for identify-
ing when the burden shifted to the mapmaker. Relatedly, they
could not explain how equal protection analysis would identify a
standard for determining when the burden shifts.
Stevens said only that "a district's bizarre shape" should re-
quire the mapmaker to justify the district on nonpartisan
grounds.,, But he did not elaborate on how to determine when a
district's shape qualified as "bizarre," and he did not explain how
equal protection would provide a basis for making this "bizarre-
ness" determination. Souter similarly would have made "devia-
tions from traditional districting principles" part of a test for de-
termining when the burden of justification shifts to the
mapmaker.289 But Souter explicitly declined to identify how much
deviation from traditional districting principles would trigger this
burden-shifting. Nor did Souter explain how or why "deviations
287 To be sure, making the original gerrymander the benchmark in this way means
that legislative maps just slightly less misshapen-those with scores of 0.9, for example-
would escape constitutional invalidation. But this truth is just a consequence of the fact
that the existing Constitution is imperfect and cannot be fairly interpreted to make it per-
fect. Nonetheless, it is still better to interpret the existing Constitution to condemn current
gerrymanders just as bad as the original one-which is a fair interpretation of the docu-
ment given its history-than to interpret it as not condemning any gerrymanders at all,
which is how the Vieth plurality would have it.
288 Vieth, 541 US at 339 (Stevens dissenting).
289 Id at 349-51 (Souter dissenting).
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from traditional districting principles" were a violation of equal
protection.
The use of the original gerrymander as the benchmark, to-
gether with the link between the original gerrymander and the
due process principle of fair play, solves the problems inherent in
the approaches offered by Stevens and Souter. There is nothing
indeterminate about the original gerrymander as a benchmark.
It supplies the exact measure of "bizarreness," to use Stevens's
term, or "deviations from traditional districting principles," in
Souter's language. There is no guessing to be done: under this due
process approach, mapmakers know exactly when the burden
shifts to them to provide a nonpartisan justification for their
maps. 2 90 Moreover, they know why they are being put to this bur-
den under the due process approach: the original gerrymander is
the constitutional evil to be avoided according to the due process
principle of fair play. If you draw a district as misshapen as the
original gerrymander, and if your misshapen map gives your
party an advantage, then you are acting in a presumptively un-
constitutional manner according to this fair play principle, and
you need to defend yourself in terms consistent with the princi-
ple of fair play in political competition. It is as straightforward
and simple as that, and this workable test is appropriately
rooted in the constitutional history underlying the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment and its Due Process Clause. There
is no reason to be mired in the indeterminacies that afflicted the
equal protection approaches attempted by Stevens and Souter in
Vieth.291
IV. FAIR PLAY AND CHANGES IN VOTING RULES
The fair play principle embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause does not constrain partisan
290 Unlike obscenity, for which Justice Potter Stewart's famous claim ("I know it when
I see it") was debatable, Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart concurring),
Ansolabehere and Palmer's observation that "we know a gerrymander when we see it" is,
by definition, mathematically demonstrable. Ansolabehere and Palmer, 77 Ohio St L J at
761 (cited in note 273).
291 Justice Kennedy in Vieth understood that "[t]he ordered working of our Republic,
and of the democratic process, depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches
of government, and in the citizenry itself." Vieth, 541 US at 316 (Kennedy concurring in
the judgment). He just could not identify the appropriate constitutional basis for this prin-
ciple of restraint or how to operationalize it. This Article has shown that due process is
the appropriate grounds for this fair play principle and how history provides a sound basis
for the judicial enforcement of it.
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overreaching only in the form of gerrymanders. It also constrains
excessive partisanship in the form of changes to voting rules.92
The improper unsettling of legitimately settled expectations has
long been recognized as a core component of what due process pro-
tects against. This same analysis applies to the unsettling of ex-
pectations concerning voting procedures. If voters have reasonably
come to rely on the availability of a particular type of voting pro-
cedure, and if the government removes its availability without a
legitimately nonpartisan reason for doing so, then this removal is
a form of inappropriate partisanship in violation of fair play and
due process. Moreover, because this protection of reasonable ex-
pectations of voting procedures against purely partisan changes
derives from the fair play principle embedded in the Due Process
Clause, there is no need to demonstrate that the purely partisan
change is a form of discrimination in violation of equal protection;
instead, regardless of the inapplicability of Anderson-Burdick and
its focus on discriminatory burdens, the Due Process Clause pro-
tects all voters, even if they are equally affected, from excessively
partisan changes in voting procedures.293
292 These two different specifications of the fair play norm do not necessarily need to
be linked directly to each other. Instead, they properly can be seen as separate applications
of the same fair play norm to different particular situations, just as both are separate from
the way fair play operates in the realm of in personam jurisdiction or criminal procedure.
Each of these specifications is best understood as an example of the kind of intermediary
constitutional principle that Professor Richard H. Fallon Jr has so helpfully analyzed. See
Richard H. Fallon Jr, Implementing the Constitution 76-101 (Harvard 2001). Constitu-
tional adjudication consists of both general norms and subsidiary implementing princi-
ples. Fair play is one such general norm, and it needs different subsidiary implementing
principles to address different particular problems, like gerrymandering and the rollback
of voting rules. To invoke (again) the analogy of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
overarching norm of government impartiality in the realm of religion leads to two different
subsidiary principles for separate implementation contexts: the "no endorsement" princi-
ple, to cover government expressions of religious adherence; and fiscal neutrality, to cover
government subsidies to religious and nonreligious schools. See Lynch V Donnelly, 465 US
668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor concurring) (describing the no endorsement principle);
Mitchell v Helms, 530 US 793, 810 (2000) (Thomas) (plurality) (describing the neutrality
principle).
293 The due process analysis applied to voting rules, as articulated here, overlaps to
some extent with my colleague Professor Daniel P. Tokaji's recent reliance on the First
Amendment as a basis for challenging legislation affecting voting opportunities. See gen-
erally Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 Fla St U L Rev 763 (2016). His approach,
like mine, focuses on the concern that partisanship causes improper interference with vot-
ing opportunities. Id at 786. His reliance on the First Amendment, while a valuable addi-
tion to the literature, has two shortcomings. First, by triggering constitutional scrutiny for
any law with a "disparate impact on voters affiliated with the non-dominant party," Tokaji's
approach is unduly intrusive. Id at 787. States should not be required to defend laws just
because they have a minimally differential impact on a political party other than the one
with majority status in the legislature. Instead, the focus should be on breaches of the
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A. The Due Process Clause's Protection of Legitimately Settled
Expectations
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have long been understood to protect persons
against laws that improperly unsettle "vested rights" or other rea-
sonable reliance interests that persons may have in existing legal
arrangements. 294 This due process protection against inappropri-
ate legal change usually has been associated with either protection
of property, contracts, or other economic interests or protection
against the retroactive application of newly enacted criminal or
other punitive measures. 295 Nonetheless, this due process princi-
ple is broad enough that it is capable of encompassing changes in
voting rules that inappropriately unsettle reasonable expecta-
tions concerning the operation of the voting process.296
norm of fair play, which is a more exacting standard. The idea of fair play gives more
leeway for the normal political competition between political parties, and this leeway is
more appropriate for judicial policing of the constitutional boundaries of legitimate politi-
cal competition in a democracy. Second, and relatedly, reliance on the norm of fair play as
a component of due process has a better fit with the historical record than does the claim
that the First Amendment protects political parties from disparate impacts. The First
Amendment, as originally drafted, was not intended to protect political parties. Moreover,
even insofar as the First Amendment has properly been construed to encompass a right of
political association, that right is not confined to political parties, but extends to all forms
of political associations, as Tokaji acknowledges. Id at 788-89. Although I share Tokaji's
view that political parties play a distinctive role in a democracy, and that the nondominant
party needs constitutional protection from overreaching legislation imposed by the domi-
nant party, I think the better way to understand that protection from a Dworkinian perspec-
tive, given the judicial obligation to assure an adequate fit with the historical record, is to
locate that protection in the due process norm of fair play, rather than a First Amendment
constraint against discriminatory impacts upon political associations.
294 Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L
J 408, 423-24 (2010).
295 Id at 423-25.
296 As already noted in Part h.A, at the end of the nineteenth century, Justice Harlan
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected against im-
proper interference with the rights of voters and candidates to participate in a fair electoral
process. Harlan's lengthy and eloquent opinion in Taylor v Beckham, 178 US 548 (1900), is
an exegesis on this point from the historically appropriate perspective of nineteenth-century
jurisprudence. See id at 592 (Harlan dissenting) (identifying the question before the Court
as being whether manipulating the counting of ballots, after they were cast, was a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and affirming that "[t]here ought
not, at this day, to be any doubt as to the objects which were intended to be attained by
the requirement of due process of law"). In finding a due process violation, Harlan did not
mince words: "Looking into the record before us, I find such action taken by the body
claiming to be organized as the lawful Legislature of Kentucky as was discreditable in the
last degree and unworthy of the free people whom it professed to represent." Id at 605
(Harlan dissenting). One more passage from Harlan's opinion suffices to settle the point:
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Before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the US Supreme
Court had construed the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
to protect vested rights from unwarranted abrogation, and state
supreme courts had done the same with respect to analogous due
process provisions in state constitutions.297 Leading constitutional
commentators of the era, including most famously Chief Justice
Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, had also an-
nounced the settled understanding that the principle of due pro-
cess protects vested rights from improper infringement.298 Indeed,
the great constitutional scholar Professor Edward Corwin later
reflected that "the Doctrine of Vested Rights" was the most "fun-
damental doctrine" of American constitutional law before the
Civil War.299
After the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Supreme
Court confirmed this understanding of due process. In Campbell
v Holt,00 for example, all the justices agreed that the deprivation
of a "vested right" would violate the Due Process Clause; they dis-
agreed only whether the retroactive suspension of a statute of lim-
itations constituted deprivation of a vested right.30' The majority
[T]he declaration by that body of men that Goebel was legally elected ought not
to be respected in any court as a determination of the question in issue, but
should be regarded only as action taken outside of law, in utter contempt of the
constitutional rights of freemen to select their rulers.
Id at 606 (Harlan dissenting).
297 See Bloomer v McQuewan, 55 US (14 How) 539, 553-54 (1852). See also Williams,
120 Yale L J at 437-45, 466 (cited in note 294).
298 Cooley, the great Michigan jurist and scholar, published the first edition of his es-
pecially influential Constitutional Limitations treatise in 1868, the year of the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification. In it, he explained that "general rules may sometimes be as
obnoxious as special, when in their results they deprive parties of vested rights." Thomas
M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative
Power of the States of the American Union 355 (Little, Brown 1868). Thus, Cooley contin-
ued, legislation will not qualify as "[d]ue process of law" if it constitutes "arbitrary inter-
ference" with "existing vested rights." Id at 355-57.
Also writing that same year was George W. Paschal, an Arkansas judge who subse-
quently lived in Texas and who had remained faithful to the Union during the Civil War.
In his own treatise, he put the same point succinctly: "[W]here rights are acquired by the
citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any branch of the government to take
them away." George W. Paschal, The Constitution of the United States Defined and Care-
fully Annotated 260 (W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1868). See also Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise
on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitu-
tional Law 537-42 (John S. Voorhies 1857) (discussing cases holding that deprivation of
vested rights violated due process).
299 Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 Mich
L Rev 247, 247 (1914).
300 115 US 620 (1885).
301 Id at 628.
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asserted: "We certainly do not understand that a right to defeat a
just debt by the statute of limitations is a vested right,"302 whereas
the dissent exclaimed: "The immunity from suit which arises by
operation of the statute of limitations is as valuable a right as the
right to bring the suit itself. .. and, when vested, is as much to
be protected as any other right that a man has."303
Some applications of this vested rights doctrine provoked no
division among the justices of the Court. This was true even in
the midst of the so-called Lochner era, when the justices were oth-
erwise bitterly divided over the use of the Due Process Clause to
protect economic interests. For example, Justice Holmes-whose
dissent in Lochner v New York304 famously proclaimed that the
Fourteenth Amendment "is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory"305-wrote in 1922 for a unanimous Court to in-
validate a Florida statute that retroactively required a shipper to
pay a toll for passage through a canal, when the law at the time
the boat actually went through the canal did not require any such
payment. 30 6 In his pithy opinion, which compared the Florida stat-
ute to one retroactively requiring "a man [to] pay a baker for a
gratuitous deposit of rolls,"307 Holmes wrote for the Court:
To say that the legislature simply was establishing the situ-
ation as both parties knew from the beginning it ought to be
would be putting something of a gloss upon the facts. We
must assume that the plaintiff went through the canal rely-
ing upon its legal rights and it is not to be deprived of them
because the Legislature forgot.308
Likewise, in 1936, even as the justices were furiously debat-
ing the constitutionality of New Deal legislation, and just a year
before the Court (thanks to Justice Owen Roberts's change of
heart) would repudiate Lochner in "the switch in time that
saved nine,"309 the Court was unanimous in its condemnation of
a Louisiana law that purported to change the terms upon which
a stockholder of a building and loan association could withdraw
302 Id.
303 Id at 631 (Bradley dissenting).
304 198 US 45 (1905).
305 Id at 75 (Holmes dissenting).
306 Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage
District, 258 US 338, 339 (1922).
307 Id.
308 Id at 340.
309 For the relevant history of this tumultuous era, see generally Barry Cushman, Re-
thinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (Oxford 1998).
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funds invested in the association.310 Despite the state's claim that
the statute was necessitated by "the existing economic emer-
gency" caused by the Great Depression, the unanimous Court (in
an opinion by Roberts) observed that the statute's provisions
were not a suitable response to the emergency, as they were "nei-
ther temporary nor conditional" and instead "arbitrarily de-
prive[d the stockholder] of vested property rights without due
process of law."311
The protection of vested rights, or other legitimately settled
expectations, against arbitrary subsequent legislation is a core
component of due process that has survived the demise of the
Lochner era. For example, in Landgraf v USI Film Products,312
the Court refused to give an amendment to the Civil Rights Act
retroactive application in order to avoid a due process violation.313
In so holding, the Court observed: "[Tihe presumption against ret-
roactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and em-
bodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic."314 The
Court also quoted Justice Joseph Story's expansive definition of
"retrospective" laws that trigger this due process principle: "[T]he
ban on retrospective legislation embraced 'all statutes, which,
though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and
past transactions."'"31
In Eastern Enterprises v Apfel,316 Justice Kennedy's crucial
concurrence rested on the ground that the statute in question, the
Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act,317 violated due process
because it operated retroactively.318 The Act imposed liabilities on
310 See Treigle v Acme Homestead Association, 297 US 189, 193-94 (1936).
311 Id at 195, 198.
312 511 US 244 (1994).
313 Id at 266, 285-86.
314 Id at 265. See also Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled
Law: Choice of Law after the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 Colum L Rev 1839, 1843 n 18
(2006) ("Settled expectations as one animating principle of due process stretches as far
back as Hobbes.").
315 Landgraf, 511 US at 268-69, quoting Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v
Wheeler, 22 F Cases 756, 767 (CC NH 1814) (Story). As the Landgraf Court noted, Story
continued: "[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective."
Landgraf, 511 US at 269, quoting Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 22 F Cases
at 767.
316 524 US 498 (1998).
317 Pub L No 102-486, 106 Stat 3036 (1992), codified as amended at 26 USC § 9701
et seq.
318 Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 547 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dis-
senting in part).
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a coal mining company that the company could not have reason-
ably foreseen when it engaged in the conduct that triggered the
subsequently imposed liabilities.319 The plurality opinion, by
Justice O'Connor, would have held the Act unconstitutional un-
der the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,320 but Kennedy
insisted that the Takings Clause was inapplicable because the Act
did not take property from the coal mining company: "The Coal Act
imposes a staggering financial burden on the petitioner, Eastern
Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner without re-
gard to property."321 Instead, Kennedy asserted, the relevant con-
stitutional question was whether the Act was "arbitrary" in its
excessive imposition of retroactive liability.322 Kennedy found that
the statute flunked this basic arbitrariness test because it
reached back to conduct that had occurred thirty-five years pre-
viously as the basis for imposing liability and was "most egre-
gious" in relationship to reasonable expectations.323
Justice Breyer agreed in his dissenting opinion (for Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, as well as himself) that due pro-
cess was the relevant issue, but concluded that the Act was not so
egregious as to be unconstitutional.324 The protection of justifiably
settled expectations against arbitrary legislative undoing, Breyer
acknowledged, was not a return to Lochner-style "substantive due
process," but instead a separate, long-standing, and deeply rooted
due process principle.325 Also invoking Story, among other histor-
ical authorities, Breyer asserted:
To find that the Due Process Clause protects against this
kind of fundamental unfairness-that it protects against an
unfair allocation of public burdens through this kind of spe-
cially arbitrary retroactive means-is to read the Clause in
light of a basic purpose: the fair application of law, which
purpose hearkens back to the Magna Carta.326
319 See id at 549 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
320 Id at 538 (O'Connor) (plurality).
321 Id at 540 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
322 Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 547 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dis-
senting in part).
323 Id at 550 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
324 Id at 554-55, 567-68 (Breyer dissenting).
325 Id at 557-58 (Breyer dissenting).
326 Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 558 (Breyer dissenting).
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Breyer simply did not see the imposition of retroactive liability on
the coal mining company as arbitrary or fundamentally unfair in
the way that Kennedy did.
Recent scholarship also has observed that the protection of jus-
tifiably settled expectations from improper legislative undoing is a
transcendent principle of constitutional law, which the judiciary
would find another basis for enforcing even if it did not so easily
have a home in the Due Process Clause. In The Non-retrogression
Principle in Constitutional Law, Professors John Jeffries and
Daryl Levinson observed that this judicial solicitude for settled
expectations arises in such divergent contexts as repeals of previ-
ously enacted civil rights legislation and the regulation of cable
television.327 Recognizing that the nonretrogression principle has
a statutory basis in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,328 these
scholars are more skeptical that a similar nonretrogression prin-
ciple should be found embedded in constitutional law-even as
they acknowledge the judiciary's insistence in finding it there.329
In Revoking Rights, by contrast, Craig Konnoth was much more
sympathetic to this judicial insistence on protecting settled expec-
tations, seeing deep philosophical and psychological reasons why
the loss of rights previously possessed is much more injurious
than the absence of rights never possessed beforehand.330 (There
is an analytic difference, to be sure, between retroactive laws,
which purport to reach back in time to change the legal conse-
quence of previous circumstances, and retrogressive laws, which
make future conditions more burdensome than those of the past.
Even so, both types of laws share the salient feature of unsettling
previously settled expectations, and the relevant scholarship-in-
cluding the Jeffries-Levinson and Konnoth contributions-shows
that both forms of disrupting settled expectations iaise constitu-
tional concerns reflected in due process jurisprudence.)
Voting is certainly one domain in which the distinction be-
tween the loss of rights previously possessed and the absence of
327 See John C. Jeffries Jr and Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-retrogression Principle in
Constitutional Law, 86 Cal L Rev 1211, 1226-34 (1998).
328 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, 439, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10304.
329 Jeffries and Levinson, 86 Cal L Rev at 1234-40 (cited in note 327).
330 See Craig J. Konnoth, Revoking Rights, 66 Hastings L J 1365, 1375-85 (2015). See
also Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015 Wis L Rev 727, 779 (referring
to the "historical aversion to retrospective laws").
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rights never held has proved especially powerful in existing juris-
prudence.33' As already indicated, the distinctive nature of § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act is premised on the principle that it protects
against the removal of voting opportunities previously available,
whereas other elements of voting rights law condemn the absence
of electoral opportunities never previously granted.332 To be sure,
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act never embodied a universal nonret-
rogression principle with respect to voting. Instead, as one com-
ponent of a statute aimed at eradicating racial discrimination
with respect to voting, § 5 addressed changes in voting laws that
were racially discriminatory in nature. Even so, § 5's effectiveness
has been negated by the failure of Congress to fix the formula for
determining which states and localities are subject to § 5's nonret-
rogression principle, in the wake of the Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of the existing coverage formula in Shelby County, Alabama
v Holder.333
Nonetheless, the idea that electoral opportunities should be
protected against backsliding remains judicially compelling. In
LULAC, for example, Kennedy, writing for the Court, found that
Texas's new map of congressional districts was unlawful because
it took away from Latino voters electoral opportunities that these
voters were just beginning to enjoy.334 Similarly, lower court
judges have seen the removal of early voting opportunities as rais-
ing distinct constitutional concerns compared to the failure to pro-
vide those same early voting opportunities in the first place.335
331 See, for example, Bennett v Yoshina, 140 F3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir 1998). The con-
cern about retroactive changes to voting rules was also a prominent feature of the due
process holdings of Roe v Alabama, 43 F3d 574 (11th Cir 1995) (per curiam), and Griffin v
Burns, 570 F2d 1065 (1st Cir 1978). See note 159 and accompanying text. The reason was
the necessity of protecting the legitimate expectations of voters, as Harlan had recognized
in Taylor. See notes 156, 296, and accompanying text. See also Richard L. Pildes, Judging
"New Law" in Election Disputes, 29 Fla St U L Rev 691, 710-11 (2001) (discussing the
"theory of detrimental reliance as the basis of constitutional injury").
332 See Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Rem-
edy?, 81 Denver U L Rev 225, 234-35 (2003); Foley, A Tale of Two Swing States (cited in
note 114).
333 133 S Ct 2612, 2622-28, 2631 (2013). See also Dylan Matthews, Here's How
Congress Could Fix the Voting Rights Act (Wash Post, June 25, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/QZ9R-L9TD (discussing Professor Spencer Overton's proposal for updat-
ing the Act's coverage formula).
334 L ULAC, 548 US at 439-40.
335 See Ohio State Conference of the National Assocation v Husted, 768 F3d 524, 557-
58 (6th Cir 2014) ("Ohio State Conference of the NAACP"), citing L ULAC, 548 US at 439.
See also Ohio Organizing Collaborative v Husted, 189 F Supp 3d 708, 756-58 (SD Ohio
2016), revd, Ohio Democratic Party v Husted, 834 F3d 620 (6th Cir 2016).
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The question thus is whether the Due Process Clause, given
its long-standing role in the protection of justifiably settled expec-
tations, can be understood as an appropriate constitutional vehi-
cle for invaliding improper legislative curtailments of preexisting
voting opportunities. If so, this due process protection would not
be a direct substitute for the now-suspended § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Its focus would not be racially discriminatory roll-
backs of voting opportunities, but instead rollbacks affecting all
voters. Moreover, the strength of an antirollback provision de-
rived from the Due Process Clause would likely be different from
one embodied in an explicit congressional enactment. Courts would
likely be much more deferential to legislative choices when using
the Due Process Clause as the basis for judicial review, rather than
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Nevertheless, judicial review of cur-
tailments of voting opportunities under due process could poten-
tially play a meaningful role in protecting voters from inappropri-
ately partisan legislation, whether or not Congress is ever capable
of resurrecting § 5 of the Voting Rights Act through enactment of
an updated coverage formula.
B. Partisan Unsettling of Reasonable Expectations about
Voting Procedures
It is appropriate for courts to construe the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as constraining
legislative changes to voting rules.336 This constraint would hardly
be absolute: of course, legislatures should be permitted to change
voting rules for sound public policy justifications. Voting rules
and procedures need to be updated in light of new technologies as
well as new social circumstances, like increased suburbanization,
which require relocation of polling places or even reconceptualiza-
tion of the relationship between polling places and where voters
live and work. Voting rules also deserve to be updated simply to
make the voting process more accessible and convenient, as en-
hancing voter turnout and protecting the social value of voting
are not static phenomena but instead are capable of improve-
ments over time.
336 See Pildes, 29 Fla St U L Rev at 706 (cited in note 331) ("The Griffin and Roe cases
are the strongest court of appeals decisions that support a constitutional role for federal
courts in overseeing potential 'new law' that arises in the midst of elections and election
disputes.").
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But not all changes to voting rules are, or should be, consid-
ered constitutionally equivalent. A change in a voting rule moti-
vated purely by a partisan desire to defeat the opposing party's
candidates is not a change deserving of judicial deference or re-
spect. A purely partisan change of voting procedures, designed to
"unlevel" the playing field between the opposing parties, is a
breach of the norm of fair play as applied to the domain of elec-
toral competition. Consequently, if the judiciary encounters a par-
tisan change in voting procedures of this nature, the appropriate
judicial response is to invalidate the change as a breach of the
norm of fair play embedded within the Due Process Clause.
No legislature will admit that any change in voting rules is
ever motivated by pure partisanship. Occasionally, a stray legis-
lator will unguardedly make a statement conveying such a mo-
tive. But usually it is difficult to attribute the off-the-cuff remark
to the legislature as a whole, especially when the legislature's
lawyers are offering the court a nonpartisan justification for the
legislative change.
Accordingly, it is necessary to fashion a judicial test that dis-
tinguishes between legitimate legislative changes to voting rules
and illegitimate ones. Building on existing due process precedents
concerning the protection of settled expectations, courts can
weigh the extent to which voters have come to rely on existing
voting procedures against the government's asserted reasons for
wanting to change those procedures. If the voting procedures are
long-standing and deeply rooted, such that the electorate's reli-
ance interests are strong, and the change that the legislature
wishes to make is significant (and not merely minimal in nature),
then the government should be required to offer a strong nonpar-
tisan justification for making the change.133 Moreover, the vote in
the legislature for making a substantial change of this kind
337 The age of a voting practice subject to legislative change would not be the only
factor. An ancient but inconsequential practice, like counting ballots by hand rather than
using an electronic tabulator to count the ballots more efficiently, would not be a feature
of the voting process giving rise to a vested interest and requiring a special justification to
change. Conversely, a relatively new feature of the voting process-like the right to vote
by mail without any particular excuse for doing so-might make voting so much more
convenient to voters that eliminating this convenience once it has been made available
would require an especially strong justification, even though the convenience had been in
place only a short period of time. (Telling voters that they had lost their previous right to
vote by mail might to some extent ameliorate the disruption associated with the loss of
this previous right, but given the magnitude of the loss it might not be sufficient merely
to provide this notice; it would depend on whether the state had an adequate nonpartisan
reason for the rule change.)
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should be sufficiently bipartisan. Otherwise, if the legislature is
making a major change to voting rules with one party in favor and
the other party not, and if the offered nonpartisan reasons for the
change are weak in relation to the severity of upsetting the elec-
torate's reasonable expectations concerning the operation of the
voting process, then this particular change will seem suspiciously
partisan in nature even without any "smoking gun" confession of
the legislature's true partisan motive. In this circumstance, the
judiciary should invalidate the legislative change as contrary to
due process, given the insufficient nonpartisan defense of the
change in relation to the degree to which the change disrupts rea-
sonably settled expectations concerning how the voting process
works.
Conversely, if the legislative change is only a modest adjust-
ment to existing voting procedures, and if the existing procedures
are themselves of recent vintage-such that the electorate has not
formed settled expectations concerning their perpetuation-then
the government should be permitted to make the adjustment
without having to provide an especially strong justification for do-
ing so. Some changes to voting rules are in the nature of an ex-
periment, and the government should be permitted to end the ex-
periment if it finds insufficient evidence of the experiment
providing added benefits as intended, without the government
bearing the burden of proving that the experiment caused a seri-
ous deterioration in the quality of the voting process. Experi-
ments, in other words, should not be locked into the status quo
and difficult to undo.338 Otherwise, the government will be dis-
couraged from undertaking experiments in the first place, a con-
sequence that would be detrimental to the improvement of the
voting process in the long run. Only after electoral experiments
have settled into the operation of the voting process to the point
that previously innovative procedures have become routine, and
voters have come to rely on them, should it be that the govern-
ment is put to the burden of showing a strong justification for un-
doing these now-routine procedures. But if an experimental vot-
ing procedure has been in place for one election only, the
government should be permitted to pull the plug on the experi-
ment with little more justification than viewing the experiment
338 See Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F3d at 635 ("Plaintiffs prefer that we adopt a
broad rule that any expansion of voting rights must remain on the books forever. Such a
rule would have a chilling effect on the democratic process.").
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as a bad idea after all, or a waste of the government's finite
resources.
As just described, this due process inquiry is a kind of balanc-
ing test, weighing the degree to which the change in voting rules
upsets reasonably settled expectations concerning the operation
of the voting process against the strength of the government's
nonpartisan reasons for making the change. Like any such con-
stitutional balancing test, there inevitably will be good-faith de-
bates about how the balance should be struck in any given in-
stance.339 The best way to understand such a balancing test is to
see it applied to particular cases and for a body of precedent con-
cerning its application to develop over time.
Applying this due process balancing test to Ohio's changes in
voting procedures, whereby Ohio cut the number of days of early
voting from thirty-five to twenty-eight and in doing so eliminated
the so-called Golden Week when voters could simultaneously both
register and vote, 340 yields the conclusion that the state has made
only a modest change to an experiment of relatively recent vin-
tage, with a nonpartisan goal of the change being to eliminate an
unintended feature of the experiment. In 2005, Ohio altered its
absentee voting rules, which had limited the availability of absen-
tee ballots to voters with a specific excuse (travel, disability, etc.),
to offer an absentee ballot on demand to any voter who would pre-
fer one to voting on Election Day.341 As a convenience to voters,
local boards of election facilitated the casting of these absentee
ballots in person, at the board's office or another centralized loca-
tion, for voters who would prefer to cast these absentee ballots
under the board's supervision rather than to deliver their absen-
tee ballots by mail (or to drop off at the board's office a previously
cast absentee ballot). By law in Ohio, all "in-person early voting"
is actually just a form of absentee voting, a form made available
as a result of local boards of election operating sites where voters
can go to cast their absentee ballots.342
After expanding the availability of absentee voting in this
way, Ohio soon discovered an unintended consequence. Prior to
339 See Foley, 81 Geo Wash L Rev at 1847-51 (cited in note 2). See also Fallon, Imple-
menting the Constitution at 80-85 (cited in note 292).
340 See notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
341 Ohio State Conference of National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People v Husted, 43 F Supp 3d 808, 812 (SD Ohio 2014).
342 Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 768 F3d at 531-32 ("Early voting is done via
an 'absentee ballot,' which may be cast either early in-person ('EIP') at the voter's Board
of Elections' ('BOE') designated voting location or by mailing the ballot to the BOE.").
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this expansion in 2005, absentee ballots in Ohio were available
thirty-five days before Election Day, while the close of voter reg-
istration was thirty days before Election Day.43 Accordingly, prior
to 2005, there was a six-day overlap between the period for absen-
tee voting and the period for voter registration. But this overlap
was inconsequential when absentee voting was limited to only
those relatively few voters who had one of the specified excuses
for voting absentee. Once absentee voting was opened up to all
voters on demand, and in particular once the convenience of voting
an absentee ballot in person was made available by local election
boards, there arose an unanticipated consequence: a person could
both register to vote and cast an in-person absentee ballot at the
same time: Suddenly, the overlap between the thirty-five-day pe-
riod of absentee voting and the thirty-day close of registration be-
came consequential. The overlap, in effect, created a six-day period
of same-day registration for those individuals wishing to both reg-
ister and vote an in-person absentee ballot at the site provided by
the local board of election.34 This overlap, apparently not foreseen
or intended by the legislature that expanded absentee voting by
eliminating the requirement of an excuse for casting an absentee
ballot, became known as Golden Week because, like the prover-
bial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, it was an unexpected
and entirely fortuitous bonus.345
In 2014, based on a bipartisan recommendation of local elec-
tion officials in Ohio, the state's legislature decided to shorten in-
person absentee voting from thirty-five to twenty-nine days,
thereby eliminating the fortuity of Golden Week.346 The reduction
of the number of days, by itself, presents no due process problems.
Ohio voters had not developed an expectation that the availability
343 Id at 531.
344 Id.
345 Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 43 F Supp 3d at 818.
346 Id at 817-19; Darrel Rowland, Panel Releases List of Voting Reforms (Columbus
Dispatch, Mar 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GY8S-P6CV:
The Ohio Association of Election Officials, made up equally of Democrats and
Republicans, says Ohio voters should be able to cast early in-person ballots on
three weekend days before a presidential election. ...
The group also would eliminate "Golden Week.". . .
"The two real goals were to demonstrate that bipartisan solutions were there
to be had, and to add certainty to the voting process," said association Executive
Director Aaron Ockerman.
The Sixth Circuit opinion on Golden Week also invoked this same bipartisan recommen-
dation. Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F3d at 623 (describing the recommendation as a "prod-
uct of collaborative processes").
742 [84:655
2017] Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship
of in-person absentee voting would extend for a five-week period.
While some Ohio voters may have reasonably developed an expec-
tation that in-person early voting would be available on either a
Saturday or Sunday before Election Day, the legislative reduc-
tion as currently administered by Ohio's secretary of state leaves
in place two Saturdays and two Sundays of in-person absentee
voting, thereby maintaining consistency with that reasonable
expectation. 347
The elimination of Golden Week is more complicated under
due process analysis. It is possible that some members of Ohio's
electorate may have developed an expectation that there would
be a short period of time at the beginning of the period for in-
person absentee voting when it would be possible to both register
and cast an in-person absentee ballot simultaneously. But the
availability of Golden Week has not been very long-standing, hav-
ing sprung into existence only unexpectedly after 2005. And few
voters who used the special convenience of Golden Week once
would need to do so again (because they would already be regis-
tered, and, if they needed to update their registration status, they
could do so online, without making any appearance or mailing any
form). Given the fact that Golden Week was an accidental exper-
iment that did not enhance significantly the opportunity to regis-
ter and vote in Ohio, it would seem under the due process analysis
that the government should be permitted to end the experiment
without the burden of providing an especially strong reason for
doing so. The fact that a bipartisan group of local election officials
in the state recommended its elimination as a way to rationalize
Ohio's policy of requiring registration in advance of voting, rather
than being a same-day-registration state, would seem a suffi-
ciently legitimate, nonpartisan reason to justify eliminating an
unintended feature of Ohio's expansion of absentee voting.
In North Carolina, by contrast, same-day registration was an
intended feature of the state's voting procedures. In 2007, the
state's legislature passed a law specifically to permit voters to
both register and cast a ballot during the state's early voting pe-
riod, which at the time was seventeen days.348 In 2013, among
other changes to the state's voting rules, the legislature both cut
347 Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F3d at 630.
348 See North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v McCrory, 182 F Supp 3d 320,
331, 336 (MD NC 2016).
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the number of days of early voting to ten and completely elimi-
nated same-day registration as an option.349
The reduction in the number of days of early voting was much
more severe in North Carolina than in Ohio. In North Carolina,
the reduction from seventeen to ten was a loss of 41 percent of the
amount of early voting that had been available previously-a sig-
nificant chunk-whereas in Ohio changing the start of in-person
absentee voting from thirty-five days before Election Day to
twenty-nine days before Election Day shrank the period of in-
person absentee voting by only 17 percent. While North Carolina
had not offered seventeen days of early voting for so many years
that the state's voters had come to rely on that exact number of
days, cutting the period of early voting almost in half was a sig-
nificant intrusion on the electorate's reasonable expectations con-
cerning the length of the early voting period.
The complete elimination of same-day registration was an
even greater unsettling of the reasonable expectations that had
developed in North Carolina concerning the availability of same-
day registration. While same-day registration had not yet become
a long-standing feature of North Carolina law, its availability was
not an anomaly in the way it was in Ohio. Rather, since 2007, it
had become an integrated element of the entire early voting pro-
cess. In North Carolina, the nature of early voting for both the
2008 and 2012 presidential elections, as well as all other elections
during that period, was that early voting was a procedure that
permitted simultaneous registration and ballot casting. Whereas
most of early voting in Ohio still required advance registration
even when Golden Week was available for just the first six days of
early voting, all early voting in North Carolina permitted simulta-
neous registration and ballot casting. Thus, the complete elimina-
tion of same-day registration in North Carolina was a significant
disruption of reasonable expectations concerning the nature of
early voting in the state. Indeed, because it was possible to use
same-day registration as part of early voting in North Carolina
even after the close of the registration period for Election Day vot-
ing (twenty-five days prior to Election Day35O), the elimination of
same-day registration in North Carolina easily could catch a voter
by surprise in a way that the elimination of Golden Week would
not. (Golden Week was always in advance of the thirty-day cutoff.
349 Id at 346-48.
350 Id at 333.
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Therefore, no Ohio voter reasonably could show up to an early
voting location within thirty days of Election Day and expect to
be able to register, and this was true even before Golden Week
was eliminated. By contrast, previously an unregistered voter in
North Carolina could go to an early voting location to both regis-
ter and vote, even after the twenty-five-day registration cutoff for
Election Day voting. After the 2013 change in the law, however,
if an unregistered voter waits until within twenty-five days of
Election Day and then goes to an early voting location to both
register and vote, this voter will be disenfranchised as a result
of the elimination of same-day registration. In this way, the
North Carolina change in voting procedures has a "gotcha" com-
ponent, contrary to reasonable expectations, lacking in the Ohio
change of voting rules.)
What is North Carolina's asserted justification for eliminat-
ing same-day registration? In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, the
state offers but a single justification: that it takes too long to ver-
ify a new registrant's eligibility to vote in order to permit same-
day registration during early voting (which occurs after the
twenty-five-day registration cutoff for Election Day voting).51 But
this justification is entirely nonresponsive: if the state is con-
cerned about verifying a newly registered voter's eligibility, it can
simply make the early-voted ballot provisional until such time as
the verification occurs. There is no reason the state has to count
the early-voted ballot immediately or abandon its verification pro-
cess. Rather, it can permit the early unregistered voter to first
register and then cast a provisional ballot, the eligibility of which
will be verified in due course as would be any provisional ballot
cast by a voter whose eligibility is in doubt for whatever reason.
Given, then, the weakness of North Carolina's justification
for entirely eliminating same-day registration, combined with the
significant unsettling of reasonable expectations concerning the
voting process that its elimination entails, North Carolina's
elimination of same-day registration flunks due process analysis
in a way that Ohio's elimination of Golden Week does not. North
Carolina's change of its voting rules, under this due process analy-
sis, seems much more suspicious as a purely partisan power grab,
in an effort to tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the party
that controls the legislature, whereas Ohio's change in its voting
351 Brief of Appellees, North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v McCrory, Nos
16-1468(L), 16-1469, 16-1474, 16-1529, *10-12 (MD NC filed June 9, 2016) (available on
Westlaw at 2016 WL 3226367).
745
The University of Chicago Law Review
rules can be defended as a more reasonable and nonpartisan ad-
justment of its electoral regime, to eliminate an unintended con-
sequence of a previously adopted expansion in absentee voting.
Because North Carolina cannot survive this fair play balancing
test, whereas Ohio can, North Carolina's change in voting rules
should be declared a due process violation, whereas Ohio's change
in voting rules should be declared consistent with the Due Process
Clause.352
C. A Comparison of Due Process and Anderson-Burdick
One might reasonably wonder whether due process balanc-
ing, as just described, is preferable to Anderson-Burdick balanc-
ing, which long has been a feature of the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence as applied to election laws. The answer
has two parts. First, for those situations in which equal protection
analysis is inapplicable, this due process balancing provides an
alternative basis for assessing the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's regulation of the electoral process. Second, even in those
circumstances in which equal protection analysis is appropriate,
the due process focus on both (i) partisan deviations from the
norm of fair play, and (ii) the constitutionally appropriate protec-
tion of reasonable expectations from unjustifiable retrogressive
unsettling of those expectations, serves as a valuable adjunct to
Anderson-Burdick balancing, which otherwise can become frus-
tratingly amorphous. Thus, rather than being a mode of analysis
in competition with Anderson-Burdick, this due process balancing
is complementary.
On the first point, Part I.B showed that equal protection
analysis simply does not apply to certain types of election laws.
The provision of ten days of early voting to all voters is, simply
put, not a violation of equal protection. It affords equal oppor-
tunity to all. Thus, to apply Anderson-Burdick balancing to this
voting law is either intellectually dishonest (if self-aware) or an-
alytically confused (if not).
352 This due process conclusion with respect to North Carolina would offer the US
Supreme Court a basis for affirming the Fourth Circuit if the Supreme Court were to grant
certiorari in the case and conclude that the Fourth Circuit's analysis on the issue of ra-
cially discriminatory intent was erroneous. See text accompanying notes 108-10. The leg-
islative rollback of early voting still would be unconstitutional as an unjustified partisan
violation of due process.
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But if a state law that provides ten days of early voting is a
reduction in the availability of early voting, which used to be sev-
enteen days, then it is appropriate to ask whether that cutback is
an unconstitutional infringement upon settled expectations in vi-
olation of due process. The answer might be no, but at least the
due process question is the correct question to ask in this context.
Here, there is no equality problem to consider. But there is a ret-
rogression issue: the law is undeniably diminishing voting oppor-
tunities that were previously available. Is this diminishment un-
constitutional or not? That question is a backward-looking one,
comparing the way the law used to be to the way the law is now.
That backward-looking inquiry fits comfortably within due process
jurisprudence, not equal protection jurisprudence. As Professor
Cass Sunstein once said in another context, equal protection is
forward-looking while due process looks backward.353 When the
constitutional concern is one about retrogression-the legislative
rollback of previously existing rights-and does not involve the
unequal treatment of individuals, as an adjustment in the avail-
able days for early voting does not, then the proper constitutional
analysis lies in due process, and not equal protection.
There is no reason to fear this switch from Anderson-Burdick
to due process balancing in those contexts in which retrogression,
rather than unequal treatment, is the relevant constitutional con-
cern. Due process balancing, as described above, asks the right
questions in these contexts. To what extent is the new law retro-
gressive? How severely does the new law disrupt reasonable ex-
pectations concerning the voting process? What is the strength of
the state's justifications for its disruption of these settled expecta-
tions? These are the appropriate issues to consider when all voters
are suffering the same diminution in their electoral opportunities.
Second, there may be situations in which both Anderson-
Burdick and due process analysis are appropriate. Consider, for
example, a change in a voter identification law that imposes a
more restrictive list of documents that qualify as valid identifica-
tion-a student ID used to qualify but now does not. In this situ-
ation, Anderson-Burdick obviously applies, as Crawford applied
Anderson-Burdick to the voter ID rule in that case.354 Moreover,
this voter ID law, like the one in Crawford, differentiates among
353 Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U Chi L Rev 1161, 1163 (1988).
354 See text accompanying notes 78-79.
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voters: those with the qualifying ID receive more favorable treat-
ment than voters without the qualifying ID. Thus, equal protec-
tion analysis is entirely appropriate.
But so too is due process analysis, and its focus on the way in
which this new ID law is retrogressive may help structure the
otherwise-amorphous application of Anderson-Burdick analysis
to this situation. To what extent did voters previously come to rely
on student IDs as an acceptable form of voter identification? It is
not just the discrimination between different groups of voters go-
ing forward that is relevant. Rather, it is also the way that the
change in the voter ID rules unsettles previous understandings
about how the voting process worked.
Moreover, adding due process analysis to the Anderson-
Burdick inquiry in this situation appropriately focuses the judi-
ciary's attention on the extent to which the change in the voter ID
rules appears suspiciously to be a partisan endeavor to alter the
playing field of electoral competition. The way in which the Supreme
Court handled the claim of partisanship in Crawford, essentially
ignoring it (except for a brief mention at the end of Stevens's plu-
rality opinion),355 indicates that the Court is uncomfortable consid-
ering claims of partisanship in the context of equal protection
analysis. By contrast, the problem of partisanship is front and
center in the due process inquiry. The reason due process applies
is because due process embodies a principle of fair play that con-
strains partisan overreaching in the regulation of electoral com-
petition. One form of such partisan overreaching is when a legis-
lature, in the control of one party, changes the electoral rules,
thereby disrupting reasonable expectations concerning those elec-
toral rules, without adequate nonpartisan justification.356
355 See Crawford, 553 US at 203-04 (Stevens) (plurality).
356 In a recent essay, Professor Samuel Issacharoff lamented the inability of current
jurisprudence, exemplified by Crawford, to directly tackle the problem of partisanship:
Starting from the proposition that the new voting cases stem from a misuse of
partisan authority over the administration of elections, the question becomes
whether a contextual burden-shifting approach can overcome an inquiry that
directs court focus away from the partisan motivations for the challenged ballot
restrictions. In effect, courts are searching for the consequences of partisan ex-
cess without being able to ferret out the root cause.
Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law, 92
Ind L J 299, 324 (2016). In a vivid summation of his concern, he explained: "At some point
the oncologist needs to look for the cancerous tumor itself, not simply for the metastatic
manifestations." Id. The due process principle of fair play provides the missing judicial
inquiry that Issacharoff sought: the fair play principle causes courts to ask directly
whether partisanship is the cause for the change in voting rules.
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Thus, the relevant due process inquiry requires the judiciary
to look for improper partisanship in the alteration of election
rules, ferreting out those unjustified legislative changes from
those with sufficient nonpartisan arguments in their defense.
This appropriate judicial inquiry under due process analysis use-
fully can supplement Anderson-Burdick balancing. When it looks
like the legislature is changing the electoral rules solely to benefit
one party, the courts can nullify this partisan breach of fair play,
and they can do so by pointing out that the Constitution protects
not only the equal treatment of similarly situated voters, but also
the integrity of the electoral process itself. If one party seeks to
control the electoral process to give itself an unfair advantage,
that power grab is a constitutional problem independent of
whether it violates the equal treatment of similarly situated vot-
ers. The courts are capable of protecting both constitutional prin-
ciples simultaneously, and doing so is especially important when
both are potentially threatened by the legislature's adoption of a
new voting rule. Conducting both Anderson-Burdick and due pro-
cess balancing simultaneously may reveal the existence of an un-
constitutional regulation of the voting process, when considering
either mode of inquiry in isolation may fail to identify the consti-
tutional infirmity.357
In sum, without abandoning Anderson-Burdick balancing,
the courts should add due process balancing to their constitu-
tional analysis in order to assure that they adequately protect the
357 In some particular contexts, it may be debatable whether a change in voting rules
contravenes the reasonable settled expectations of voters, thereby requiring the state to
justify the change under this due process analysis. Suppose, for example, that a state elim-
inates a preexisting practice that permitted candidates or political parties to send chal-
lengers to polling places for the purpose of challenging the eligibility of voters before they
cast a ballot. One can imagine a legislature justifying the change on the ground that such
challengers might risk causing long lines on Election Day. One can also imagine, however,
that some voters might attack the legislative change as motivated by partisanship, trying
to make it easier for ineligible voters to cast a ballot. Would this legislative change unsettle
reasonably settled expectations, thereby triggering the obligation to provide a nonpartisan
justification? One way to approach this question is to ask whether voters have any kind of
vested expectation of the ability to challenge the eligibility of other voters at polling places.
Would the removal of this right to challenge be a retrogression of voting rights for the
purpose of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act? While the statutory retrogression analysis under
§ 5 would not be dispositive of the constitutional retrogression analysis under due process,
it nonetheless would be a useful analogy. The likely conclusion would be that voters do not
have a vested entitlement to challenge other voters. In any event, even if put to the obli-
gation to provide a justification for the purpose of due process analysis, a legislature likely
would be able to justify this change in the law because the fear of long lines at polling
places would be a compelling concern.
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voting process from partisan power grabs that breach the funda-
mental principle of fair play in electoral competition.
V. LIMITS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PARTISAN OVERREACHING
The previous Parts of this Article show how construing the
Due Process Clause to constrain partisan overreaching provides
judicially enforceable standards for redressing the problems of
gerrymanders and legislative cutbacks in voting opportunities. The
same fair play principle embedded in due process constrains other
forms of partisan overreaching, such as manipulation of ballot-
counting rules after ballots have been cast.35 8 There are likely to
be other issues of election law that emerge in the context of par-
tisan competition to win elections to which the same fair play
principles would appropriately apply to protect that electoral
competition from excessive, or undue, partisanship.359
But what about issues beyond the regulation of the electoral
process? What is the full scope of this due process constraint
against partisan overreaching? Would it not apply to other forms
of partisan abuses by legislative majorities; and if so, what is the
limit to this due process principle?
It is true that there is nothing inherently electoral about this
due process principle of fair play and its constraint against exces-
sive partisanship. It is not an attempt to implement the idea of elec-
toral equality. Indeed, that is its virtue. As Part I demonstrated, the
idea of electoral equality ran into limitations when it endeavored
to tackle the particular problems of gerrymandering and legisla-
tive cutbacks of voting opportunities. The separate principle of
fair play, it turns out, does a better job of addressing these prob-
lems-and does so precisely because it is not concerned with the
equal electoral rights of citizens but instead directly condemns
the abuse by the majority party in the legislature of its dominant
position. That kind of partisan abuse obviously can have electoral
358 See, for example, Roe v Alabama, 43 F3d 574, 580 (11th Cir 1995) (per curiam)
(regarding the "retroactive validation of a potentially controlling number of votes");
Griffin v Burns, 570 F2d 1065, 1075-76 (1st Cir 1978) (regarding a retroactive ruling by
a state election board that invalidated ballots); Pildes, 29 Fla St U L Rev at 710-11 (cited
in note 331).
359 I share Professor Richard Levy's recognition of the need to develop a doctrine to
protect the electoral process from various forms of excessive partisanship, but as indicated
earlier I differ from Levy in maintaining the necessity of letting legitimate partisanship
operate in American politics and in invoking due process as the appropriate constitutional
basis for distinguishing between legitimate and excessive partisanship. See note 17.
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ramifications, as elections are an obvious area in which the dom-
inant party might wish to secure an unfair advantage against its
political opponents.
The dominant party, however, might seek an unfair ad-
vantage in other domains as well. Indeed, the canonical exam-
ple of partisan overreaching that formed the context for the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification was the attempt by Radical
Republicans to remove President Johnson from the presidency
through the misuse of the impeachment process. 360 This quintes-
sential instance of excessive partisanship did not concern the reg-
ulation of the electoral process.
Thus, insofar as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is properly interpreted as embodying a constraint
against partisan overreaching-and is properly so interpreted be-
cause of the history concerning the impeachment of Johnson and
the ultimate defeat of the excessively partisan effort to remove
him from office-this due process principle cannot be intrinsically
limited to the electoral context. Most obviously, for example, it
would potentially apply to any future misuse of the impeachment
power in an attempt to remove a president from office because of
a partisan disagreement over policy.361 It might potentially also
apply to other ways in which the majority party in the legislature
might abuse its power over legislative procedures, such as exclud-
ing members of the minority party from participating in legisla-
tive committee hearings.32 Conceivably, it could also apply to
breaches or manipulations of the legislature's own rules govern-
ing the processes for enacting legislation, as Congress was ac-
cused of doing when it used a highly unorthodox method for pro-
mulgating the so-called Obamacare legislation.363
To put this point more formally, this fair play constraint
against partisan overreaching would seem to yield a new form of
360 See Part II.B.2.
361 See generally Richard K. Neumann Jr, The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan
Political Weapon, 34 Hastings Const L Q 161 (2007).
362 See generally Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A Constitutional Analysis of
Legislative Exclusion, 55 Emory L J 1 (2006).
363 See Tonja Jacobi and Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future
of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 UC Davis L Rev 261, 312-15, 317 &
n 290 (2013). See also Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Pro-
cesses in the U.S. Congress 188-232 (CQ 4th ed 2012). Congress contemplated using an
even more controversial procedure to enact Obamacare, but ultimately decided against
doing so in order to avoid a potential challenge. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr, Decon-
structing Deem and Pass: A Constitutional Analysis of the Enactment of Bills by Implica-
tion, 90 Wash U L Rev 1071, 1072-75, 1078-87 (2013).
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judicial review, which could be called "due process of lawmaking"
or "legislative due process."364 This new form of judicial review
would police legislative procedures, not just the substance of leg-
islation, and not just adjudicatory procedures. If existing legisla-
tive rules prohibited enactment of a statute without three read-
ings of the bill on the legislative floor, for example,365 then an
attempt to pass a bill after only two readings might run afoul of
this form of judicial review.
While some academic commentary has advocated that the
Supreme Court embrace "due process of lawmaking" as a judi-
cially enforceable principle,366 for the Court to do so would require
a thorough repudiation of long-standing precedent. In 1892, the
Court adopted the so-called enrolled-bill rule, meaning that,
whenever Congress itself formally asserted that a bill had duly
passed both chambers, the Court would accept that assertion at
face value and refuse to look beneath that status for procedural
defects.367 For over a century, the Court has never repudiated the
doctrine. Rather, the Court has seen it as a species of the broader
principle that the Court lacks power to police the internal proce-
dures of the legislative branch.68 Indeed, pursuant to that broader
principle, the Court will not adjudicate a claim that the Senate's
procedures for trying an impeachment violate the Bill of Rights,
including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.369
Thus, the very context that gives rise to the idea that due process
constrains partisan overreaching-the abuse of the impeachment
power-is off-limits to judicial enforcement under the so-called
political-question doctrine.
364 See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legis-
lative Process, 91 BU L Rev 1915, 1921 n 24, 1966 (2011). See also generally id (providing
a comprehensive analysis of the relevant literature including the canonical piece, Hans A.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb L Rev 197 (1976)).
365 See, for example, Va Const Art IV, § 11(c).
366 See, for example, Bar-Siman-Tov, 91 BU L Rev at 1970-74 (cited in note 364).
367 See Field v Clark, 143 US 649, 672-73 (1892).
368 In Baker, the Court's major restatement of the political-question doctrine, the
Court analyzed Field and its enrolled-bill rule as an example of a matter "committed to
congressional resolution." Baker, 369 US at 214.
369 See Nixon v United States, 506 US 224, 233-38 (1993). Although the Court's opinion
in Nixon explicitly concerns only the nonjusticiability of the Constitution's Impeachment
Trial Clause itself, the Court's reasoning in the case is well understood to extend to any
constitutional claims concerning the Senate's trial of an impeachment, on the ground that
such trials are committed exclusively to the authority of the Senate. See Michael J. Gerhardt,
Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments after Nixon, 44 Duke L
J 231, 261-75 (1994) (addressing "the Constitution's allocation of unique impeachment
authority to Congress").
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Does the nonenforceability of due process in the context of im-
peachments, pursuant to the political-question doctrine, doom the
idea that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies a constraint against partisan overreaching? More
broadly, does the Supreme Court's repeated and emphatic rejec-
tion of any role for a "due process of lawmaking" doctrine preclude
adopting the idea that due process includes a principle of fair play
that condemns excessive partisanship in some contexts, including
gerrymandering and legislative cutbacks of voting opportunities?
The answer to these questions is, most definitively, no. It is
true that this long-standing and deeply rooted precedent neces-
sarily limits the scope of a judicially enforceable principle of fair
play that constrains partisan overreaching. But this precedent
does not preclude this judicially enforceable principle entirely. As
long as the judiciary does not interfere with the legislature's rules
for its own internal operations, the judiciary can insist that en-
acted legislation comply with the fair play principle that con-
demns excessive partisanship.
This cabining of due process, so that it does not contravene
firmly entrenched precedents concerning the legislature's self-
governing autonomy, is not a foreign concept in constitutional
law. Occasionally, when two constitutional principles abut each
other, one of them will need to be carefully circumscribed so as
not to undermine the other. The absolute immunity of the presi-
dent for conduct in office, for example, means that even if a pres-
ident intentionally violates the Fourth Amendment by ordering a
warrantless wiretap without probable cause, the president can-
not be held liable for damages caused by this flagrant constitu-
tional violation.370 Likewise, because it would be inappropriate to
subject the president's decision to order a military strike to judi-
cial supervision, the president's targeting of even a US citizen
abroad must be immune from judicial issuance of injunctive re-
lief even when there are allegations that the targeting violates
due process. 371
370 See Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731, 755-57 (1982).
371 See Al-Aulaqi v Obama, 727 F Supp 2d 1, 52 (DDC 2010) (holding that the court
was not equipped to evaluate instances of "decision-making in the realm of military and
foreign affairs"). But see Al-Aulaqi v Panetta, 35 F Supp 3d 56, 70 & n 21 (DDC 2014)
(finding that, despite the political-question doctrine, the court had subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over a claim involving the same targeted killing of a US citizen).
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Thus, the due process principle of fair play must not be in-
voked to permit judicial scrutiny of whether the legislature ad-
hered to its own internal procedures.372 But this limitation has no
applicability to gerrymandering, legislative cutbacks of voting op-
portunities, or other partisan manipulations of electoral proce-
dures. The electoral process is not a part of the legislature's inter-
nal operations. Consequently, even though conceptually the
principle of fair play and its constraint against partisan over-
reaching is not limited to regulation of the electoral process, as a
practical matter this principle may have its greatest applicability
to electoral procedures just because the same principle is judi-
cially unenforceable with respect to the legislature's own internal
procedures.373
This practical limitation, however, is no obstacle to judicial
enforcement of the fair play principle in those domains other than
the legislature's internal procedures. Thus, the courts should pro-
ceed robustly in enforcing the fair play principle to constrain par-
tisan gerrymandering. Likewise, they should invoke the fair play
principle when legislatures inappropriately upset settled expec-
tations concerning voting procedures. These are areas in which
the invocation of the fair play principle is not foreclosed by prece-
dent. On the contrary, these are areas in which the judiciary has
struggled with articulating a coherent theory of adjudication, at-
tempting to use equal protection as a basis for jurisdiction, but
372 Theoretically, the Supreme Court could distinguish the enrolled-bill rule as it ap-
plies to acts of Congress from an equivalent doctrine that would preclude federal court
review of a state legislature's internal procedures. Field, in other words, could remain good
law purely on separation-of-powers grounds, while leaving open the possibility of federal
court review of state legislative procedures under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But while that distinction is theoretically available, it too would require over-
ruling long-standing precedent, as shortly after Field itself the Supreme Court refused to
examine the alleged deficiency of a state legislature's procedures if the state's own judiciary
would not do so. See Wilkes County v Coler, 180 US 506, 524 (1901) (holding that federal
courts should "follow the rulings of the highest court of a State on the question whether a
particular enactment found in the printed statutes had been passed in such a manner as
to become, under its constitution, a law of the State").
373 Invocation of due process, moreover, is potentially constrained by the textual ne-
cessity that the government must be depriving a voter of some sort of "liberty" or "prop-
erty" interest in order to violate due process. "Liberty" or "property" can be interpreted
capaciously for the purposes of enforcing the norm of fair play. As early as 1900, in Taylor
v Beckham, 178 US 548 (1900), Justice Harlan was prepared to rule that voters have a
liberty interest in protecting the counting of their ballots from partisan ballot-box stuffing.
See id at 592-93 (Harlan dissenting). Voters similarly have a liberty interest in protecting
their right to vote from the drawing of legislative districts based on partisan distortions.
But it remains important to note that the interpretation of due process cannot be entirely
untethered from the protection of the liberty or property interests of individual voters.
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failing to spell out a satisfactory understanding of how equal pro-
tection applies. In these contexts at least, even if not in all conceiv-
able contexts, the judiciary should embrace a fair play principle
rooted in due process as the basis for condemning constitutionally
inappropriate partisanship.
CONCLUSION
America and the Supreme Court face a stark choice. It cer-
tainly is possible to construe the Constitution, as Justice Scalia
did in his Vieth plurality, to provide no constraint against exces-
sive partisanship. This reading of the Constitution would pre-
sume that it never outgrew the mistaken premise of its Framers
that the separation of powers would suffice to prevent factions
from coalescing into permanent two-party competition. On this
reading, given this foundational mistake, the only way for the
Constitution to redress the problem of excessive partisanship is
through a constitutional amendment.
This "failed premise" understanding of the Constitution, how-
ever, is not the only available one. On the contrary, as this Article
has shown, the circumstances surrounding the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment reveal that this especially important
amendment-the one responsible for reconstructing the Republic
on a foundation of equality and fundamental rights-owes its
existence to a congressional recognition that partisan overreach-
ing would destroy the Republic. Once this history is properly un-
derstood, it becomes possible to interpret the Amendment's Due
Process Clause, and the idea of fair play that due process gener-
ally entails, as specifically encompassing a constraint against
forms of partisan overreaching that would endanger democracy.
Which of these two interpretative options is the better choice?
If one is a narrow "conventionalist,"374 because one cannot con-
ceive that faithful interpretation of a written text can generate
new meaning based on a better understanding of the text's his-
torical circumstances and its ongoing role in a nation's political
development, then one inevitably is confined to the "failed prem-
ise" understanding of the Constitution. But if one is open to the
possibility of a more organic form of constitutional interpreta-
tion-one that recognizes that the Constitution, while a written
text, plays a uniquely empowering role in the life of the nation
(being the document that both created the polity and continuously
374 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 94-95 (cited in note 18).
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sustains it)375-then it becomes easy to embrace the reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rooted in its own special history, that
understands its Due Process Clause as embodying a constraint
against partisan overreaching destructive of democracy.
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as entailing this fair play constraint against excessive par-
tisanship would provide a way out of the morass of attempting to
derive an antipartisanship principle from equal protection. Parti-
san avarice is, regrettably, compatible with one person, one vote.
But partisan avarice is not compatible with fair play. Thus, reli-
ance on the fair play norm embedded in due process can redress
directly the excessive partisanship that equal protection strug-
gles to regulate.
Interpreting due process in this way provides an antidote to
egregious partisan gerrymandering, which has previously proven
elusive using only an equal protection approach. This interpreta-
tion of due process also provides a straightforward constitutional
condemnation of state laws that remove previously available vot-
ing opportunities, like early voting, without nonpartisan justifi-
cation-another issue that equal protection has struggled to han-
dle. Thus, the interpretative choice that America and the
Supreme Court face should yield a straightforward resolution. In-
terpreting due process to condemn partisan overreaching is a con-
struction of the Constitution that accords with the best under-
standing of its history and its role in safeguarding the democracy
that it both established and perpetuates.
375 See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 277-319 (Belknap 2011).
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